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1 Introduction 
“[T]he main inducement for the development of innovation studies, particularly in 
Europe, appears to have been the recognition of its wider social and economic impact 
and the perceived need for increased knowledge about what role policy may play.”1 
This is exactly the focus of this work. On the one hand, we will concentrate on the 
wider social and economic impact of innovation and will consider the implications on 
the dynamics of a society. On the other hand, we aim at finding hints on a proper role 
and strategy for the public sector and its policies to successfully support a prosperous 
development of its society, specifically with respect to social insurance. 
We cannot simply derive a justification for governmental action from the fact that 
markets are imperfect.
2
 This may be true and reasonable in the neoclassical school, but 
in evolutionary economics the most important factor of an economy is its ability to 
positively shape the future. In that sense, a market imperfection is very different from 
a situation of market failure. 
In cases where market failure is the cause for a loss of wealth, governmental action is 
beneficial by limiting the negative consequences. On the other hand, if we speak of 
market imperfections, which could for example result from the situation which we will 
present below, the government does not necessarily have to take action. For, in most 
cases, governmental action is not as perfect and impartial as it is supposed to be and it 
is not always foreseeable which consequences the public action will have in other 
fields. An example for a market imperfection can be an innovation in a sector where 
the diversity of similar products offered is very high or where we find a high speed of 
innovation. Customers may not be willing to pay the due cost of information to find 
the product best suited to them and might therefore not adopt innovations that would - 
from the point of view of an unrelated observer - be beneficial to them. Those cases 
cannot be qualified as market failure, but are rather market imperfections because the 
market could provide the wealth maximizing option. 
The reason why governmental action is relevant and important lies in the social 
justification. There are emergent phenomena in a society that will lead to a distribution 
of wealth and happiness that may disadvantage those who are less apt at realizing their 
potential. As an exemplary case, we can think of the combination of aging and 
poverty. In regions where a substantial amount of the elder population is facing the 
                                                 
1
 [FaVe09], p. 229 
2
 cf. [Wegn09] 
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risk of poverty, many services designed for senior citizens may not be realistically 
available. Health care services and medical support appliances are often very costly. 
Not every person has had the opportunity to save enough money during their active 
life to provide for those risks at a later stage in life or some people may have chosen 
not to save enough money. In both cases, the society is in a difficult situation. Helping 
those people may be very costly and not helping them is not acceptable from a moral 
point of view.  
Private insurance companies could be set up to cover those risks. Especially health 
insurance is in many countries provided by private companies. This can be organized 
in a very efficient way. Nevertheless, there is still an advantage related to public 
intervention. For example, help for senior citizens in need could be achieved by 
establishing a public transport system that explicitly takes into account the needs and 
specialties of the elder. This includes busses with curb-level access, traffic light 
intervals adjusted to slower pedestrians or even the installation of important public 
services in spatial proximity to the people who need the particular service. 
Those measures are certainly designed to be implemented on a medium- to long-term 
scale. Besides, they are realistically only achievable by a public organization since 
they involve decisions that influence the society as a whole and since many such 
projects involve very large amounts of money to be invested. A third reason is that 
private insurance companies mostly care about the insured risk and would therefore 
only support measures reducing this risk. A public body, however, aims at optimizing 
the happiness of the people and their welfare. By consequence, its scope and portfolio 
of adequate measures is unequally larger and can be better targeted at the needs of the 
particular focus group, e.g. senior citizens. 
In that sense, the social insurance is a direct support for social peace and can assist the 
individual in a very efficient way on his pursuit of happiness. No private system could 
offer a comparably comprehensive approach due to the limited target group of only 
those insured, the limited financial possibilities only provided by the members and the 
limited regulatory and practical possibilities. A private company can achieve the same 
result as a public system almost exclusively with respect to spending and distributing 
money, but it has to fall short against the societal counterpart in all other domains 
where money may not be the only component to a successful and efficient provision of 
services designed at helping people in need. 
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From this discussion, we can easily derive the justification for a system of social 
insurance. Since not everybody will be struck by fate in the same way and some will 
experience better luck than others, we could argue that social insurance should be 
instituted following the mandate of justice and fairness, as well as social peace.  
Nevertheless, these are rather political arguments and it is interesting for an economist 
to approach this question with a different mindset. This study will try to gain insight 
on the economic effects of such a social insurance offering when looking explicitly at 
the future orientation of an economy. This means that we will explore the effect which 
the integration of the public sector has on the innovativeness of the members in the 
society. We will establish an agent-based model based on the Comprehensive Neo-
Schumpeterian Economics-approach. This model will be used to analyze the impact of 
social insurance in order to answer the research question, if social insurance can spur 
innovation in a society.  
Our work is structured as follows: in chapter 2, we will focus on innovation and 
discuss why it plays such a central role in today‟s economic discussion. Chapter 3 is 
devoted to the Comprehensive Neo-Schumpeterian Economics-approach and explains 
its theoretical concept as well as the qualities which make this the best suited 
framework for the ensuing discussion. The subsequent chapter 4 deals with the 
question how innovation can be spurred and which measures can be used to actually 
increase innovativeness in the society. It also looks at the specificities of the most 
relevant actors in the process of generating novelty. Chapter 5 will focus on the other 
side of our research question and deals with social insurance by introducing the 
concept and discussing the important aspects. Furthermore, we will present other 
studies which have dealt with comparable issues. Their results will later be compared 
to the outcome of the simulation. In chapter 6, we concentrate on agent-based 
modeling and explain and discuss this form of reasoning as well as its use in 
economics. It will serve as a theoretical prelude for chapter 7, which is devoted to the 
description of the model. In agent-based modeling, it is important to make sure that the 
model is thoroughly explained so that all assumptions, hypotheses and integrated 
influences are visible. This will allow us to interpret the results in chapter 8 where we 
find that social insurance seems to be able to foster innovativeness and generate a 
positive effect on the mean income in a society. Chapter 9 will conclude. 
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2 Innovation 
 
2.1 Definition of Innovation 
It is crucial to first define the key terms used in this paper before starting to discuss 
their influences. When trying to pin down the term “innovation” we find mainly two 
slightly different approaches. The first is somewhat broader and can be illustrated by 
the following quote: “Innovations result in qualitatively new products or methods, 
which are considerably – however this could be defined – different to the original 
state.” 3 This definition stems from the practical view of the business world and takes 
into account what counts for managers. Nevertheless, it leaves out an important 
distinction and therefore, this paper will deal with the term “innovation” following the 
second definition, which states that there is a difference between invention and 
innovation: “Invention is the first occurrence of an idea for a new product or process, 
while innovation is the first attempt to carry it out into practice.” 4 So, the intention to 
use it commercially is a crucial fact that turns an invention into an innovation. The 
differentiation between the two ideas can sometimes be hard or impossible, but there 
are many cases in which the inventor is not using his invention commercially and thus 
he cannot be described as an innovator. 
One of the most famous cases in this context is the invention of the Apple-PC. Steve 
Wozniak developed in 1975 both the Apple I and the Apple II which can be 
considered as the first personal computers of the world. It was then Steve Jobs, who is 
still CEO of Apple Inc. today, and the investor Mike Markkula who commercialized 
these inventions, while Wozniak only became a simple developer at Apple‟s.5 
This example can also illustrate, that there are different prerequisites for an invention 
and for an innovation. In order to come up with an invention, people need a certain 
amount of creativity or a willingness to explore new paths and in most cases some 
specific technical knowhow. For an innovation, on the other hand, it is important to 
have a thorough knowledge concerning the integration of an invention into the 
production or the production process as well as its commercialization and diffusion. 
Steve Wozniak definitely had the technical knowhow and the creativity to build a PC, 
but he lacked the capabilities to market it successfully. Thus, the innovation was made 
by Apple. 
                                                 
3
 cf. [Pösc00] 
4
 cf. e.g. [Fage05], p. 4 
5
 cf. [VPet06] 
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A precursor in the economics of innovation was Joseph Alois Schumpeter. His 
scientific approach was based on the assumption, that economic growth can only be 
generated by new combinations.
6
 Those can be accomplished in five different ways: 
i)  introducing a new product, which also includes the improvement of an existing 
good; 
ii)  introducing a new production technique; 
iii) entering a new market; 
iv) finding a new source of resources or preliminary products; 
v) implementing a new form of organization. 
For Schumpeter, it is not important if those techniques, markets, sources of resources 
or preliminary products or forms of organization have existed before. What matters is 
that they have never been used in this industry or this context. 
Others prefer a stricter and narrower definition. For example, the OECD states in its 
Oslo Manual that in order to speak of an innovation there needs to be commercialized 
technical novelty in terms of products or the production process. Basically, this 
definition is limited to the forms i) and ii) of Schumpeter‟s list.7 
This paper will refer to all five of Schumpeter‟s forms, since the decisive point is to 
make sure that there is a dynamic force in the market and the society. As long as there 
is novelty in one of those fields and this novelty is used commercially, then we will 
consider it an innovation. 
Besides, we find the distinction between radical and marginal innovation.
8
 Radical 
innovation, on the one hand, is the consequence of a technological revolution, 
marginal innovation, on the other, stems from a process of incremental improvement. 
While it is true, that the radical form has a much better visibility in the public, it is 
important not to underestimate the marginal innovations. In many cases, marginal 
innovation is needed to adapt a good or service to adequately serving its purpose or to 
increase the utility for the consumers. As an example, one can think of the first cars (a 
radical innovation). Those first ones were hardly faster than horse carriages and both 
difficult to navigate as well as hardly reliable, especially on longer journeys. Thanks to 
incremental innovations, those first cars turned into the highly complex machines, 
which grant our societies an important part of our mobility. This is a common process 
                                                 
6
 cf. [Schu34a], S. 188 
7
 cf. [OECD01] 
8
 cf. [Fage05] 
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in almost every industry: marginal innovations improve a radical innovation and 
increase the value and utility for the consumers. 
2.2 Why innovate? 
The Canadian Dairy Commission quotes a study of 800 Canadian companies in the 
food processing and manufacturing industries, which showed that 64% of the firms 
that had introduced product innovations achieved higher margins on the new products 
in comparison with their regular product lines.
9
 This data would likely be sufficient to 
convince a great deal of people of the importance of innovation. Nevertheless, it falls 
short of some points. 
An innovative entrepreneur does not only face many valuable opportunities, but also 
some considerable risks. Trying to innovate is expensive and there is no guaranteed 
return. Is it worth innovating, if my older products will lose part of their market share? 
How much will I have to invest, until the innovation will be ready to be sold on the 
market? How can the risk of a failing innovation be measured and how high are the 
sunk costs of an unsuccessful innovative endeavor? All those concerns are valid 
remarks which make it important to answer one combining question: why should an 
entrepreneur try to innovate? 
The main criterion for a manager to be willing to be innovative is that the innovation 
will lead to higher benefits compared to the status quo or the predicted developments 
of the industry when keeping the current strategy. This could, for example, be the 
result of an increase in the sales of the product provided that the margin on the product 
does not diminish. 
The increase in sales and thus in profits can result from a change in the consumer‟s 
behavior influenced by an innovation. The utility of such an innovation can also stem 
from a decrease of production cost. You can also think of avoiding a predicted 
decrease in profits by introducing a new product or strategy. This chapter will treat all 
those cases and tries to find answers to the question why it is reasonable for an 
entrepreneur to innovate. 
Some sources quote the need to innovate fairly drastically by stating: “But not to 
innovate leads to an even stronger and particularly fatal danger. It‟s choosing one‟s 
own decay.”10 This statement shifts the focus completely since the risk of an 
innovation loses importance. The choice that is left for an entrepreneur is sure failure 
                                                 
9
 cf. [CDC05] 
10
 [CECII02]: “Mais ne pas innover conduit à un péril encore plus grave et particulièrement fatal. C‟est 
se condamner à terme” 
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or having the chance to survive and even grow thanks to innovation. If you know that 
your competitors will take over your market share – even though this may happen 
slowly – then not innovating will definitely be your ruin in the long run. This is, of 
course, not true in all sectors or industries, but every manager has to understand that 
choosing to remain on old paths increases the chance for the competitors to get ahead. 
So, securing the market position and competitiveness is a first incentive to innovate. 
Only focusing on the fear of losing market share, though, will not entirely grasp the 
problem. Innovation can also serve the purpose to broaden one‟s own position in the 
market, strengthen its environment and increase own profits. In that case, the 
innovation has to provide the entrepreneur with a comparative advantage. This can 
mainly be achieved by one of four strategies: (1) a better performance, (2) lower costs, 
(3) a clear differentiation in the own product line compared to the competitors or (4) a 
better focus on customer needs and other demands like governmental regulations. 
The first argument, a better performance, follows the thought that this will increase the 
value for the customers. It fits into category i) and iii) of Schumpeter‟s list. For each 
product, there are potential customers who decide not to buy a product. Some of them, 
may have been tempted or almost indifferent, but finally chose not to consume or buy 
it. Those customers can be attracted by an improved performance, since there are now 
even more arguments for purchasing this particular good or service. Besides, this 
strategy of improving your goods will only rarely lead to major losses of existing 
customers since the increase in sales is achieved by an improvement and not a 
repositioning of the product. It is probably even more convincing when thinking about 
this strategy in terms of entering a new market. The old customers will keep buying 
the product as well as at least some of the customers in the new market. This will raise 
sales for the entrepreneur.  
A very vivid example of such a strategy can be found in the market for video games. 
For years, Microsoft, Sony and Nintendo have been struggling for the predominance in 
this sector. The smallest of the three, Nintendo, has introduced a new concept in the 
video game experience for players and tried to regain customers through this shift into 
a new market: “In order for the video industry to continue growing, it has to win back 
those who oppose games and conquer the entirely absent groups of women and senior 
citizens. In order to reach this goal, – above all – game consoles have to be easy to 
Individual Risk and Innovative Behavior - Innovation 
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handle and offer new gaming possibilities.” 11 The innovation is thus used to reactivate 
former customers, win new ones and tie existing ones to their own product line. The 
success of this endeavor didn‟t take long to show: the Nintendo Wii won the 2007 
Customer‟s Choice Award by the review publisher Reevoo12. 
The second strategy we had been talking about was to reduce costs, which means that 
a company focuses on innovations coming from the points ii), iv) and v) of 
Schumpeter‟s list. An innovation in the field ii) refers to those cases, where a new 
production technique is used, which makes it possible to produce the good or the 
service at lower costs than before. The textbook example of such an innovation is the 
introduction of the conveyor belt and the assembly line by Henry Ford which helped 
increase efficiency in car manufacturing. This optimization of the production process 
gave the Ford Motor Company the ability to produce considerably more cars in the 
same time and at lower cost per car than their competitors and gave them a clear cost 
advantage.
13
 The next point, iv), deals with new sources of resources or of preliminary 
products, where a company can be innovative by finding new ways of getting the 
inputs they need in the production process. A German entrepreneur has, for example, 
come up with the idea to stop mining gravel from gravel pits, but to lift it from the 
ground of the ocean. This enables him to avoid the rising prices due to the growing 
scarcity of gravel on land and helps him secure his market position in the long term.
14
 
The third point is a cost reduction in the way the company is organized. For example, 
for some companies a change in the legal form or a move of their headquarters into a 
different country can lead to a lower tax burden or improved conditions for loans.
15
 
The third strategy, to win a competitive advantage by differentiating the product or 
service, applies to the category iii) of the list. In this case, it‟s not necessarily the 
novelty of the product, but more importantly its distinction from other offers on the 
market, that make it successful. If an entrepreneur feels that a certain part of the 
market is not targeted by the existing products and services, he may see an opportunity 
in tailoring his offer specifically to this segment. This change in his product line does 
not necessarily have to be a change in the product, but could just be a new image of 
the brand or a new channel of distribution. Airlines for example offer a fairly 
                                                 
11
 [Köll06]: „Damit die Videoindustrie weiter wachsen kann, muss sie die Spieleverweigerer 
zurückgewinnen und die gänzlich abstinenten Frauen und älteren Semester erobern. Dafür müssen die 
Konsolen vor allem einfach zu bedienen sein und neue Spielmöglichkeiten bieten.“ 
12
 [Wood08] 
13
 [PrVo07] 
14
 [ZDF07] 
15
 [Goahead10] 
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homogenous service, which is the transportation from point A to point B. Still, some 
companies focused on trying to add to this service many accessories like free food and 
beverages during the flight. This opened the doors for other companies to tailor their 
service of transportation to those people who cared more about the price than the 
additional services offered on other airlines. The innovation in the differentiation and 
the entering into this new market segment – customers who only want the flight but 
are not keen on paying extra for food and drinks on board or large leg room – made it 
possible for those no-frills airlines to get a hold in the market of aviation.
16
 
The fourth option, adapting better to customer‟s needs and wants and other rules, can 
basically apply to each of the five points on Schumpeter‟s list. It is crucial for a 
company to make sure the customer understands how the product will serve his needs 
and wants and how it will adjust to his demands. Besides, sometimes a small 
regulatory change for example because of governmental prerequisites can give 
companies a lead in their market. The car manufacturer Peugeot had been using filters 
for particulate matter in its cars when in 2005 the European Union passed a directive 
on the pollution with this particulate matter
17
. Thanks to the new directive and the 
customer‟s shift in perception, the French company could market their cars differently 
and had a considerable competitive advantage over its competitors. 
Those were some examples, why it is reasonable for a profit-maximizing manager to 
be innovative. By applying one of the mentioned strategies, he can improve his 
company‟s position in the market and increase its profits. Only innovation offers the 
possibility to enter new markets. Other strategies can only bring shifts in the structure 
in the existing ones. 
Apart from the pure profit maximizing strategies, other factors can also lead 
entrepreneurs to attempt to be innovative. Fame and social recognition can also 
explain the motivation to take such risks. In this respect, the personality of the 
entrepreneur is crucial since it is his devotion that will make him pursue his goals. He 
has to keep working on his inventions and innovations even when projects seem to be 
difficult. At times when there may be no or little motivation from his environment, he 
will have to assure that intrinsic motivation is maintained until the innovation will be 
introduced into a market. In some cases, it seems that those non-monetary motivations 
gain importance in the sector of innovation. Movements like the open-source software 
industry or open-innovation approaches of companies have shown that projects where 
                                                 
16
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inventors and innovators actually finalize their inventions to establish innovations can 
be successful and lasting without monetary recompense for the creators.  
We also have to ask from an economic point of view if and why innovation is 
important for an economy and its members. So while we have shown the interest for 
the individual entrepreneur to venture an innovation, we can ask why a public body or 
the so-called “social planner” would have an interest in creating an innovation 
welcoming environment. 
The main objective of most economic models is to explain and predict the allocation 
of limited resources amongst individual actors.
18
 Out of the great number of different 
approaches and models, the neoclassic and the neo-Keynesian are the most popular. A 
third theoretical school, evolutionary economics, however, is catching up in popularity 
amongst researchers. It has been established well into the 19
th
 century and has grown 
ever since with famous economists contributing to the growing theory. “The heterodox 
orientation of this economic current shows in representatives such as Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen, Friedrich August von Hayek, Thorstein Veblen and, last but not 
least, Joseph A. Schumpeter, all of them being substantial precursors to this school of 
thought.”19 A combining critique of those economists concerning the neo-classic 
theory lies in the assumption of homogeneity of the economic agents. We will further 
elaborate on this critique in section 6.1.3.4 when we justify our choice of agent-based 
modeling as the methodology used in this paper. In this context, Joseph Alois 
Schumpeter uses innovation as the crucial parameter for economic development. 
Schumpeter reasons that describing an economic system by its tendency towards 
equilibrium is not satisfactory.
20
 Neoclassic and neo-Keynesian theories can explain 
how prices and quantities are set on a market and can model the process of adapting to 
a given set of data. They can also map situations in which there exists more than one 
equilibrium because a change in the data can lead to different equilibriums and 
therefore different situations. Schumpeter lists explicitly changes in “non-social data 
(natural conditions) or in non-economic social data (here belong the effects of war, 
changes in commercial, social, or economic policy) or in consumer‟s tastes”21 as 
examples for which those two theories can find adequate answers. 
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 see for example [HaKC02] 
19
 [HaWa09], p. 10 
20
 the following argumentation is based on [Schu34a], pp. 184 
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 [Schu34a], p. 185 
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He starts his critique at the point where economic life in itself is changing. Static 
analysis may be able to deal in some ways with continuous change such as for 
example, the evolution from a small retailer to a large chain of supermarkets. When it 
comes to discontinuous change, though, they fail because they can neither explain the 
emergence of such “productive revolutions”22 nor the phenomena linked to them or 
their effects on the way of living in a society. Schumpeter mentions as an example the 
construction of a railroad, which can fundamentally change the way of doing business 
and have a considerable impact on the people‟s everyday lives. Economic 
development is change, which is produced endogenously – so from within the system 
– and not caused by exterior influences. Therefore, the mere growth of an economy 
can not necessarily be described as economic development, since it might only stem 
from a change in the environmental variables (for example, the growth in the 
population). 
Axiomatically, economic theory often argues that it depends on the producers to create 
economic development. This is in conflict with the theory of product or life cycles, 
where the needs and wants of consumers play an important role. Schumpeter 
advocates a different mindset and follows that “[d]evelopment in our sense is then 
defined by the carrying out of new combinations.”23 Nowadays, this relation is closely 
linked to his name: “Generally, one may say that novelty, i.e. innovation, is the core 
principle underlying the Neo-Schumpeterian approach.”24 
A second important aspect in Schumpeter‟s theory is linked to uncertainty, which is 
inseparably linked to the discontinuous process of developing innovations. It is the 
ignorance about when innovations will come up and what effects they will have. There 
is a considerable difference between the concept of risk and uncertainty. Risk in this 
context is defined as the chance that a certain event may or may not occur and that its 
probability can be estimated.  
Uncertainty, on the other hand, is an aspect that is different to risk in its most 
important characteristic. We speak of “true uncertainty”25 when the probability of 
certain events cannot be estimated with any heuristic or when we cannot even predict 
what consequences an event will have. In that sense, innovations are always linked to 
uncertainty since they are something new. The new aspect in the product or service is 
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 [Schu34a], p. 185 
23
 [Schu34a], p. 188 
24
 [HaPy06], p. 5 
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responsible that – even if we knew every other single coordinate in the system – we 
could not be certain about the implications of the introduction of the novelty.
26
 “For 
when it comes to the unknown novelty, the danger of the emergence of uncontrollable 
situations can never be completely ruled out.”27 Consequently, using an approach 
dealing with expected values and outcome matrices will not help an innovative 
entrepreneur in his decision about the implementation of the innovation and 
accordingly, a social planner who tries to support innovation in order to maintain or 
improve the standard of living should also think about how people can best cope with 
this uncertainty. 
The next chapter will use the Comprehensive Neo-Schumpeterian Economics (CNSE) 
approach to try to explain where innovation comes from. 
  
                                                 
26
 cf. [GrPH01], pp. 8 
27
 [Witt87], p. 162: “Denn für das unbekannte Neue läßt sich die Gefahr, daß unkontrollierbare 
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3 Innovation and the CNSE-Approach 
This chapter will deal with the question how innovation can be measured and will link 
the results to the CNSE approach, which is suited to analyze the innovative activity in 
a region and will serve as a basis for the following discussions. 
The CNSE-approach which we will present in the second part of this chapter is rooted 
within the school of evolutionary economics which we have introduced above. 
Similarly, we will place our model in an evolutionary economics context. This binds 
us to respect three fundamental criteria which distinguish evolutionary theories from 
other economic approaches.
28
 
An evolutionary theory has to be dynamic and focus on a development in time. This 
implies that we should not limit ourselves to static situations and try to improve or 
optimize those, but that it is important to find theories which can deal with change and 
evolution which is inherent in each system. Even though adding development and time 
into models makes those more complex and might even create further difficulties, 
ignoring the influence of change over time may lead to fundamentally wrong 
implications. Therefore, economic models in an evolutionary perspective have to be 
dynamic. 
Additionally, an evolutionary concept has to follow a historic time approach which is 
irrevocable. This means that if the system could ever face the same decision matrix 
again, it does not have to follow the same development path. Even though there are 
proverbs in many languages stating that “history repeats itself”29, we cannot consider 
that a situation will always lead to the same end, because this would not only imply 
that we can reproduce the exact same situation – which may be possible though 
extremely unlikely – but it would also necessitate a world without memory meaning 
that there are no experiences which can lead to a different decision behavior of the 
involved actors. Yet, every human being has a certain history of events which will 
influence his behavior and where it is impossible to entirely ignore it in any decision 
process. “History is important, partly because every complex organism, every human 
being and every society carries the baggage of its past.”30 This leads to a situation 
where every decision – as similar as it may seem – is unique in its historic context and 
each theory will have to respect the impossibility of creating general theories which 
                                                 
28
 This presentation of characteristics is based on the explanations in [Witt87], pp. 9f 
29
 An easy search through Google for “History repeats itself” and its French and German counterparts 
“l‟histoire se répète” and “Geschichte wiederholt sich” leads to more than 5 million pages (search 
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will hold universally. “Those changes can neither form a circular flow, which could 
always repeat, nor can they be considered to be pendulum movements around a 
center.”31 
Furthermore, the third criterion which is necessary before we can speak of an 
evolutionary theory is that the subject of research is innovation and the impact of 
novelty on systems and entities. The critical part in this point is that “the generation of 
new situations and possibilities are explained endogenously.”32 Non-evolutionary 
theories can very well include change and novelty, but they treat it as an exogenous 
shock to the system and subsequently explain the reactions and adaption processes 
within the system. In order to qualify as an evolutionary theory, the generation of 
novelty and the introduction of new combinations have to be interior to the model and 
part of the explanatory power of the theory. 
Considering those three aspects, we will develop an agent-based model which is 
supposed to shed light on the correlation between the welfare state and its social 
insurance promise, and the innovative behavior of its citizens. The model is dynamic 
since it simulates a certain period of time, it is irreversible and situated in historic time 
since each run will generate different „histories‟ which the agents will use as decision 
bases for their behavior and it focuses on the generation of novelty and innovation in a 
society comparing the different concepts of social insurance and their effects on the 
innovativeness of the people in the economy. Therefore, we will use evolutionary 
economics approaches in the setup and interpretation of the model. 
3.1 Measuring innovation 
Before trying to figure out how innovations are created and how the model should be 
designed, we first have to find a way to measure innovations. Some economists even 
feel it could be worth dedicating their whole career to this goal: “The dream of getting 
hold of an output indicator of inventive activity is one of the strong motivating forces 
for economic research in this area.”33 A first approach could lie in the assumption that 
an entrepreneur who wants to commercialize an invention will try to protect it. So the 
number of patents could be a measure for innovation. 
Two arguments are in favor of this idea: (1) patent protection is not for free and can be 
linked to high costs. Therefore, the expected profit from the patent has to be at least as 
high as its costs. The consideration of those factors can serve as a first filter to identify 
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real innovations. Besides, (2) there is a selection within the patent offices. Not every 
patent application is granted and therefore it is assured, that patents meet certain 
standards.
34
  
Nevertheless, patent protection as a measurement for innovation has several 
shortcomings. One of them is that many innovations will never be patented.
35
 The 
ongoing discussion on the patentability of computer software and the new trend in this 
sector, where many programmers and companies offer their software for free as so 
called open-source software, are linked to this issue. Patents are therefore not in all 
sectors a valid proxy for innovations. A second shortcoming refers to the varying 
relevance of innovations and their different impacts on economic development. Some 
patents may protect an invention that fundamentally influences its market and another 
one might merely serve as protection for a different product from the same inventor. In 
comparison, patents can serve as a blur estimator for innovation if one bears in mind 
the difficulties inherent in this approach. 
A different approach
36
 focuses on the legal disputes and litigations concerning patent 
issues. The idea behind it is that a company will only go to court for patent 
infringement if the value of the claim is sufficiently high. This measure could 
therefore help distinguish valuable from not so valuable patents. 
Other methods trying to measure the innovative activity of a society focus on the 
success of an innovation. This may be legitimate in sectors, which are highly 
innovative and where lots of innovations appear. Nevertheless, this approach does not 
only share the disadvantages of a very indirect measurement and a vague cause-effect-
linkage, but it also might fight the wrong battle, since “[i]nnovation is not always 
measured by success. (...) Learning from failure can be a big part of innovation.”37 The 
discussion on the correct ways of measuring innovation is still not settled. In 2006, the 
government of the US has established a new commission that is charged to work 
exactly on that question.
38
 
In this paper, we will consider each novelty, which is successfully introduced into a 
market, an innovation. As shown above, this is empirically hard or even impossible to 
measure, but for the theoretical analysis, this definition is sufficiently accurate. 
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3.2 The CNSE approach 
The Comprehensive Neo-Schumpeterian Economics (CNSE)-approach
39
 has been 
developed in the Neo-Schumpeterian spirit as described above and tries to enlarge this 
concept. Its starting argument is that technological innovations may be a major source 
of economic development, but they are not the only one and they need a fitting 
environment. Therefore, the influences and interactions with the financial and the 
public sector have to be taken into account as well. 
“In order to understand the crucial co-evolutionary relationship, one must explore the 
bracket accompanying all three pillars, namely their orientation towards the future 
which introduces uncertainty into the analysis. The fundamental importance of true 
uncertainty (cf. Knight 1921) has to be seen as a characteristic concerning the single 
pillars as well as a phenomenon shaping the relationships between the three pillars 
causing a high degree of complexity.”40 
 
  
Figure 3-1: The three pillar model in the CNSE
41
 
For an integral analysis of economic development the co-evolutionary interrelations 
between the three sectors have to be included, since they can be complementary or 
rivaling and therefore either spur or hinder economic growth. In either case, the 
influence of those interdependencies on the system will be non-deterministic, which 
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means that uncertainty will increase. The system‟s development will consequently be 
shaped by the interaction of the different functions and mechanisms of the three 
pillars. The following paragraphs will present these pillars in detail. 
3.2.1 Industry sector 
Unlike the neoclassic or neo-Keynesian theories, the Neo-Schumpeterian approach 
separates the industrial sector in three levels: micro, macro and meso. It follows that 
“entrepreneurs carry out innovations (the micro level), that swarms of followers 
imitate them (meso) and that, as a consequence, „creative destruction‟ leads to 
economic development „from within‟ (macro)”42. 
The micro-level is where all actors are individually active and behave on a certain set 
of rules. It is the most elementary level and the single elements of a system are treated 
and analyzed on an individual basis. The meso-level allows for an analysis of 
structures and smaller organizations which result from the interaction of some 
individual agents who share certain characteristics, while the macro-level offers a 
perspective of the whole system. As an example, we could think of all the companies 
as the micro-level. They can be combined to industries on the meso-level and then the 
macro-level would look at the whole system of all companies. 
In all those models, there are many different dynamics such as catch-up-processes or 
sudden, discontinuous changes which result from developments in the sectors or in the 
institutional conditions of the markets. Those changes may have implications for the 
competitiveness of nations or regions (the macro-level) as well as for companies and 
their environment (the micro-level). The consequence of those qualitative changes is 
that the price will not be the only criterion on which competition plays, but that 
innovation and responding to change plays a crucial role. This leads to the fact, that 
“[i]n knowledge-intensive industries, we often observe the coexistence of small 
entrepreneurial firms, shaping technological development and contributing strongly to 
technological progress, and large established companies carrying on their business in 
routinised ways”43. 
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3.2.2 Finance sector 
For Schumpeter, the creative entrepreneur was the most important actor for economic 
development, but the banker followed right afterwards. According to him, the two 
need each other in order to work efficiently: the entrepreneur offers investment 
opportunities for the banker and the banker provides the entrepreneur with the capital 
he may need.  
Today, the financial sector is much broader than only banking, since it also includes 
stock markets, private equity companies as well as venture capital provider. All the 
actors in this sector face the same two exogenous constraints: the uncertainty, if 
innovations will be developed and will prevail, and the time-frame of an innovation. 
Knowledge creation and innovation are developments which cannot be planned and 
which need time. This fact underlines the future-oriented design of the Neo-
Schumpeterian approach. Furthermore, it leads to two opposing behavioral patterns: 
on the one hand, an investor will try to limit the time horizon of his investment as 
much as possible in order to minimize uncertainty and to be able to react faster to new 
developments. On the other, this short-term approach increases the risk of barking up 
the wrong tree and can lead to dangerous bubbles in certain markets.  
Those bubbles underline furthermore the role of the banker in a Schumpeterian 
system: for central banks in the CNSE, it is crucial to watch both the price level 
stability and the pace of the market. In order to have the right balance for the market, 
they have to find the optimal configuration between two directions: the first one is to 
limit money supply in order to manage inflation and the second one – quite opposite – 
is a sufficient money supply that fosters innovation and the Neo-Schumpeterian 
dynamics. Schumpeter argues that the regular flow of money is bound in the 
production process that is already in place. In order to receive the financing to develop 
and implement an innovation, the innovator needs money that is currently not used.
44
 
Here, the role of the banker is crucial in allocating those funds to the most promising 
entrepreneurs.  
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3.2.3 Public sector 
True uncertainty in the Neo-Schumpeterian model makes a governmental agent 
necessary. Following each innovation there will be – as already expressed in the term 
“creative destruction”45 – winners and losers. Since no individual knows ex ante if he 
will be a winner or a loser, it can be beneficial for him to agree to a social contract.
46
 
Depending on their risk behavior, a group of individuals could set up a social contract 
which can minimize uncertainty. In this contract, every individual agrees that if he will 
be a winner, he will help the losers. Ex post, every individual will have an outcome 
that will allow him to live decently even if he was not a winner. This idea of a 
willingness to accept a contract that might prove to have been too cautious is 
commonly described as humans acting under the veil of ignorance, since uncertainty 
makes it impossible to estimate the risk an individual is facing.  
We will discuss in chapter five, why a government is structurally better suited to offer 
such a contract than a privately organized system. For the government, it is important, 
that all the measures taken to establish such a contract have been weighted on how 
they influence the future orientation of the society and its economy. It is obvious that 
the potential for economic development is not supposed to be drastically limited, but 
rather to be promoted. Important fields where governmental action can be beneficial 
are all goods and services with external effects, such as merit goods.
47
 We speak of 
external effects when the consumption of a good or service impacts other people 
without them being involved in the consumption decision. This can be a positive effect 
such as education or environmental protection. The added value that a year of 
schooling gives to an individual may be lower than the benefit better qualified citizens 
bring for the entire society and the extent to which a highly educated citizen can 
contribute to an improved standard of living in a country. The same is true for an 
insurance against poverty in the old age. Here, the dilemma grows out of the high time 
preference of humans. Many will not save a sufficient amount in order to finance their 
retirement. A future-oriented government might choose to implement measures that 
will incite people to prefer future consumption over the present one and thus secure 
their lifestyle at a later point in life.  
This can also be illustrated when looking at unemployment insurance and its external 
effects on the future-orientation of a society. There is evidence, that this form of 
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insurance as well as its dimension influence the match quality of workers compared to 
their jobs and their employers.
48
 The coverage people receive and feel in a situation 
where they lose their job or are unable to work will take the pressure from them to 
accept the first somewhat decent job offer, and will allow them to take the time to 
search for an adequate position. Since people will be more motivated, more creative 
and more productive when working in positions they feel more comfortable in, 
offering unemployment insurance should have an innovation enhancing effect. 
This is true irrespective of disincentives linked to unemployment insurance related to 
the increase in opportunity cost of work which will lead to a reduced supply of work 
from some workers. This negative effect can be due to two reasons: some job 
searchers may not find a job which pays more than the funds they receive from the 
unemployment insurance scheme and others might value the combined utility of 
unemployment compensation and of free time higher than the additional income a job 
would provide them with. In any case, unemployment insurance can offer an 
advantage to the inventiveness and the creativity in a society thanks to its catalyst 
function in the search process for a new job. 
Furthermore, creative destruction leads to a shift in required competencies for 
workers. When moving from the horse carriage to the car, there were many qualified 
coachmen and too little chauffeurs. In a Neo-Schumpeterian context, the government 
has the obligation to take such developments into account when designing a labor 
market policy that deserves to be called future-oriented. A mere focus on full 
employment in potentially obsolete fields of activity is far too short-sighted and will 
destroy the development opportunities of the concerned country in the future. It is 
important that the government acts to reduce the consequences of drawbacks both for 
society and the individual while enabling the system to react fast and successful to 
new opportunities that will arise. “In this way, public dynamics are closely connected 
to Neo-Schumpeterian dynamics, which demand higher qualities of public goods such 
as infrastructure, education, basic research etc. as a condition sine qua non for 
economic development.”49 
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4 How to foster innovation? 
Now that we have established that innovation is necessary to ensure a productive and 
prosperous development of an economy and that it is crucial for every economic actor 
to take into account all three sectors and their interplay, the next question relates then 
to how it is achievable that innovative activity and technological progress can be 
stimulated from a policy perspective.  
This chapter will discuss current approaches that are supposed to serve as a guideline 
for political actors to support innovation in a sustainable way without risking a 
breakdown of the system due to exaggerated dynamics in some sectors. We will 
introduce the Neo-Schumpeterian Corridor as a framework in which we can further 
demonstrate the different roles and fields of action a social planer has to respect. 
Following this discussion, we will look at the personality of the innovator with a 
special focus on his risk aversion, for the risk aversion plays a critical role in the 
decision to realize and implement an innovation and it is therefore in the interest of the 
actor who is trying to stimulate innovation to respect the different interdependencies 
between the individual risk aversion, the innovative activity in an economy and the 
political measures he has at hand. Finally, we will point to important features which a 
Schumpeterian banker needs and which should be respected when designing a policy 
approach aimed at fostering innovation. 
4.1 Current approaches 
In order to stay within the Neo-Schumpeterian framework and especially to follow 
along the CNSE-approach, we will consider first the state of an economy by 
introducing a concept called the Neo-Schumpeterian Corridor. 
4.1.1  The Neo-Schumpeterian Corridor50 
In the past, the different economies in the world have always evolved in waves where 
expansion and boom phases have been followed by times of contraction, recession and 
even depression. Besides, we have seen many bubbles form and eventually burst 
leaving behind surprised economic actors who were unwilling or unable to foresee that 
a dynamic development in a certain sector had left a healthy and sustainable 
development path and had started to grow too fast for other, interrelated sectors to 
keep up with it. The idea of the Neo-Schumpeterian Corridor is based on exactly this 
observation that while an economy which grows too slow cannot be a goal of political 
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intervention, there also exists a development path which goes too fast for the system to 
support. The optimal situation of an economy is when both dynamics – those 
stimulating growth and development and those slowing down the system – jointly 
keep an economy within a certain zone of development found to be sustainable.  
 
Figure 4-1: The Neo-Schumpeterian Corridor
51
 
The goal of a political actor is then to keep the economy within this corridor and to 
secure its staying in that position. That means that he will have to watch for slowing 
tendencies and support new innovative fields, but also that he will have to keep in 
mind that an exaggerated growth might endanger the whole system. This future-
orientation is the most prominent feature of the Neo-Schumpeterian Corridor. A 
system can only pursue a stable growth path for a longer period of time if it stays 
within this corridor.  
Every economy that is growing too little will face difficulties of creating the necessary 
dynamics in order to advance the standard of living. The functional chain evolves 
according to the following logic: due to the low growth, there is no need for 
companies to invest any further than the mere replacement of investments. So, there 
will be a lack of new, especially risk-taking investments, which would be needed to 
reinstall a positive momentum. This is true in many dimensions since the lack of 
investment can be found “with respect to physical, human, intellectual and social 
capital”52. Therefore, all those industries producing investment goods and services will 
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suffer due to a lack of demand. As a consequence, private consumption will decrease 
since households will experience a loss of income or wealth when companies lose 
profits (lower dividends or capital gains distributions) when they will have to reduce 
their workforce (loss of work income), or when they are evaluated at a lower price due 
to deteriorated future growth perspectives (falling stock prices). Even the fear of an 
income reduction in the households can have strong effects on the consumption 
behavior.
53
 At this point, the crisis spreads to the market for consumption goods and 
the economy falls even deeper below the corridor.  
In a society, not only the amount of innovations will decrease but also the support for 
risk-bearing entrepreneurs and as a consequence the standard of living will drop – if 
not on an absolute scale then at least on a relative scale compared to economies which 
have been able to keep a dynamic and growing system. 
On the other hand, if the economy is growing at an accelerated rate, then the 
environment will soon be supportive and spur an even faster process of change within 
the concerned sector. The interrelatedness of the economy, however and the 
interdependence of the different sectors require the fast growing domains to watch out 
for their less dynamic partners. There exists a state where the inert sectors slow down 
the fast growing and innovative fields to a sustainable but dynamic growth path. This 
situation, where the less dynamic sectors serve as a “natural brake for an exuberant 
economic dynamics”54, is from a theoretical point of view the most successful 
situation even though it is not necessarily very stable or frequently found.  
Much more common, however, is the case, where the dynamic sectors expand at an 
insupportably high rate. If the differences between the fast changing fields and the 
more sluggish domains are growing too big, then the tension within the system 
increases ever more. Bottlenecks, capacity shortages or an insufficient speed of 
adaptation in low growth sectors can then endanger the system that it might break and 
fall into pieces due to the excessive pressure and stress the economy is faced with. In 
such a situation, the economy has fallen prey to its own success.
55
 Such a highly 
dangerous development may unfold out of several constellations.  
One possible scenario is that the dynamics within a successful sector speed up 
considerably. Then an increasing number of actors will try to participate in this 
lucrative field and invest their time and money with a fading consideration of the risks 
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involved. This is comparable to a crowd starting to populate a frozen lake. The first 
skaters will access it very cautiously and carefully test if the ice is strong enough to 
hold them. The more people are already on the ice, the less newly arriving skaters will 
doubt the sufficient load bearing strength. Eventually, some people will arrive who are 
absolutely inexperienced with judging if an ice sheet is strong enough and they will 
trust in the fact that they see as many people already on the ice. Even though their first 
steps may still be a little hesitantly, all skaters will grow ever more confident in the 
strength of the ice. If either the load bearing capacity is exceeded or the weather starts 
melting part of the ice, then the ice field will break and experts and beginners alike 
will find themselves in the water. The analogy holds for the unfolding of an economic 
bubble and its bursting.
56
 Whenever clever entrepreneurs find a new field, they will 
carefully assess their risks and opportunities and will be fairly aware of their odds. The 
better an economic sector performs, the more people will see their chances in this 
domain and will risk their own entrepreneurial endeavor. Just as most skaters may 
have left the ice before it breaks and therefore leaving it intact for experts to use and 
enjoy it, it is possible that the market forces work good enough to ensure that the 
system will not overheat. In the case of overheating, however, the ice may break in a 
sense that demand withdraws or investors pull out leaving both the successful 
companies and the imitators in critical distress to recreate their business environment. 
This is comparable to the crash in the dot-com-industries in 2000. The additional 
danger stems from the interaction of the different sectors in economic life. The 
financial investors will push forward an emergent boom in an industry and will be 
ready to sponsor ever more projects. In this situation of greed and over-confidence in 
the system, dangerous bubbles may form that bear destructive power if they burst.
57
 
The other possible and dangerous development of such an overheating of the system is 
based on the interrelatedness of different sectors and the varying speeds of change 
bearable in each of these sectors. Even though a nascent field may be able to support 
high dynamics and an accelerating development process, the connected sectors may be 
overstretched and their failing to keep up with the changing environment will make 
the whole industry tumble. This follows the common example of an athlete who works 
out too hard in the beginning in order to strengthen his muscles, but who does not 
watch at an accompanying training for the adjacent ligaments. In a situation of stress, 
the muscle may be able to withstand the forces, but the ligaments and joints may not 
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be able to support the tension and tear. The consequence may be that the 
corresponding body part will suffer important limitations because of the failing of a 
crucial link.
58
 We can observe such a development in many fast growing domains, for 
example in emerging countries where capacities in many domains of public life have 
to be enlarged while the investment boom neglects crucial but less visible linkages. 
The financial crisis in Asia in the mid-1990s has come about from exactly such a 
phenomenon. While the investors who came mainly from abroad saw great new 
opportunities, the economies in the countries were not yet ready for this enormous 
boom. “As the Asian economies grew, infrastructure bottlenecks became apparent.”59 
In the end, the crisis in the financial markets tore down many aspiring projects and 
crushed dreams of a too rosy future. The economic growth path had not only come to a 
halt, but it was important for society and the economy in those countries to redefine 
their rules of the game in order to avoid a next crisis. Even though the failing has 
eventually only occurred in the financial market, the entire economies had been 
brought close to a breakdown. This overstressing of systems which cannot or not yet 
support high growth dynamics is the second reason why a growth path above the Neo-
Schumpeterian Corridor is not sustainable. 
Often, such a situation of exaggerated speed of change is accompanied by a hype on 
certain, selected industries and the following high dependence on the performance of 
those sectors. Those industries may consequently become of systemic importance and 
a negative development for those sectors may prove to be disastrous for the economy 
and the society. It is of utmost importance for a regulatory body to watch over an 
increased specialization and the resulting dependencies. As we have seen in the recent 
crisis, some companies had to be saved by the government because their systemic 
relevance made the risks following a potential failing of the company unpredictable 
and likely devastating.
60
 
A situation which we might consider to be best apt at securing a positive future 
development turns out to be in itself catastrophic. The Sugarscape model, a landmark 
in agent-based modeling, simulates one case that shows such a development.
61
 In 
general, the individuals have to live on this “sugarscape” – which can be thought of as 
a simulated country or region – where they provide for their needs by harvesting sugar 
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in a landscape. The sugar is the only good they need to survive and the more they have 
the wealthier they are. They behave according to the metabolisms needed and the 
vision they have. The lower the metabolism the less sugar they need to survive, and 
the higher the vision the better they can find fields with plenty of sugar. In this setting, 
a simulation with individuals that have low metabolism and high vision – which can 
be considered as showing the highest amount of fitness possible – led to a complete 
extinction of the specie while a less good equipped society managed to survive 
virtually forever.  
Briefly sketched, this situation is comparable to a free and unregulated development 
path in the individual model we will develop hereafter. Even though it may be very 
dynamic and productive, this system could also prove to be less good suited to secure 
a sustainable growth path. It is also a question of fitness and how this parameter could 
be defined in specific terms. A system which we might qualify as very “fit” in the 
sense of being very productive may not at all be “fit” to cope with structures it caused 
by itself. Consequently, it is difficult to define a fitness parameter which should be 
directed at evaluating the efficiency of a system.  What it comes down to can be best 
described by the following quote from Schumpeter: “A system – any system, 
economic or other – that at every given point of time fully utilizes its possibilities to 
the best advantage may yet in the long run be inferior to a system that does so at no 
given point of time, because the latter‟s failure to do so may be a condition for the 
level or speed of long-run performance.”62 
Only when an economy is following a development path which is within the corridor it 
can develop in a sound, future-oriented way best designed at generating future success. 
It is this speed of change where the more sluggish sectors will not be over stretched 
and where the dynamic sectors still have the possibility to tap into their full potential. 
Thus, watching for a healthy and joint development of all different economic actors 
and sectors will generate the highest long-term success opportunities for an economy 
and a society.  Realistically, this can only be achieved if the different sectors interact 
on a basis of mutual understanding of every sector‟s role as discussed above. This 
explicitly includes an active role for the government. “Modern capitalism needs an 
active and both sensitive and authoritative support and control. Without continued 
promotion by entrepreneurs and without thorough monitoring by governmental 
agencies (a necessity which is strongly underestimated by many supporters of the free 
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market and even by Schumpeter) it can neither reach its full potential nor capitalize on 
it on a sustained basis.”63 It is of crucial importance that an active public sector 
watches over the development in the economy, for only through its intervention a 
system can be kept within the corridor for a longer period of time. 
4.1.2 Innovation enhancing regulation 
When a public body is trying to support the innovative activity in the society, it can 
start at different points. The most general is linked to using financial means to set 
incentives in certain fields for innovation. This can include funding for research 
institutions, subsidies for innovating companies or the shift in public consumption to 
products which show some kind of innovating activity. In each of these cases, the 
government uses money directly to support some kind of innovation. The difficulty, 
however, lies in the justification for the subsidy. No government can simply spend 
money without explaining the purpose of the expenditure. Innovation itself can be 
such a goal, but then it is hard to target the money, because innovation can happen in 
every field and sector which is conceivable. 
Still, we can point to some regulatory measures which will certainly increase the 
potential for innovation in the society just because they facilitate the access to 
information or make it easier to realize the innovation.
64
 This includes decisions in the 
regulation of intellectual property rights and the possibility to trade those. An example 
is the availability of public data which can increase the usability for third parties and 
may lead to new utilizations and benefits which can be derived from it.
65
 In this case, 
the regulatory aspect focuses on the framework which accompanies innovative activity 
in a given society and therefore creates a better potential for innovation. Since this 
approach is not linked to large budgetary consequences, it can be fairly easily 
implemented.  
If, however, the government links the goal of innovation fostering to a different goal, 
then it will have to specify the purpose which the novelty is supposed to serve. 
Consequently, the state will have to regulate either its spending procedure or the 
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criteria for companies to receive subsidies. This means that we have to ask if it is 
possible to actually enhance innovation through regulation. 
Innovation always refers to something new and unknown which implies that it is 
impossible to predict or foresee where and when inventions will be made or novelty 
will surface and how this will affect the market. Regulation, on the contrary, always 
has to have a justification and therefore a purpose which it is meant to promote. Unless 
innovation per se is the goal of the regulatory act, which seems very unlikely because 
there is hardly a clear way how to promote innovativeness itself, then the problem 
arises that the regulation will have to be directed at some kind of purpose or goal in 
the future.
66
 “If we cannot approximately foresee what may happen, then we cannot 
implement laws or supportive measures for it.”67 Consequently, regulation and 
innovation cannot be easily brought together. 
Nevertheless, it may be favorable to try to link the goal of future orientation to some 
other goals. Looking at the actual implementation in the field of environmental 
protection in Europe, we find that it has grown more and more important over the last 
years, among others because the state created incentives to invest and innovate in this 
field. In an exemplary way, we can take a look at the law for renewable energies
68
 in 
Germany, where the government pursued its goals of environmental protection and 
provided substantial subsidies for innovative forms of harvesting energy such as solar 
power, wind power or biomass energy. The public money gave a large incentive to 
researchers across the country to focus their knowledge and creativity in exactly this 
domain. The result was that “now the Germans are suddenly in the limelight for being 
a forerunner of promising technologies for the future.”69 
So, is public regulation which follows precise goals a good way to foster innovation? 
The answer can certainly not be too easy since we can hardly estimate the effects 
which would have resulted if the regulation had not taken place. There could have 
been some substantial research in the field of renewable energies because either the 
main actors would have focused on those domains anyway or because some landmark 
invention could have been found even without the increased incentive. Furthermore, 
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we do not have a measure how much of the research incentive is going to labs which 
do not create a benefit. 
Additionally, a very difficult argument points to the fact that we do not know if the 
researchers who now focused on projects within the scope of the subsidies could have 
contributed to a more substantial progress in a different field. This means that a 
research and innovation incentive in a certain sector may divert the inventive capacity 
and effort from other fields and create a shortage of innovation there. Since it is 
impossible to foresee the future and innovation itself, it is even less possible to 
estimate the size of this redirection effect. 
Furthermore, in a world where innovation follows a linear chain of events starting with 
basic research and leading to a marketable new product or service, such regulatory 
support may help in a way that the government can find the bottlenecks in the chain 
and try to open those up. But, once we understand innovation as a recursive and 
interactive process which takes place among different actors, we can no longer 
consider it a linear process. This implies that any regulation will affect one or more 
components of this system and a change will have repercussions which are difficult to 
estimate.
70
 From this we can follow that regulation which is meant to foster innovation 
is not suited for situations in which market imperfections should be cured since the 
government is in no way a perfect player but is likely to introduce new imperfections 
at other stages.
71
 Accordingly, in this work we ask which – if any – effect the 
measures in place have on the innovativeness. This analysis may help in the future 
when assessing the potential of governmental methods to foster innovation and to help 
sharpen the view for the interactions which may result between different sectors and 
measures. In the next two sections, we will focus on the two most prominent actors in 
the innovation process: the innovator and the financier. 
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4.2 Personality of the innovator  
The most important actor when talking about innovation is the person who will 
implement it. This is the one Schumpeter refers to when talking about an 
„entrepreneur‟ or the person who is willing to carry out new combinations. The 
innovator is the one who will recognize new opportunities and goes on to grasp them, 
he is the one who “is seeing what everyone else has seen, and thinking what no one 
else has thought”72.  
There is an important distinction for Schumpeter between the entrepreneur and the 
manager. While the English definition of entrepreneur today is closely connected to 
the idea Schumpeter had in mind
73, the German term „Unternehmer‟ is still used in a 
much broader way.
74
 For Schumpeter, the entrepreneur is the driving force within a 
capitalistic economy, for he is the one who can disturb a static equilibrium process, 
bring about change, and make the society exit the circular flow it is otherwise doomed 
to follow. His view is therefore one of an “equilibrium-disturbing [...] entrepreneur”75. 
Without a Schumpeterian entrepreneur, we would find ourselves in a static economy 
where the life cycle is repeated over and over. Consequently, in such an economy the 
Walrasian entrepreneur making neither profit nor loss would appear.
76
  
We have to make sure that the entrepreneur is not confounded with a manager who is 
merely the one leading an enterprise. An innovator does not have to be the manager of 
a company and not every manager is an entrepreneur in the sense that he is an 
innovator. Only if the manager is innovative and grasps and tries new ways or things, 
then we can consider him an entrepreneur. Furthermore, an individual who may not be 
in an executive position at a company can still be an entrepreneur if he dares to try the 
introduction of a novelty or of an innovation. “Therefore, the true importance of the 
function of the entrepreneur consists, not in the mere running, but only in the creation 
of an enterprise”77. Accordingly, we will use the term „entrepreneur‟ in the 
understanding that he is the one who will implement innovations and carry out new 
combinations. 
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A second distinction is important because Schumpeter himself takes great care to 
distinguish the two: entrepreneur and capitalist. An entrepreneur can create new 
combinations and by consequence be innovative without using any capital of his own. 
Schumpeter separates very clearly between the person who has and employs capital in 
the production process and the one who brings in new ideas with which he can change 
the structure of the economy. In order to be entrepreneurially active, it is not necessary 
to possess large amounts of money.  
Since the model which we will develop is based on the micro-entities in an economy, 
we have to focus more closely on the personality of this innovator and discuss the 
personal traits, his “entrepreneurial spirit”78, which lead him to the implementation of 
innovations as well as his incentives to search for novelty. 
Whenever a person is trying to create something new, he will run into difficulties, 
barriers and opposition. There are people who fear the change and there are rules and 
regulations which may inhibit the execution or trial of new things. In order to 
overcome such obstacles, an entrepreneurially disposed individual needs to have the 
will and the passion to keep pursuing his goal.
79
  
Furthermore, there are certain facets in the personality of each person which can make 
him likely to try to achieve greatly.
80
 Schumpeter points to two aspects which are not 
easily brought in line with traditional economics
81
: there are people, who have 
managed to acquire great wealth and who could use it to satisfy their wants and needs, 
but who will continue to work hard and accept challenges and enormous difficulties. 
Even though it can hardly be the desire to gain more consumption possibilities, they 
keep pursuing ambitious goals. Consequently, they seem to see a utility in working 
and forgoing their leisure time. 
The second aspect we find in the Schumpeterian analysis is that many innovators and 
entrepreneurs do not aim for the monetary rent linked to an innovation or the 
implementation of a new idea. There are very different motives underlying the 
inspiration to create something new, such as “the dream and wish to found a private 
empire, [...] the will to win. The will to fight on the one hand, the will to be successful 
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solely for the sake of the success on the other hand. [...] Joy of creating finally is a 
third kind of family of motives.”82  
While this intrinsic characteristic which motivates the individual to become an 
entrepreneur is clearly important, it is not sufficient when we aim at explaining the 
innovative behavior.
83
 There are more personal traits which play a role such as the 
educational level and the experience which the individual has acquired in a certain 
field of interest.
84
 We will define those additional traits in more detail in section 
7.3.3.6 when we explain the precise implementation of the inventive and innovative 
behavior in the model.  
Nevertheless, we will briefly discuss the risk attitudes of an innovator and the 
implications for the innovative process. We could argue with Schumpeter that “the 
entrepreneur is never the one who bears the risk. [...] For, even though the 
entrepreneur is liable with his potential wealth, the possession of such wealth is not 
something substantial, albeit something facilitating.”85 He goes on to find that the 
entrepreneur might even risk his reputation, but that he never bears the economic 
responsibility. When following Schumpeter, then the innovator only has to worry 
about his innovation turning out to be a success, but in any case he has nothing to lose. 
Yet, this is only true for the innovator who will not simultaneously assume the role of 
the capitalist or of the banker providing the means to finance the innovation. Besides, 
he may not be worried about the perception of failure in his social environment. This 
leads us to the point that “[w]ithout a general willingness to innovate, i.e. a willingness 
to deal with the ex-ante non predictable possibility of failure and economic losses, any 
innovative behaviour becomes impossible.”86 Furthermore, it may be hard in some 
theoretical cases to separate between the functions of entrepreneur, capitalist, manager 
and financier, but it is virtually impossible in real world cases, especially if the 
entrepreneur is also the manager or the one providing the financial means. 
Consequently, the risk related to an innovation or an entrepreneurial activity may be 
twofold for the innovator
87
: first, he has the opportunity cost of pursuing other 
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activities which could for example consist of earning money in a conventional industry 
or simply being employed. Second, he may not see the reward related to carrying out 
the innovation substantial enough considering the risk related to it. The financial risk 
is only one aspect among several others, such as for example “[o]lder people might 
include [...] the specifics of the health care system in the risk-reward assessment”88. 
Accordingly, once we consider an individual who is trying to implement his 
innovation, we should also take into consideration the risk he might face within this 
process. In the simulation, we will implement those ideas in such a way that an 
inventor who will use the financial support of a financier to implement the innovation 
will not calculate his risk. An innovator who will realize the innovation using his own 
means, however, will judge the risk and decide according to his risk assessment if he 
will carry it out. 
4.3 Personality of the financier 
From Schumpeter‟s argument that the entrepreneur is not the one who has to assume 
the risk of an innovation and shoulder the uncertainty, we have to ask who will – in 
this theoretical framework, and then applied to practical terms – bear the risk 
connected to the realization of an innovation. Schumpeter is very clear on that: “The 
risk is always exclusively borne by the capitalist”89 and defines earlier that “the banker 
[...] himself became the capitalist.”90 To Schumpeter, the entrepreneur will gain the 
entrepreneurial profit for having the idea of trying a new combination. It is thinkable 
that he does not possess any funds, but that he will receive the financial means from a 
future-oriented banker.  
While the banker can therefore contribute the financial resources to the innovative 
endeavor, his role will not stop there. There are some important non-pecuniary 
contributions he can offer to increase the probability of a success of the innovation.
91
 
This means that the banker should be familiar with some aspects of the industry where 
he is investing and that he can assist the founder with his expertise from earlier 
investment projects or with his insight into the financial promotion of the innovative 
project.  
The financier can offer the innovator a network of experiences and contacts which 
may be very valuable but not at all a financial contribution. Establishing a close 
                                                 
88
 [BoLe10], p.15 
89
 [Schu34b], p. 112, footnote 12: “Das Risiko trägt immer nur der Kapitalist” 
90
 [Schu34b], p. 110: “Der Bankier [...] ist [...] selbst der Kapitalist geworden.” 
91
 cf. [Chri05]  
Individual Risk and Innovative Behavior - How to foster innovation? 
34 
contact between the entrepreneur and the financier will help both because the financier 
will get to know better the entrepreneur which might reduce the risk of asymmetrical 
information and moral hazard, and the innovator will be able to profit from the insight 
and the network of the financier.  
From a practical view
92
, venture capitalists focus more and more on the personality of 
the entrepreneur and his skills and personal traits. High quality education becomes a 
factor which is highly relevant in the decision on funding. Nevertheless, there are 
many elements which an investor will look at – and there is no clear sign what 
characteristics are the most important. While some financiers focus on the proximity 
to the investor, others may concentrate on their knowledge in the particular field of 
interest. 
There are different strategies, how a business angel can reduce his risk connected to 
the investment. More experienced investors tend to group together with other angels 
when financing a project, whereas less experienced business angels prefer those fields 
of investment where they have a sound knowledge of the market structure and the 
business environment.
93
 
When it comes to the strategy and the approach of the financier towards the innovative 
endeavor, we may look at the perspective which venture capital firms use when 
assessing start-up projects. It seems that the quality and the academic qualification of 
the venture capital seeker grow in importance with the amount of money and of insight 
sought for. The inventor, who is not willing to make the effort to get a venture capital 
partner and the business insight linked to it, is “starving on the wrong foot”94. The 
business angel needs to see the effort of the inventor which makes it crucial to 
constantly convince the stakeholders of the project. 
Furthermore, we can ask how a financier will react towards an inventor who is looking 
for an investor, but who has already failed in earlier comparable projects. According to 
the five panelists from the venture capital discussion quoted above, the unsuccessful 
trial of implementing an innovation and starting a business is in no way a drop-out 
criterion for potential venture capitalists. What is important to the investors is to see 
the reasons for the failure as well as the reaction of the individual to this experience. 
Yet, failure is something which is not entirely avoidable or “you don‟t have to worry 
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about failure. [...] Failure will find you.”95 This implies that an unsuccessful 
innovation endeavor does not necessarily lead to the impossibility of finding an 
investor for the next innovative project. 
Overall, the inventor who is unable to finance the implementation of his own invention 
will need to resort to an investor who will provide him with the financial means. If this 
financier can also add some non-pecuniary contributions such as a promising network 
and valuable insight, then the innovator-banker couple will assume the predominant 
role, Schumpeter assigns to them in an economy. 
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5 Social insurance 
Every human being on this planet needs – at a minimum – food and shelter in order to 
survive. Most healthy adults are capable of procuring for their own needs, while it may 
be difficult for the young and the old, for the sick or the handicapped, for the less witty 
or the less skilled people to secure a sufficient income. Many of the features that limit 
us in taking care of our own life are changing over the course of a lifetime. While the 
infant will eventually grow to be an adolescent and learn to look out for himself and 
while the adult knows that with increasing age, the risk of being unable to satisfy his 
needs and wants grows larger and larger, there are some factors which not every 
human being will be concerned with. Illness, unemployment, accidents are all strokes 
of bad luck that a person may or may not encounter and that influence his life to 
different degrees. Since often enough, those people struck by negative incidents face 
major difficulties of continuing their life and their predicament may not even be 
anyone‟s or at least not their own fault, people have always tried to secure themselves 
against such risks. 
In this work, we will understand social insurance as all measures by the public 
authorities to secure a certain standard of living for everyone in the society. This 
means that it can go beyond mere monetary measures and payments to people in need 
and that it can include the provision of public services designed to alleviate the distress 
individuals may face in the situation of a realized risk. Furthermore, social insurance 
in our situation will require the recipient to be in need. This implies that he does not 
have the means to secure his own standard of living.
96
 Most countries have installed 
some system of social insurance in order to make sure that no person will be in 
existential distress.  
In the next sections, we will first discuss social security in its historical context and 
look at the concrete implementations especially in Germany, France and the US today. 
Furthermore, we will look at models which have tried to answer the question on how 
social insurance influences the welfare in a society, we will present empirical data on 
the issue and we will link the discussion to the political domain of the median voter. 
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5.1 Social security 
The terms „social insurance‟ and „social security‟ are not unambiguously used.97 In 
this work, we will use them almost synonymously. We will refer to „social insurance‟ 
as the theoretical concept of providing a safety net for the citizens governed by the 
public authority in question and we will use the term „social security‟ when speaking 
about concrete implementations.  
5.1.1 History of Social Security 
The ancient Greeks would store olive oil thanks to its two features of high nutritional 
value and longevity, so that they would be able to overcome difficult periods and 
avoid any risk of starvation.
98
 Furthermore, people would look out for each other as a 
kind of social contract, where those who were fortunate enough to escape from major 
dismays would help those who had to suffer damages. This could be accomplished in 
an informal way in a family or clan setting or more formal in guilds or principalities 
and is a behavior that can be observed in most groups of human beings. 
When those groups grow too big, it becomes more and more difficult to secure the 
lifestyle of every member of the group and the social contract as well as the moral 
pressure on the fortunate ones to share degrades. On the other hand, if the behavior of 
the individual in need is not observable at a reasonable cost, then the free-rider 
problem arises with people trying to shirk their duties and thus living from the welfare 
of others. Soon enough, societies realized that they had to formally organize the 
support for people living in abject poverty so that they would secure their survival 
without putting social harmony at risk. 
In the middle of the 16
th
 century, Elizabeth I., queen of England, passed some acts that 
were supposed to alleviate the life of the poor.
99
 Especially the Elizabethan Poor Law 
of 1601 would consolidate all previously passed measures, so that poor people who 
wanted to work but could not, would receive help from the society. The same 
accounted for those who were too old, too young or not able to work. Only those 
members of the society would not receive help who were able to work but refused to 
do so („idle poor‟). Besides, the Poor Law stated that every parish had to institute a 
poor relief rate that was collected from the property owners and was used to support 
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the „deserving poor‟, meaning the people who were in a precarious situation without it 
being their fault. 
During the industrial revolution, the situation for workers in Western Europe was 
often marked by exploitation, low wages and high risk for the own survival. This 
condition would become even more critical, if the person was not able to work 
anymore. At that time, first economists started to analyze the situation and tried to 
draw their conclusions. In the French turmoil of the Revolution, there was Marie Jean 
Antoine Nicholas de Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, who was very optimistic that 
progress and innovation could lead to better conditions for society in general and thus 
for the poor in particular.
100 He fought for rights that would protect workers from 
ruthless employers, worked out ideas for a social system helping those in need and 
spoke in favor of low interest rates which would allow poor people to borrow money 
without sacrificing their future. His ideas died with him in the aftermath of the French 
revolution. 
In England, the situation was quite different. Robert Malthus scared the ruling elites 
with his analysis, that the growth of the population would by far outweigh the growth 
in the production of food. This would inevitably lead to famines and a decrease in 
population to a sustainable level. Besides, people who have enough means to live and 
raise children will have those children. So, in order to limit the explosive growth of the 
population, the poor had to stay poor enough, so that they could not afford to have 
children.
101
 This idea led to the “Poor Law Amendment Act”102 which greatly limited 
the rights of the poor by, for example, stripping them from some rights to vote. 
The situation in Germany at the end of the 19
th
 century was also marked by social 
inequalities and the unhappiness of the workers who felt exploited by the ruling elites. 
The tendency of the poor people to support radical ideas of socialism and to stop 
supporting the state or the king led the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck to 
introduce social insurance, which started in 1883 with an insurance that paid the 
workers half of their salary in case of sickness where employers had to pay one third 
of the contributions and the workers paid the remaining two thirds.
103
  In the following 
years, he added an insurance against accidents which would pay in the case of a 
continued handicap that would keep the person from working and an insurance for old 
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age and disability, which can be compared to today‟s retirement systems. In 1927, 
long after Bismarck‟s death, Germany introduced an unemployment insurance thus 
covering another risk that people face and that can destroy their capability of taking 
care of themselves.
104
 Many other countries copied more or less closely the German 
system and today there is at least a basic standard of social security and guaranteed 
standard of living in every industrialized country.  
The United States had already set up a pension system in 1776 but it was limited to 
war veterans. The characteristics and eligibility criteria changed over the years, 
making it a decent form of security for soldiers during the Civil War, except for those 
fighting as Confederates. The non-veteran US citizens had to wait for social security 
until 1935 when the Great Depression and its harsh consequences for the life of 
millions of people in the United States forced the government to act. The Social 
Security Act was passed and a general system of old age benefits was introduced. Still, 
there were some lacking points like disability or medical benefits, but the average 
person would be secured against the “hazards and vicissitudes of life”105. 
From the beginning, the German system was universal in its design, meaning that it 
included all workers. In France, authorities tried to introduce in 1945 a general system 
designed to protect all French citizens. Following a strong resistance in the population, 
it was modified to allow two groups to opt out of it: those employees who already had 
their own system of protections and those who were not employed and did not want 
such integration into a nation-wide system. So, the people themselves did not judge a 
universal system desirable for their own situation. 
5.1.2 Goals of Social Security 
When the German emperor, Wilhelm I., signed the first declaration that announced the 
introduction of social insurance, the justification and the goals were merely 
summarized in the statement “that the healing of the social damages is not only to be 
found through repression of social democratic riots, but to the same degree through the 
positive support of the situation of the workers.”106 The idea was to increase the 
support of the working class for the state, the nation and the governmental structure by 
giving them a real interest in a prosperous state. Even though the pensions would not 
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be higher than the cost of one loaf of bread per day
107
, the first step towards a 
government that helps those in need had been taken. 
In 2010, the German legal code contains twelve subsections of social laws where the 
first article states that the social laws are meant “to secure a decent life, to create 
comparable preconditions for shaping the personality […], to protect and promote 
family, to enable people to freely choose an occupation with which to cover their cost 
of living and to avert or smoothen […] exceptional burden”.108 The goals of social 
security are thus manifold. The most important and most historic reason of securing a 
life worth living is probably also the first, people would cite, when talking about the 
necessity of a social code. The other points are more the expression of a common 
standard of living that should be preserved and made accessible to everyone. Stating 
that everybody should have comparable chances of creating his own life or trying to 
give the free choice of profession to everybody are noble goals which may not be easy 
to achieve and which do not necessarily – if they are not met – imply that the person 
suffering is not able to live a decent life.  
The French and German laws see the family as one of the central aspects integrated 
into social laws, while the US Code of Federal Regulations in its Title 20, Chapter III 
(Social Security Administration)
109 defines more limited goals. In general, it seems 
that the goals of modern social security contain at the very first a guaranteed minimum 
standard of living which allows people to lead a decent life without having to worry 
about what to eat or where to sleep. The most essential dangers to survival have thus 
been eliminated by the society. 
In some cases, the social laws go even further and try to guarantee the person some 
freedoms like having a family, choosing his profession or being able to realize his 
goals. In those cases, social security offers more than just covering the basic risks of 
survival, but it guarantees the integration into society and with it a great possibility to 
carry on through trying times. The necessary means and conditions for living what can 
be considered a dignified life will change over time and between societies. Those 
standards are always relative to the standards and possibilities of the whole society 
which is concerned. It is easy to understand, that people in Sub-Saharan Africa will be 
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offered different social security measures than people in Western Europe. This is due 
to both the economic differences and the cultural differences between those regions. 
The same argument – the forms of social security provided depend on economic and 
cultural conditions – is also true between countries or societies that are more easily 
comparable than the two regions above.  
5.1.3 Forms of Social Security 
The fields in which social security helps are thus similar but not the same in most 
Western countries. In the US, France and Germany, there are four fields they have in 
common. First and foremost, there is an additional income for those who are not able 
to cover the minimum expenses to keep a decent standard of living. Even though the 
conditions to receive such an income and the lifestyle that it is meant to guarantee vary 
greatly, in each country people in need are supported financially through a 
“Supplemental Security Income (SSI)”110, a “Revenu minimum d‟insertion (RMI)”111 
or a “Grundsicherung für Arbeitsuchende (ALG II)”112.  
A second field where social security tries to soften the imponderability concerns the 
health of the people. Often times, health care costs are very high and it may not be 
possible for an individual to afford a treatment that will allow him to continue to lead a 
dignified life. In those cases, health insurance is meant to provide a basic care that will 
guarantee life-saving measures as well as return the person into a state in which he is 
able to participate in a social and professional life. Even though the Hippocratic 
Oath
113
 requires physicians to treat people in need without mentioning any reward 
from that person in particular and is therefore interpreted as a general requirement for 
doctors to give life-saving treatment to anybody regardless of their ability to pay, a 
health insurance goes further in that goal. Even for people who could theoretically 
afford to pay their health treatment, getting this treatment could mean having to sell 
their house or having to sacrifice on other expenses in the household, which could 
have negative implications on, for example, the education and health of children. 
Through offering health insurance, the random risk of getting ill is covered.  
The third common field between those countries is the retirement regime. People will 
receive certain amounts of money in their old age when generally they may not be able 
to work anymore or when the members of the society judge that they should not have 
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to work anymore. While the US, Germany and France considered for a long time the 
standard age for entering retirement as 65 years, both in the United States and in 
Germany this has been raised to 67 for all those born after 1960 (US) and 1964 
(Germany) in order to cope with the demographic change.
114
 Besides, there are strong 
differences in the way the retirement subsistence is financed. Many western countries 
use a pay-as-you-go system where the money paid out to the retired people comes 
directly from the contributors compared to a system where the individual will save 
money in some form and will use it in his old age in order to secure his standard of 
living.
115
 The phenomenon of aging societies will put additional pressure on the 
pension systems and may lead to a stronger shift towards fund-based insurance 
schemes. 
Unemployment benefits form the fourth common sector. In the US, France and 
Germany, the amount which a person will receive is linked to the previous income of 
the individual. In the US, the duration of payments also depends on the last income.
116
 
Furthermore, in Germany there are certain rules where the duration of contributing to 
the system can have an influence on the amount of months an individual is entitled to 
unemployment benefits.
117
 In any case, the amount of payment is linked to the last 
earnings and the subsistence minimum or a certain social standard is irrelevant for the 
decision about the amount paid out in case of unemployment. If this amount is too 
small then the person is, of course, entitled to claiming the social minimum additional 
to the unemployment benefits. The average sums received can vary strongly between 
the different systems in the countries and within each system depending on the 
previous income.
118
 
From this short overview of the most prominent aspects of the system of social 
insurance offered in different countries, we will now turn to the more theoretical 
discussion of effects of such an insurance scheme on the welfare in the society. 
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5.2 Social insurance and welfare effects 
While it seems fairly straight-forward that a government should concentrate on the 
position of the economy in the Neo-Schumpeterian corridor and that it can set a 
regulatory framework designed to support innovation and channel the resources into 
promising paths as we have argued in section 4.1, it should be just as evident that this 
cannot be the only strategy and handing out money might not even be the most 
promising depending on the situation.  
It may just as well be feasible and worthwhile for a public entity to improve on the 
infrastructure in order to enable people to be more creative and inventive or to 
facilitate the realization of innovation. As we will show in this section, there is some 
evidence and discussion that social insurance can serve as a measure to incite 
innovation. This idea will also be the starting point for our model and lies at the 
bottom of the question which we approach with the simulation.  
In the subsequent part of this section, we will present two approaches and one 
implementation thereof which focus on questions related to our model. We will 
discuss their findings and the aspects where our approach tries to offer additions and 
further insight. 
The first concept treats the question if a social insurance scheme can improve the 
incentives for individual members of a society to assume risk and therefore have a 
beneficial impact on the economy and the standard of living in a country or region.
119
 
It starts by stressing the relevance of a social insurance scheme in a society. 
Theoretically, such a contract insuring against certain risks could entirely be organized 
without a public sector. If it is beneficial for an individual to have the security of a 
guaranteed payout in case of being on the loser‟s side and of having to pay for others 
if he is in the fortunate position of being on the winner‟s side, then it should be 
possible that a private insurance company offers precisely such a contract.  
There are some problems, however, that limit the result the private sector is able to 
achieve. Once the “veil of ignorance”120 has been lifted to a certain degree giving the 
individual an impression and an estimation of his situation later in life, then it will be 
difficult to convince him to agree to such a contract. If he knows that he might be on 
the less fortunate side, he will be happy to subscribe and be part of those who might 
profit from the contract. If he sees himself on the winner‟s side, then there is no reason 
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why he should join a contract where most of the subscribers are likely to be net 
receivers of support. This would mean for him, that he had to pay even more than in 
the situation of a social contract as there are few contributors facing many receivers. 
So, agreeing on such a contract becomes more difficult the more the veil has been 
lifted. 
The consequence of this analysis is that the social contract has to be underwritten as 
early as possible, at best even before the individual has been born. At that time, his 
abilities, capabilities, talents and features are still unknown
121
 and every individual 
could profit from a contract securing him in case of a tough fate. It could, for example, 
be the parent‟s decision to have their newborn directly join such a contract so that it is 
insured over the course of an uncertain lifetime. If the new person grows up to be on 
the sunny side of life, he might, however, decide to sign out of the contract. In order 
for the contract to work as a private insurance, it would have to be impossible for the 
individual to opt out. The problem is that it is inconceivable in Western legal codes 
and contrary to Western ethics that a person may be bound by someone else for the 
rest of her lifetime. The only legal body that has the power to do so is a publicly 
elected government.  
This is the reason why the public sector is necessary and irreplaceable in the function 
of providing such an exchange between members of its society who are more fortunate 
and others who are less fortunate.
122
  
The model created in the subsequent part of the cited study focuses on an individual 
who can lose part of her income due to exogenous shocks and can undertake an effort 
to reduce the likelihood of such income shocks. Several cases are modeled where 
social insurance and redistributive taxation are implemented in different ways. Those 
equations are then mapped in a --space in order to compare the mean income of an 
individual with the variance of his income. The more his income can vary, the higher 
the risk he took. 
Private insurance cases where households receive a compensation for realized risks are 
then compared to social insurance cases where redistribution is used to compensate 
households and where everyone receives a certain lump sum regardless of the 
realization of any risks. The analysis finds that insurance has two effects on the risk 
behavior of the individual: on the one hand, since the insurance reduces the existential 
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risk for the individual, he will be more likely to accept risks and change his behavior 
to be more risk-seeking. This is not a case of moral hazard, since risk taking can make 
the individual as well as the society better off.  The consequence is that the 
compensation he requires for accepting a new risk will be lower, which brings about 
more adventurous entrepreneurs. 
On the other hand, a private insurance has the advantage that the marginal return to 
risk taking increases due to the fact that a part of the risk is now insured. The return 
which can be generated by assuming an additional risk has to be mapped against the 
uninsured fraction of the risk. This is, however, only true for private insurance since 
“redistribution only creates the first type of incentive”123 because social insurance 
cannot take the individual‟s particular situation into account, but will only average 
over the society to achieve a fiscal equilibrium. Consequently, a social insurance is not 
fair in the sense of a private insurance. 
Nevertheless, a private insurance is not applicable in the case of insuring lifetime risks 
such as discussed in the paper and in our model. One reason for this inadequacy is the 
aforementioned problem of the veil of ignorance. An individual can be “subscribed” to 
a social insurance and redistribution system before his veil is lifted. Furthermore, 
“[t]ypically there is a very narrowly defined set of circumstances under which a 
private insurance company pays indemnification. Social insurance, by way of contrast, 
is an all-inclusive insurance that protects against the risks of lifetime careers.”124 
Therefore, the aspect of crowding out between a private insurance and the public 
system are not considered. The question is nevertheless relevant to our discussion 
since the agents in the individual model have to provide for their own risk and can do 
so by choosing investment funds. Even though those are not modeled as insurances, it 
could be possible to set them up in such a way that they are comparable to partial 
insurance plans as we find them in real cases.  
The presented concept from Sinn concludes by stressing the importance to increase 
research on the beneficial role of redistribution and social insurance in societies thanks 
to their effects on the willingness to assume risk and to the induced increase in mean 
income in the economy. Our model follows a similar setup since we also model the 
consequences of risk realizations on the individual‟s income and look at the risk-
taking implications which can be derived from the introduction of a public sector. 
Similarly, we look at the effects which a social insurance scheme protecting members 
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of a society from too harsh conditions can have on the risk behavior of individuals. 
Our analysis breaks open the abstract idea of risk into two categories: risk which 
reduces the income
125
 and risk related to innovation which can be chosen to be taken 
and which can increase income. 
In the presented case, an individual can choose to do an effort to decrease his risk of 
losing part of his income. The effort is understood as time and money spent on 
education which will reduce the chance of losing income during the course of his life. 
Our model differs from the presented case by allowing the income to increase and to 
decrease according to certain risk realizations. On the one hand, there is the possibility 
that external shocks can decrease the income similarly to the model just introduced. 
On the other hand, it is possible that there are positive shocks to the income such as 
fluctuations in the work pay (i.e. bonus payments) or increases in banking or 
investment interests leading to a rise in proceeds from capital. Furthermore, we 
consider the case that individuals assume the risk of implementing an innovation. Each 
successful innovation will lead to returns which can increase the agent‟s income. 
Therefore, our model can incorporate positive and negative shocks to the income 
while looking at the risk taking behavior. 
Additionally, moral hazard in the model presented is designed as effort to reduce the 
probability of losses which is not tax-deductible. In the logic of the model, individuals 
may therefore choose not to undertake this effort and assume the higher risk knowing 
that the government will help them in case of distress. While this is certainly a 
plausible scenario, it may not be the only form of moral hazard relevant. In our model, 
effort is not tax-deductible comparable to the approach here, but we include more 
aspects into the risk-behavior of an individual such as the history of the simulation as 
well as the interaction in the individual‟s environment. Therefore the agents will be 
influenced to be more risk-seeking or more risk-averse depending on their character 
and factors in their environment. The agent-based setup allows us to enlarge the scope 
of the model towards a more inclusive picture making moral hazard an endogenously 
surfacing phenomenon. Besides, the pay-out behavior of the state in the Sinn-model is 
independent of the actual risk situation of the individual household. This means that 
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each household will receive a certain transfer from the government without taking into 
consideration if any loss-entailing risk realization has surfaced.
126
  
In our model, we have heterogeneous agents. Therefore, the contribution of each of 
these agents to the social insurance system as well as their receipts from it can be 
defined in a more elaborate way taking into account certain characteristics of the 
individual as well as the society. We have chosen to model it as a median voter 
concept, where the median voter can decide on raising or lowering the subsistence 
minimum provided by the government. The government will then set the rate of 
contribution such that it can provide this insurance and still keep a balanced budget. 
The influence of the median voter is discussed in detail in section 5.3. In contrast to 
the presented model, the agent-based framework allows us to leave out a specific 
condition for a balanced budget in every single period. The government has the 
possibility to adapt its behavior during the course of the simulation to always refocus 
on the goal of a balanced budget therefore allowing to spend more than the budget in 
some periods and less in others. This is not possible in the model we have just 
discussed.  
Nevertheless, the model shows that there are very elaborate approaches towards the 
risk-taking effects of a social insurance scheme pointing at positive influences of a 
redistributive taxation scheme. It finds that social insurance can – if it is well adjusted 
– increase the mean income in the population. This goes together with a pre-tax 
increase in the variance of the income meaning that more people take risks and, 
consequently, more people may fail and have a low income. There is no conclusive 
estimation of the post-tax effect since the redistributive insurance will provide some 
relief to the losers in the society. In our model, we find in section 8.2 that social 
insurance increases post-tax income in the society and reduces the variance of income 
therefore creating a more equal society.  
Generally speaking, our model tries to add insight to this issue thanks to the different 
possibilities of the agent-based framework and shifts the focus by including innovation 
in the scope of the game in order to secure the future-orientation in a more specific 
way. 
There is a study conducted by Bird in 2001
127
 which builds on the just discussed 
model and which tries to single out those effects in cross-country panel data in order to 
                                                 
126
 This is not problematic for the model since it focuses on “an economy with ex-ante identical 
individuals who have the same preferences and who are endowed with the same set of probability 
distributions”. [Sinn96], p. 273 
Individual Risk and Innovative Behavior - Social insurance 
48 
analyze the effects of social insurance. It explores the standard deviation of income as 
the risk faced by households and looks at the US, the UK, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, Hungary and Poland. 
The study suggests that “the larger welfare states in continental Europe seem to 
encourage risk.”128 Consequently, a country such as Germany induces risk seeking 
behavior in the population because it offers a high level of welfare. 
Nevertheless, in a different regression, the data suggest that the welfare state is not 
able to considerably change the risk in post-transfer income, since “no country‟s 
income insurance system changes its standing in the world with respect to risk”129. 
Surprisingly, it finds that the income risk is highest in Germany and lowest in Poland 
and Hungary. This means that people in Germany face the strongest oscillations in 
income while the income in the latter countries will not vary much on a year-to-year 
basis.  
While the two results can explain that the income variation in Germany is highest in 
pre-transfer income, it is surprising to find that even in post-transfer income Germany 
has the largest variation. Consequently, the data show only a very small insurance 
effect generated by social welfare, which implies that it is almost sufficient to offer a 
basic level of social insurance. “[O]nce a country obtains the basic system of means-
tested benefits and social insurance programs, further increases in the scale of the 
programs seem to have little effect on the system‟s income insuring effect.“130 
We have tested the influences of the different welfare systems in our model and have 
observed a similar effect as Bird just described. Even a fairly low level insurance 
scheme could generate more innovations than a system without any protection. A 
detailed analysis of the results can be found in section 8.2. 
Besides this approach, we will now present another concept which tries to relate social 
insurance to welfare aspects. It is not directly focused at innovation or making a 
society more innovative, but it does look at different risks an individual is facing and 
discusses the different implications of the wide variety of uncertainty members of a 
society are confronted with.
131
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The model starts to break down the factors which can influence a household‟s income 
so that different sources of risk can be analyzed separately. It differentiates between 
the following shocks to the income level: disability, health related income shocks, 
unemployment, job changes, wage shocks, changes in work hours and other changes 
grouped in a residual. In estimating the different effects which the realizations of those 
risks may have on the individual‟s income, the author tries to infer the value of a 
social insurance on the welfare of households. He uses PSID
132
 data to calibrate his 
model and creates a set of Bellman-equations used to recursively analyze the 
household‟s consumption development. Using the setup of the model, different 
insurance options are analyzed and discussed. The author finds that even an actuarially 
fair social insurance would only have very small effects on household‟s welfare 
measured as a change in consumption possibilities.  
The model is constructed such that individuals are born at the point where their work 
life begins and they therefore only have two phases in life corresponding to working 
years and retirement years. Income is then estimated in both phases as well as for the 
last year before retirement because this will be used to define the retirement benefits. 
The welfare analysis is conducted by calculating the amount of money (in percent of 
lifetime consumption) necessary to make an individual indifferent between the insured 
life and the situation without the insurance. Two different insurance schemes are 
presented where the insurance always fully eliminates a negative effect of a realized 
risk supplying the household with the amount lost due to the shock.  
Similarly to the model we set up, this approach takes the different wealth implications 
of various sources of risk into account and stresses the importance of including risk 
and insurance considerations into an analysis of welfare. The model is solved by 
numerical dynamic programming, which requires Bellman-equations up front and then 
evaluates the recursive formulae. It is therefore a fundamentally different approach to 
agent-based modeling since it necessitates that all assumptions and hypotheses on the 
individual‟s behavior and characteristics have to be brought into one equation which 
can then be analyzed. On the other hand, there is no option for agent interaction in a 
society or the introduction of historical time leading to different trajectories from 
comparable initial settings.  
While the setup and parameter estimation is very thorough and valuable, there are 
some aspects to this model which are worth being discussed. For some of those 
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aspects, we feel, an agent-based model can offer useful additions. Firstly, the 
introduced scheme only evaluates the benefit of a social insurance after all other 
applicable insurance benefits have already been paid to the individual. This is due to 
the data used to calibrate the model. They show household income only at a time when 
all those insurance payments the household has subscribed to have already been paid 
out. A consequence of this situation is that household income increases with disability 
and unemployment, meaning that if a head of household became unemployed in a 
certain period, the household‟s income will be above the previous level due to either 
insurance benefits from contracts other than the investigated social insurance or from 
behavioral reactions such as a different labor supply of a spouse. The same is true for 
the income situation of a household where the head is retired. The parameterized 
model takes the household‟s income after social security benefits have been paid. This 
affects considerably the importance of a social insurance scheme, since any such 
payment plans are only additional to the contracts already chosen by the surveyed 
panel. The simulation we propose hereafter will be a basic insurance meaning that 
without the insurance, the individual would have to bear the full effect of a negative 
shock to his income. Consequently, the value of such an insurance scheme for the 
individual is expected to be much higher and the aggregate welfare implications 
should also be more important. 
Furthermore, the value of the insurance is estimated against the situation where the 
individual faces his risk from a point of view before the work life begins. An 
individual therefore will not change his behavior in the case of a realized risk or will 
not attribute different utilities to certain consumption levels.
133
 As the author states 
himself, though, “[m]easuring the value of insurance conditional on, for instance, 
being disabled or unemployed would yield higher benefits of additional insurance”134. 
The impact of the different valuation of a social insurance on other aspects in public 
life in the modeled society cannot be taken into consideration in the model and it is 
therefore assumed to be negligible for the analysis. An agent-based model, on the 
other hand, can incorporate such developments, and can, hence, offer valuable 
additional insight. 
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Moreover, the definition of the specific set of Bellman-equations requires the author to 
take some assumptions concerning the characteristics of the households which are not 
integrated as variables into the estimated functions. In the present case, this includes 
factors such as the mean size and composition of a household with mean level of 
education. Again, the author draws attention to this issue and the limitations it 
generates for the interpretation of the results: “It is important to bear in mind, 
however, that a clear understanding of the role of heterogeneity is required in order to 
draw definitive conclusions.”135 Therefore, a model which can respect the 
heterogeneity of the individual members of a society could lead to a better 
understanding of the role of a social insurance plan on welfare or the future-orientation 
of a society. 
Additionally, an important aspect which is not specifically mentioned concerns the 
question on who can subscribe to this insurance and how the premiums are calculated. 
While the plans are fairly straight-forward in the design of the payout in case of a 
realized risk and the idea that the premium over the lifetime is actuarially fair, it is not 
clear how contribution is set up. It is important, however, if an individual has the right 
to subscribe to such an insurance or if it is obligatory for the society. The welfare 
implications will be considerable since it is impossible to create an insurance scheme, 
which is ex-post balanced meaning that for every insured person the actual payouts 
equal the premium paid. Therefore, it is important to take the aggregate emerging 
structure into consideration when discussing if such a measure is preferable. 
Lastly, the important aspect of interaction cannot be included in such a numerical 
dynamic programming approach. Since every equation is set up to reflect the 
individual‟s situation, it is possible to include parameters which take environmental 
variables into account. Those variables have to be defined at the start of the recursive 
run and will follow identical distributions for the different actors. In some models, 
including interaction may not be of larger interest, but when the whole lifecycle is to 
be analyzed then effects from other members of a group may have important 
repercussions on the agent‟s behavior and characteristics. Furthermore, those 
influences can be reciprocal and include learning behavior by agents. The more 
complex the interrelatedness gets, the harder it is to analyze it through those numerical 
dynamic programming models. 
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Nevertheless, the two preceding discussions can hint at the important factors relevant 
when talking about social insurance and its implication on the lives of the individual 
members of a society and the future development of the economy in question. While 
the first model could shed some light on the relationship between insurance coverage 
and the willingness to take risk, the second model broke the different risks an 
individual is facing down into its parts and considered the individual effects on 
welfare. 
5.3 Empirical evidence 
There are several empirical studies which have tried to approach this question from 
looking at the data of different countries or settings. Their findings are not identical, 
however, when it comes to answering the question how social insurance influences the 
innovative behavior in a society. In many studies, entrepreneurship is measured by 
looking at the total early-stage entrepreneurial activity in order to grasp the amount of 
people who face up to the challenge of starting their own company. There is a crucial 
differentiation which is taken when entrepreneurial activity is analyzed: have people 
founded a company out of necessity or out of opportunity. 
An enterprise founded out of opportunity means that an entrepreneur has taken the 
decision that the rewards – as diverse as they may be – compared to the risks and costs 
are worth taking the chance of starting a business. On the other hand, there may be 
people who will found a company out of necessity because of the lack of other 
opportunities. Especially in less developed countries, many people cannot find a job as 
an employee and are consequently forced to become entrepreneurially active.
136
 
Still, we have to make sure that the qualification of an entrepreneur is identical in all 
cases. We have defined an entrepreneur earlier in the Neo-Schumpeterian sense as an 
economic actor who is willing to take the risk of creating something new in the quest 
for the increased return. The studies we refer to in this section do not necessarily 
follow this definition, but consider anyone an entrepreneur who is the founder or 
owner of an enterprise. Therefore, we have to be cautious when interpreting the results 
to the different ideas behind the concept of being an „entrepreneur‟. 
On the one hand, there are studies pointing at the possibility that offering social 
insurance has an insignificant effect on becoming entrepreneurially active.
137
 They 
note that the data certainly reject the hypothesis that social welfare programs work as a 
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disincentive for potential entrepreneurs. The personality of the individual is much 
more important when it comes to his willingness to start a new company: “individuals 
who are pre-disposed toward entrepreneurship will proceed regardless of the 
institutional barriers they face or the relative generosity of the social welfare 
system”138. This finding leads to two conclusions with respect to the general question 
of this work. Firstly, public policy and especially the social insurance scheme should 
be designed and justified with respect to other arguments and influences than 
supporting the entrepreneurial climate in an economy. Secondly, the goal of fostering 
entrepreneurial activity can only be achieved by addressing the intrinsic behavioral 
characteristics of each individual and trying to support his own future optimism as 
well as his willingness to start his own business. 
On the other hand, we find studies which suggest a positive influence between social 
insurance schemes and the willingness of individuals to start their own company. 
There are some approaches comparing different health insurance schemes in the US 
system. The more common approach is that an individual is insured through an 
employer‟s insurance plan. This leads to a situation where “[w]orkers may be reluctant 
to switch jobs when otherwise optimal because of the possible loss of coverage due to 
pre-existing condition exclusions, waiting periods on new jobs, loss of particular 
insurance plans, and disruption in the continuity of care with their healthcare 
provider”139. A general health insurance offer could then increase the propensity of an 
individual to start his own business. “More generally, the IHCP140 provides an 
opportunity to examine the impact of social insurance on economic risk-taking like 
entrepreneurship”141. The political goal of enabling people to obtain health insurance 
through private insurance companies creates a valuable situation for researchers to 
compare the behavior of Americans with or without this deregulation. The results 
support very strongly the idea that self-employment can be spurred by offering a 
general social insurance plan: “My main findings suggest that the IHCP increased self-
employment in New Jersey [...] by roughly fourteen to twenty percent”142.  
Besides, there is evidence that in states where such a scheme is not available, 
entrepreneurial activity only becomes attractive once an individual qualifies for 
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governmentally provided Medicare which usually starts at the age of 65. A person who 
will receive medical services thanks to this program has less risk when he decides to 
found a company. Interestingly, “[b]usiness ownership rates increase from 24.6 
percent for those just under age 65 to 28.0 percent for those just over age 65, whereas 
we find no change in business ownership rates from just before to just after for the 
remaining ages in our sample of workers ages 55-75”143. Consequently, it appears that 
social insurance can have beneficial effects on the entrepreneurial activity of an 
individual. This would imply that public policy should set up social insurance schemes 
not only for reasons of justice or equality within a society, but also in order to sustain 
future development and innovation.  
Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting the opposite being true that entrepreneurial 
activity declines as a consequence of social security offered in a society. “As regards 
the level of social security benefits it is clear from the results of this study that the 
social security entitlements of employees have a negative effect on the rate of early-
stage entrepreneurship.”144 Additionally, the social security contributions for an 
employer also have a negative effect on the willingness of a person to start his own 
business. Therefore, there are two negative implications which suggest that social 
insurance coverage works as a disincentive to entrepreneurial activity: first, a person 
risks losing his benefits and secondly, he will not only have to pay more for his 
insurance coverage since no employer will cover a share of the cost but he also has to 
contribute to the insurance costs of his employees. This creates a reinforced negative 
effect leading to the finding that the only way to induce entrepreneurial activity is by 
increasing labor participation. The suggested way of doing so is by reducing social 
security increasing the necessity for people to search for earning opportunities.
145
 The 
same can be found for the case of unemployment insurance which is suggested to 
crowd-out nascent entrepreneurship both for opportunity entrepreneurs as well as 
necessity entrepreneurs.
146
 
Following this logic, the conclusion for the public sector has to be that social security 
should be reduced to a minimum so that the state still fulfills its obligation to look out 
for its members but that it infringes as little as possible the entrepreneurial activity. 
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There are even those studies who argue that it might almost be impossible to find a 
regression using publicly available data which proves or rejects convincingly the 
hypotheses on social insurance effects on entrepreneurship.
147
 Even though they find 
that the results do allow for a situation where employer-based health insurance does 
not have any effect on the decision of individuals to found a company, it is not 
unambiguous that this effect is predominant.  
Obviously, it is impossible that all of the previously cited studies are correct on a 
general basis since their results are contradictory. The discussion in this section is 
meant to underline the difficulty in assessing the effects social insurance has on the 
innovative behavior of individuals in an economy. The model we present in chapter 7 
will try to add insight to this question. 
5.4 Influences of the median voter 
We will design the model in such a way as to demand that the entire society adheres to 
one system – either the governmental system offering social insurance or the 
individual system where every agent will bear his own risk. The choice for which 
system will be chosen will be taken in a democratic choice problem which is reduced 
to a bipolar decision where agents can only choose between those two options.  
This vote will not be modeled, however, since we do not allow for a change in regime 
during the course of the simulation. While this may seem interesting and might lead to 
insightful developments, it is beyond the scope of this work to integrate those cases.
148
 
Therefore, we will presuppose for every simulation run that the choice of system setup 
has already been taken and that this choice has led to either a governmental system of 
social insurance or to the individual system. We will then test how two identical initial 
setups of the system will evolve in the governmental model compared to the individual 
model. 
Nevertheless, we will resort to the concept of the median voter
149
 and its decision 
making influences in the simulation when it comes to voting on the scope of the social 
insurance offered within the society in question.
150
 The median voter model is helpful 
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whenever there seems to be a set of choices which only differ with respect to one 
aspect and therefore can be represented in one dimension. Additionally, each voter 
will prefer the party which is closest to him with respect to this one characteristic, 
because this is the only difference between the parties. Once the political actors are 
aware of this situation, they will tend to move closer together in order to increase the 
amount of potential voters.
151
 Consequently, the voter who occupies the median 
position in the society with respect to this criterion will cast the decisive vote, since 
the amount of voters on either side of him equal each other out. A political actor will 
therefore aim to receive the median voters‟ support. 
In our simulation, we will use this theorem when simulating the process of voting for 
an increase, a decrease or no change in the level of social support offered to those 
people in need. While the government will always pay out to people who are incapable 
of securing their own subsistence minimum the required difference of money and 
therefore the expenditure side of the budget is fairly inflexible, the percentage of the 
revenues raised as contribution to finance the social insurance system is flexible and 
will be set by the government. The people can vote every four years for a change in 
the minimum level provided for by the state. This election will be held on a median 
voter basis meaning that we could imagine all voters in favor of a decrease on the left 
hand side of the spectrum, those in favor of an increase on the right hand side and the 
ones who prefer not to change the current level in the center. Since every individual in 
the simulation will be given one vote, we will see a decrease in the guaranteed 
subsistence level, if the group on the left counts more than 50 percent of the agents 
and an increase if the group on the right holds the absolute majority. In all other cases, 
the median voter will belong to the group of people who prefer to keep the present 
level. 
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6 Agent-based Modeling 
There are many ways in which we could approach the central research question asking 
to what extent a government can influence the innovative activity in its society by 
offering a system of social insurance. Generally, we speak of inductive and deductive 
forms of creating insight. While the inductive approach starts by collecting data and 
tries to find structure inside it, deduction starts off with a hypothesis and tries to 
calculate its consequences on the real world. Neither approach is per se better or 
optimal, and it might even appear to be important to try several means to learn more 
about the cause-effect-relationships of a certain topic.
152
 Following the enormous 
progress in computational power, simulation has evolved to be something like “a third 
way of doing science in addition to deduction and induction”153. Even though each 
simulation starts off similar to a deductive form of reasoning by setting assumptions, it 
then creates the data it will later investigate in an inductive way. 
Similarly to all deductive approaches, we will have to abstract from reality in order to 
be able to draw any conclusion. This implies that it will be necessary to construct 
some kind of representation of the real world – in that sense a model – tailored to 
explaining the interactions we are interested in. Our model has to simplify reality to a 
certain degree: it has to be simple enough to allow the filtering out of interrelations 
and it has to retain as much complexity as necessary in order to be able to use the 
conclusions in the desired way. “Regardless of the approach, the quest of any model is 
to ease thinking while still retaining some ability to illuminate reality.”154 Following 
this mindset, we have to think about the best method to set up our model.  
In the following sections, we will introduce agent-based modeling (ABM) as a 
methodology and explain where it offers advantages for the theoretical understanding. 
Furthermore, we will focus on the branch of agent-based computational economics 
and explore some of the advances made so far in this field. This will help with 
understanding and evaluating the model presented in chapter 7. 
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6.1 ABM155 
Over the last decades, computational power has increased dramatically and has made 
it possible for many new ways of scientific research to be discovered. From the 
cellular automata and their impressive implementations in the Game of Life from John 
Conway
156
 or Thomas Schelling‟s Segregation Game157, the applications became more 
and more sophisticated and managed to show how very complex phenomena could be 
derived from fairly simply behavioral rules. Agent-based modeling provides one way 
of exploring functional relationships between different elements of a system. 
6.1.1 Definition 
We will use Gilbert‟s definition of agent-based modeling in order to introduce the full 
potential of this technique: “agent-based modeling is a computational method that 
enables a researcher to create, analyze, and experiment with models composed of 
agents that interact within an environment.”158 Gilbert‟s highlighting already stresses 
the most important terms and we will address those shortly.   
The most basic term in this definition is “model”, since anyone who creates an agent-
based model is always a modeler. No matter how a researcher may approach a 
theoretical question, he will most likely have some kind of model in his head about 
how things relate and he will choose a technique that should be able to provide some 
insight to his research question. In all those cases, he will have some kind of mental 
model as the basis.
159
 In order to find more details on relationships in the world, he 
will have to create some simplified representation of the world where his specific 
subject can be addressed. “Models don't stand or fall on their detailed verisimilitude, 
but on their capacity to capture the essence of what is already known about a 
phenomenon and to generate expectations concerning what more might be discovered 
if the scientist were to look where the model pointed.”160 This means that we have to 
make sure that our model will be rightly aimed at our research question and that we 
have to be able to justify the diversions from reality. 
In order to increase the understanding of mechanisms in a social system, some forms 
of modeling are better suited than others. Gilbert introduces four different types of 
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models and argues that scale models – small scale representations of the explanatory 
situation –, analogical models – metaphor representations of the problem in question –, 
and ideal-type models – the environment is stripped of some complicating aspects – 
may be best suited to explain why systems react the way they do and help understand 
emergent structures. Mathematical or equation based models – the fourth form – may 
have limits in explaining why certain structures emerge, because they follow a 
different approach. They are often designed to fit to underlying data, but not 
necessarily from “theorizing about the behavior of the firm”161. Furthermore, often 
dynamic general equilibrium models use numerous restrictive assumptions and it is 
not clear “how far findings, obtained under theses simplifying assumptions, carry over 
to scenarios where agents are heterogeneous or out of equilibrium”162. 
The model we will develop is based on the scale and the ideal-type approach meaning 
that we will reduce complexity of the model by both reducing the amount of 
dimensions which could be relevant as well as removing some factors which will 
further complicate the situation. The important task will be that our model does not 
lose the explanatory power because we may have removed important aspects. 
Agent-based modeling is further defined by the use of agents. While there is no 
universal definition on what an agent is
163
, there are certain characteristics which are 
widely accepted: 
An agent is “a discrete individual with a set of characteristics and rules governing its 
behaviors and decision-making capability.”164 This means that each agent is an object 
which can be distinguished from its environment and other agents which may live in 
the same space as the one in question. Consequently, this makes it possible to give 
each agent an individual set of characteristics in order to create a heterogeneous world 
and allow for the simulation of diversity. 
Furthermore, an agent has four distinct categories of behaviors and characteristics.
165
 
Firstly, it has to be able to act autonomously in its environment which means that the 
agent can execute behaviors at certain points if it feels that this is favorable for 
reaching his goal. In our simulation, it can be a successful inventive endeavor which 
the agent chooses to implement into an innovation or the choice of a high risk or a low 
risk capital investment. 
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Secondly, the agent has to be responsive, which means that it has to be able to react to 
changes and input from its environment. This creates a more realistic scheme of 
interaction where the individual agent will take into account everything that happens 
in its specific surroundings which is different from the situation of other agents who 
may be exposed to different environmental stimuli. In our model, agents will, for 
example, react to a change in the interest rates offered in their neighborhood. 
Furthermore, an agent is supposed to be proactive, which implies that it is capable of 
generating actions by its own initiative in order to reach some goal or desired 
objective. Through this capacity, they change from being objects to agents who will 
actively decide to implement some action or show a certain behavior. In the presented 
simulation, we will find this proactive behavior for example when the agent decides to 
move somewhere else in his environment. 
Lastly, the agent has to be able to interact with its environment and the other agents in 
the simulation. This means that an agent can exchange messages with another agent 
and react to those inputs. Furthermore, it allows for an interaction between the actors 
in the simulation. The model which we will explain in chapter 7 will have agents who 
communicate with their peer network on risk related aspects and can therefore 
influence others as well as they are influenced by others. Consequently, this creates 
very quickly a complex structure of reciprocal influence. 
Our definition above also referred to the environment in which the agents are placed. 
This may be understood to be a space but it can just as well be a theoretical context in 
which agents interact. In our model, the environment has the simple representation of 
a square on which the agents are living. Nevertheless, the funds for example can be 
understood to be close or distanced from an individual not in spatial dimensions but 
relating to their investment strategy.
166
 
Furthermore, agent-based modeling is mostly based on computational methods since 
the calculations can grow very complex and their amount grows very large once we 
allow a number of agents to interact with each other and with the environment in 
several consecutive time steps. The great advantage of the last years is that 
computational power is highly available and many complex calculations can be left for 
the computer. 
Lastly, Gilbert‟s definition above pointed to the idea of experimenting. In social 
sciences, it is very difficult to conduct experiments as we do in physics. Since we deal 
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with humans, we can never start two experiments with identical points of departure 
since we either have to choose groups of different humans or – if the same group of 
individuals is taken – they will have the experiences from the first experiment when 
the second starts. Furthermore, they will know that there is an experiment done on 
them and they might change their behavior, or we may face some ethical concerns 
because of the implementation. Besides, an experiment which might last for several 
years can probably only be run a few times in the course of a researcher‟s professional 
life. So, it is impossible to create the situation where a treated group can be compared 
to an untreated group and we can generate a “ceteris paribus”-situation where only the 
one impact which we are trying to investigate is changed. Therefore, experiments in 
social sciences always have to accept considerable limitations if they are attempted. 
Modeling has the limitation that we have to find a way to define, in very precise terms, 
the world which we try to analyze and that we probably have to reduce the complexity 
in order to be able to present our research question. But once that is achieved then we 
can experiment very well and in a very extensive form with this model and see if we 
can derive valuable insight from its results. 
6.1.2 When to use ABM? 
Computational modeling offers great benefits, but it also has its shortcomings. We will 
use this section to shed light on the advantages that this form of theorizing offers and 
discuss the aspects where other theoretical approaches may lead to better solutions. 
There are several reasons why agent-based models may be employed. Their usage may 
be valuable even though a mathematical representation of the situation is possible and 
solvable. Nevertheless, the main advantage arguably lies in the simulation of 
relationships which cannot be solved mathematically. In such a situation, if an agent-
based model can be formulated which uses the same or related assumptions then the 
insight created from its different runs can help solve the research question.
167
 
Furthermore, we have to note that agent-based modeling requires the researcher to be 
very specific about each and every assumption he takes in the model. “[T]he 
simulation format does impose its own constructive discipline in the modeling of 
dynamic systems: the program must contain a complete specification of how the 
system state at t + 1 depends on that at t and on exogenous factors, or it will not 
run.”168 This quote underlines that in order to program a model that is supposed to 
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show some cause-effect relationships you will have to specify every detail of the 
process. No implication or self-evident linkage can be left out and this makes a 
computer based model extremely transparent and reproducible. 
On a general basis, we can identify three large advantages of agent-based models:
169
 
ABM can show developments: 
Once several individual agents interact over a longer period of time, we can see certain 
patterns and structures emerge among them. It is either very hard or maybe even 
impossible to figure those out by analyzing the behavior of a representative member of 
this group. This can be due to the fact that the sum of the interactions does not equal 
the development of the overall system. For example, we can observe that traffic jams 
move “backwards” along highways.170 This can be explained by the fact that cars may 
be able to drive again at the beginning of the traffic jam, but that the newly arriving 
cars still approach cars standing at the end of it and are forced to stop. Consequently, 
the traffic jam is growing at the end while it dissolves at the beginning and we can see 
it moving backwards along the highway. This development may seem to also be 
analytically presentable in this example which is due to the low complexity. 
Nevertheless, it serves very well to illustrate the possible discrepancy between the 
individual behavior of members of a system and the system‟s behavior we would 
intuitively expect, and the observed phenomenon in the overall structure. The way 
agent-based models are designed we can easily grasp those developments. 
ABM offers a natural way of describing a system: 
While classical methods tend to try to describe the activity within a system through 
sets of equations, agent-based modeling starts at a very different level. Instead of an 
analysis of aggregate values, it can start with a description of the behavior of the 
individual elements which make up the system in question and watch the aggregate 
states which emerge from it. Traditional methods could, for example, measure the 
density and the flows of visitors of a shopping mall and represent those at least in an 
approximate way by equations. ABM, on the other hand, can offer a system where the 
behavior and the moving patterns of the individual shopper can be modeled and the 
consequences on density and flows of visitors can be endogenously created.  “Agent-
based models are well designed to handle any of these situations, since they can 
specifically model agent interactions in any arbitrary space.”171 This bottom-up 
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approach furthermore offers the ability to explore in the model the effects of changes 
in the behavior or the environment, which may not easily or intuitively be predicted in 
a classical representation. 
ABM is flexible: 
Agent-based modeling offers in many dimensions a higher degree of flexibility than 
other methods. It is possible to vary the amount of agents within a system or change 
their setup fairly easily, because the simulation will then integrate those changes and it 
is possible to watch the outcomes change. This allows for an adaptation of behavioral 
patterns, a change in reaction and interaction structures or a modification of properties 
of the individual agent. Furthermore, different levels of aggregation can be watched at 
all time steps during the simulation and simultaneously, making it easier to find the 
underlying reasons behind an observed development. Often enough, the overall 
behavior or even emergent strategies in the individuals‟ actions and reactions may 
surface and evolve during the course of a simulation making it possible to include 
group effects from an individually based perspective.
172
 Thanks to this flexibility it is 
not necessary that we find in the beginning the one exact calibration of the model or 
define the desired level of aggregation. It allows the analysis of the model‟s evolution 
and its outcomes from many different perspectives. Furthermore, it allows other 
researchers to possibly use the same model for research on a different research 
question. 
Those are the most prominent advantages of the agent-based modeling. We will now 
discuss some of the difficulties which have to be respected when creating or analyzing 
the models. One dilemma which every modeler is facing is that he has a vast array of 
possibilities to make the simulation ever more realistic and refine the assumptions so 
as to match the real world example. This will however create a complexity in the 
model which requires the designer to specify how many underlying processes evolve. 
“These all involve many design choices and may include many low level parameters 
for which economic intuition is almost nonexistent.”173 Consequently, it is important 
to demonstrate very diligently why specific design choices have been taken
174
 and 
open the source code allowing others to reproduce the results and test other 
specifications. 
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Another aspect that is often criticized in agent-based modeling refers to its ability of 
precise predicting. It seems that when it is impossible to give a clear outcome of a 
situation that then, the model is not worth anything. The computational model then 
appears to be hard or impossible to test because there is no way that this result can be 
mapped to reality. In fact, while it is true that computational models will hardly ever 
come up with one (equilibrium) result and therefore seem to be incapable of 
predicting, we have to stress, though, that agent-based models offer ranges of 
outcomes.
175
 Most mathematical models which will offer a single point solution are 
then compared to a set of data from the real world, where we try to factor out the 
influence investigated and try to falsify or support the formulas employed. So this 
means that traditional approaches compare a point to a cloud. In computational 
models, we run a simulation a number of times and will receive a cloud of results from 
those different runs. In order to test the model for its plausibility, we can then see if 
the reactions seem comparable. So, now we do not have to eliminate all kinds of noise 
from the results in the real world, but take the real world data as is and compare it to 
the different outcomes of the simulation. This means that we do not match a point to a 
cloud anymore, but that agent-based modeling allows us to compare one set of data to 
a second set. In other words, we are “comparing clouds to clouds”176. 
Furthermore, the simulation may lead to a cloud of different outcomes given a set of 
assumptions for a model. This leads to the situation where each researcher can 
compare the model setup to a real-world problem and find linkages or differences 
which may allow the reasoning of why situations evolved differently than in the model 
or how changes to the real system may influence future development. No economic 
problem can be dealt with by using easy methods because of the complexity of the 
world in general. Even Marshall noted this when writing: “The fact that the general 
conditions of life are not stationary is the source of many of the difficulties that are 
met with in applying economic doctrines to practical problems.”177 Since we cannot 
systematically forecast what will happen in the future, having models which may 
highlight certain influences and dependencies on a broader scale can increase the 
possibility of keeping a certain flexibility in the system in order to respond adequately, 
even to unexpected and therefore unprepared events.
178
 In this context, agent-based 
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models can serve as “computational laboratories”179 where it is possible to test and 
explore the effects and consequences of certain characteristics on the entire system. 
6.1.3 Particularities of ABM 
In this section, we will introduce some aspects which are worth considering when 
analyzing agent-based models in order to be able to evaluate their concepts and 
estimate the potential usage of a specific simulation. 
6.1.3.1 Dimensions 
With respect to the multitude of agent-based models and simulations referring to 
different societal phenomena, it may be worthwhile to structure them in different 
dimensions in order to better evaluate their concept:
180
 
Abstract vs. descriptive models: we can differentiate models by the degree to which 
they are meant to focus on the reality as prototype. Some models prefer a high 
specificity in details in order to mimic certain developments while other models use 
strong abstraction in order to better illustrate the underlying research focus. 
Artificial vs. realistic models: Some models use assumptions which cannot be met in 
the real world in order to analyze the potential of certain development paths.
181
 On the 
other hand, modelers may wish to design their models as realistic as possible. 
Positive vs. normative models: Positive models are generally used to explain 
phenomena and developments and find the underlying reasons leading to their 
emergence. Normative models, on the contrary, focus on generating policy 
recommendations which can be used in real world problems. 
Space-related vs. network-oriented models: The former will try to simulate agent 
behavior in an environment which can be understood as a clearly defined space. The 
large field of geographical information systems (GIS) simulation includes very precise 
geographical data in the simulation in order to improve the interaction of the agents 
with their environment. On the other hand, models may not require a clear space-based 
definition of the agents‟ environment and may focus on the networks between the 
different actors in the simulation in order to focus on different aspects of interaction. 
Complex vs. simple agents: Finally, we can create agents with high artificial 
intelligence which can adapt in a very elaborate way to their surroundings or we can 
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create agents with precise and simple behavioral rules depending on the goal of the 
simulation. We will treat agents more closely in section 6.1.3.4. 
6.1.3.2 System setup 
In this section, we will sketch a rough draw of the central components needed in an 
agent-based model
182
, so that the presentation of the design in chapter 7 will be 
comprehensible. 
Discrete time steps: most models are created in an environment where we use discrete 
time steps which can be understood as different durations in the real world, such as for 
example a year or a week. There are models where the simulation is event-driven and 
not every agent will be active at every time step
183
, but even then time is evaluated in 
discrete ticks. 
Agents: The agents are the heart of the simulation since they incorporate the behavior 
and will act or react to environmental stimuli. We will treat them in more detail in 
section 6.1.3.4. 
Micro States: Every agent will have a set of properties which can change in reaction to 
his own actions or as a consequence of influences from the environment. Some may 
even change on a regular basis such as for example the age of the individual. Other 
possible variables in this category include the income of the agent or his risk aversion. 
Micro-Parameters: There are certain parameters which are innate in each agent and 
which cannot be changed during the course of the simulation because they do not rely 
on any endogenous development within the model. In our precise case, micro-
parameters of an agent can be the amount of innovations the agent‟s ancestors have 
successfully implemented. 
Macro-Parameters: While micro-parameters are linked to each agent and can be 
different between agents, macro-parameters apply to the overall simulation 
environment and are constant for every agent and over time. This means that they 
characterize the fixed surroundings and settings in which the simulation is placed. 
Examples for macro-parameters include minimum ages required for working, the 
available levels of education or the geography of the space in which the agents 
interact. 
Interaction Structures: They describe the relationship which may exist between agents 
and which express the influences and interactions which are possible on the micro 
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level. The interaction structures can be modeled as networks or as spatial possibilities 
to reach, communicate with and influence other agents in the simulation. 
Micro Decision Rules: The rules shape the behavior of the agents. Depending on his 
micro states, his micro-parameters, the macro-parameters, and the interaction 
structures an individual will decide on his actions and reactions in the current time 
step. The agent‟s micro-states and his interaction structures can be influenced by his 
decisions and the consequences of his choices. Moreover, his actions may have an 
effect on the environment and specifically other agent‟s micro-states or their 
interaction structures leading to possibly very complex structures.  
Aggregate Variables: In order to analyze some meso- or macro-level influences and 
cause-effect-relations, it can be useful to aggregate micro-states of the agents to higher 
level variables. 
Consequently, a certain initial setup of the environment and the agents will lead 
through the application of the micro decision rules as well as the interaction structures 
to a situation, where the system can start a dynamic development on its own and where 
the outcome may not be readily guessed.  
The difficulties lie in judging the complexity which should be included in the model 
design and in the way the problem is approached. The dilemma lies in the fact that the 
more realistic and detailed a simulation gets the less transparent and understandable it 
will become.
184
 This leads to a situation where it may be more difficult to infer certain 
relationships between influences. It seems that most agent-based modelers have tried 
to solve this dilemma by stressing to use the KISS-approach.
 185
 
Models are first and foremost meant to be simple, so that they do not carry in them 
ideas and influences external to the research question. “Modeling is like stone carving: 
the art is in removing what you do not need.”186 Once a model is set up, understood 
and running, we can add complexity and try to reshape it to better serve certain ends. 
Nevertheless, it is important to keep a clear and well justified system setup to which 
more and more aspects can be added through future research. Otherwise it may be 
hard to identify the mechanisms and the cause-effect relationships within the system 
which limits the explanatory power of the system.
187
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6.1.3.3 Time 
One aspect which is different in computational modeling is that we have to devote 
special attention to time in the simulation process.
188
 In regular neoclassical models 
including dynamic programming approaches as we discussed in section 5.2, all actions 
are supposed to happen simultaneously or sequentially and then we can derive certain 
conclusions. This leads us, for example, to the conclusion that in a homogenous 
market with perfect information, the price will settle in a position where supply 
matches demand. Time is not considered to be a decisive criterion since both actions – 
the adaptation of demand and of supply – are considered to be equally influential for 
the eventual equilibrium found in the market.
189
 
In a computational model, we can easily match this behavior by defining consuming 
agents and supplying agents. The consuming agents will look at some values (maybe 
prices for homogenous goods) and make a decision about how to behave during their 
next move. Similarly, the producers will look at some values and decide which 
quantity and which price to offer upon their next step. This will not yet uniquely 
define a computational model, however, since nothing has been said so far about the 
frequency of the different behaviors. How often will the consumers make their 
decision and how often will the producers react and revise their action? It is important 
in agent-based modeling to consider the timeline of events and justify why an event is 
triggered at a specific moment. Additionally, while this issue may be left implicit in 
any other kind of model, the computer needs the specification about which action to 
implement and when. 
While it may seem trivial at the example of finding a market-clearing price in one 
market, this becomes a very important aspect in more complex models where 
interaction between agents happens at different levels.  
Additionally, it is important to figure out where the simulation will start. While it is 
easy to define the time to start in the model, it is not trivial to relate it to a starting 
point in the real world problem which the simulation is meant to help shed light on.
190
 
This means that while the simulation has a clearly defined starting point, there is 
hardly any development in reality which starts at a given point zero. Therefore, the 
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modeler is required to explain the specific initialization methods of the model which 
create the starting point for the simulation. 
6.1.3.4 Definition of the agents  
In many models of traditional economics, the behavior of the people is assumed to be 
that of a homo oeconomicus who will behave rationally in a utility maximizing way 
and in always the same manner given the same decision problem. This assumption has 
allowed many great models and advances in explaining economic phenomena and it 
proved to be very valuable for numerous economic theories.  
Nevertheless, there are many critiques to using this hypothesis and – particularly in the 
strand of behavioral economics – economists have tried to abstract from this principle. 
In many experiments
191
, economists have shown that in countless cases humans do not 
follow a simple strategy of utility maximization but that they also try to use 
simplifying heuristics and surface a “satisficing”192 behavior meaning that they will 
not necessarily try to reach the best case solution but that they are willing to settle for 
a successful solution. Nevertheless, abolishing all kinds of rationality from an 
individual‟s behavior would not be a sensible solution either. “Our modeling of social 
agents tends toward extremes: we either consider worlds composed of remarkably 
prescient and skilled agents or worlds populated by morons. Yet, we know that real 
agents exist somewhere in between those extremes.”193 It is therefore important to 
carefully shape the agents and their behavioral patterns to be designed in a somewhat 
similar way to how they would behave in a real world environment which may be 
governed by bounded rationality, chances, or accidents.  
“It is specifically the stochastic nature of innovation processes in particular, and 
economic processes in general, that leads economic agents to use routines.”194 So, 
while some concepts can be analyzed on a macro basis ignoring the underlying 
interdependencies on the micro and meso levels, it may seem shortsighted to explain 
the creation of economic structures without a micro economic theory supporting it. In 
some cases, reducing the model to a macro-based approach can help limit the 
complexity of a model and can be the only possible way to actually analyze some 
effects. Nevertheless, today‟s computational capacities and the strengths of the 
                                                 
191
 see for example [Xlab10]. For a critique on those experiments and their explanatory power as well as 
a defense for the concept of the homo oeconomicus, see [EpstR08] 
192
 [Simo59], pp. 262ff 
193
 [MiPa07], p. 28 
194
 [Engl94], p. 227 
Individual Risk and Innovative Behavior - Agent-based Modeling 
70 
simulation tools, enable us to set up a much deeper analysis model and include the 
micro economic factors that actually create the macroeconomic structures.
195
 
Consequently, we will define sets of rules which govern the agents‟ behavior and will 
allow them to act and to react to certain environmental stimuli or to input from their 
peer network. The rules we define are meant to be simple and easy, so that the model 
will not lose too much transparency. Further research can add to those rules and 
enlarge the model in order to increase the explanatory power. 
A second aspect concerning the agents is the homogeneity of their characteristics and 
their behavior. In many traditional models, we had to assume an average person of the 
group to be the “representative agent” and we would set out to model his behavior. 
Yet, while it may be possible in some cases to assume homogeneity in the 
specification of different members of a group, this may be harmful in some other cases 
to the conclusions drawn concerning the overall dynamics of a system. Homogeneity 
and average behavior can lead to inferences which defer widely from a heterogeneous 
representation of agents within a group. 
We will use an example to show where those differences come from and why it is not 
possible to make up for them in a model using average behavior.
196 
We will consider 
two different cases where heterogeneity will have a stabilizing effect in the first setup 
and a destabilizing and reinforcing effect in the second. Both effects cannot be 
reproduced in a model based on homogeneous representative agents calibrated to 
reflect the average member of a population due to the lack of including feedback 
loops.  
In the first case, the idea is that bees can help control the temperature in the hive. If all 
bees start their cooling or their heating activities at the same time because the “average 
bee” is feeling uncomfortable, then the hive will see strongly fluctuating temperatures. 
If, on the other hand, bees have different temperatures at which they engage in those 
regulating activities, then we can observe a fairly stable temperature curve for the 
hive. This is due to the decentralized reaction of the individual bees which will not all 
cool, heat or stop at the same moment. 
The second example takes the defense reaction of the hive to show how positive 
feedback in a heterogeneous setting can lead to a rather instable situation. If in the 
homogeneous case, each bee will start to defend the hive once it sees more than 50 
bees engage in defensive action, then this will be the threshold below which the 
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population will not show any reaction and above which the whole hive will start 
defending. In a situation, however, where each bee has an individual threshold which 
can range from 1 to 100, then stimulating one single bee to a defensive reaction will 
make the whole population defend the hive. A bee with a threshold of one, that sees 
one other defending the hive, will join the action. Since now there are two of them, 
those with a threshold of two will join in. Consequently, while in the homogeneous 
case the impulse had to be of at least 50, an impulse of one is sufficient in the 
heterogeneous case for a reaction of the entire hive. 
From these two examples we can see that the emerging behavior of the overall system 
can be dramatically changed by assuming heterogeneity within a population and 
including feedback processes into the group behavior. 
An advantage of computational models such as agent-based models is the possibility 
of diligently specifying the individual agent‟s behavior. Then it is possible that there is 
no longer the absolute need to homogenize the group of individuals allowing different 
agents to react differently in seemingly identical situations due to different preferences 
or characteristics. Moreover, we can open the behavioral rules to interaction, learning 
and adaptation and therefore integrate a social component into the dynamics. 
Accordingly, the agents can be specified in a more realistic way and we can allow the 
model to become more complex. 
6.1.3.5 Verification and validation of the model 
Once the model is designed and set up in a sufficient way and implements the desired 
behavior, the modeler will have to test if it runs properly and without errors and then 
he will focus on the validation of the model. 
The more complicated a model gets, the harder it is to make sure that certain results 
are due to emergent behavior within the system and not mere effects of programming 
errors. The task is even more complicated when dealing with computational models 
since they often use random numbers in order to simulate stochastic processes. 
Consequently, each run of the simulation will be different and it may be tedious to 
track each program step since the amount of random numbers entering in the process 
can be substantial. Sometimes “it is only the distribution of results which can be 
anticipated by the theory.”197 
Therefore it is crucial to devote sufficient attention to the debugging process of the 
model as well as the verification of the integrity of its interior methods. It may also be 
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useful to add some control variables to the model which help to verify the proper run. 
Besides, tracking certain steps or specific agents may help find programming errors or 
the causes of unintended consequences within the behavior of the simulation. 
The validation part of checking the model is no longer linked to finding internal errors, 
but rather deals with the question if the model is designed to meet its target and 
provide insight to the research question considered. There are several issues which can 
make it difficult to actually validate a model on real world data. 
The more abstract a model is the more difficult it will be to validate it against any data 
because the modeled scenarios do not exist in such a form at all.
198
 Validation can then 
consist in checking if the emergent structures lead to an expected or an explainable 
result and if it is possible to add theoretical insight from the models‟ outcomes. Then 
those results can be mapped against real world observations in the desired field of 
attention and they can be judged at least on the plausibility of the argument.  
The goal can be in finding certain characteristics that may be important both in the real 
world and in the simulation and to add those to construct less abstract models in 
further research where certain emergent situations can be better related to data.  
Furthermore, there are some important arguments to respect which make a clear 
validation difficult and which have to be considered when interpreting the results.
199
 
Since most simulations include random number and since we find stochasticity in the 
underlying real world phenomena, we can certainly not expect a direct correspondence 
of the results. Comparing clouds of results to clouds of data may help estimate the 
validity of the model. Additionally, most results depend on their own history. This 
means that the initialization is crucial to the results and it may be impossible to start 
them with the same setup as the realistic prototype situation. This can also lead to 
situations where models may be incapable of reproducing certain realistic aspects even 
though they seem very well calibrated and show expected developments. Then the 
validation has to rely on sensible interpretation and explanation of why certain aspects 
may distort the results. Sometimes, however, the problem may not be on the 
simulation‟s or the programmer‟s side, but it can be hard or even impossible to obtain 
correct data about the modeled target. Then again it is important to check if the 
model‟s results can be explained by a theory or if the reasons for certain developments 
within the system can be found through the observation of the individual agents. 
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Once a model is believed to be valid, sensitivity analysis will help check for the 
robustness of the emergent developments and may show certain thresholds and tipping 
points to consider. It may also add to the insight on the usefulness of certain 
assumptions if the model seems to be overly sensitive or not reactive at all to changes 
in certain variables which are supposed to be important for the simulation. Therefore, 
a sensitivity analysis should check the results of different runs
200
 and different initial 
situations. 
6.2 Agent-based Computational Economics 
Generally, agent-based modeling is possible and feasible for all kinds of sciences and 
domains where individual entities interact in a certain environment. Since we will 
focus on an economic research question within the field of social science, we may turn 
to the field of agent-based computational economics (ACE). It can be defined as “the 
computational study of economic processes modeled as dynamic systems of 
interacting agents.”201 
We can point to four distinct focal points of ACE which also suggest the wide field of 
potential application. The first deals with the understanding of the emergence of global 
structures in a decentralized economic setting even though there is no planning or 
control of any superior institution. The main idea is to explain why specific individual 
actions of intelligent and independent actors can lead to regular structures in the 
overall market. As we can see in the many real world economic developments and as 
Adam Smith has explained so accurately as an invisible hand
202
, we often find 
situations where the result would make us suppose a concerted action while no central 
coordination between the individual actors generating this result has ever taken place. 
The micro-based explanation of emergent patterns and structures which may be stable 
over time or keep evolving is the central aim in this strand of agent-based 
computational economics.  
The second aspect where ACE-methods show promising opportunities is that an agent-
based model can serve as a form of laboratory in which different consequences and 
situation can be analyzed. The goal is to test, understand and possibly predict in a 
normative way the consequences and effects that different specific socio-economic 
                                                 
200
 This could be done, for example, by using the same initial setup but different random numbers. 
201
 [Tesf07] 
202
 Smith puts it very fittingly when he points to the fact that it seems as if the actions of an individual 
are “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention.” [Smit76], Book IV, 
chapter 2.9 
Individual Risk and Innovative Behavior - Agent-based Modeling 
74 
constellations have on the behavior of individuals, on the interaction within existing or 
newly formed networks, and on economic growth and wealth in general.
203
 “The 
general approach is akin to filling a bucket with water to determine if it leaks.”204 It is 
all about creating and installing a system where it is possible to test and explore which 
circumstances make it efficient, fair or structured. 
The third focal point is a descriptive approach where the main goal is to explain why 
certain structures and forms of collective behavior can be seen in the real world and 
why others are not apparent. Models following this idea are mainly trying to promote 
the understanding and theoretical insights in the economic theory. Agent-based models 
will then be used to test which influences, characteristics and interaction patterns are 
theoretically suited to create such a development or which ones can be ruled out to be 
responsible for creating observed structures. 
The fourth strand of ACE-research finally concentrates on factors which can improve 
agent-based models so that they can provide better use for economic research 
questions. This relates on the one hand to a better use of the technology available 
meaning the computational power of the hardware as well as the offered potential of 
available software environments. If the technological progress can be used to improve 
the scope of agent-based models, then this way of theoretical reasoning may increase 
in acceptance. On the other hand, part of this argument is also the work on existing 
models and their processes of creation, implementation, documentation and 
exploitation.
205
  
The individual behavior of agents, their reaction to the specific environment and 
surroundings as well as the influence which the behavior of other agents triggers in the 
them often limit the ability to express those interrelations in a formal way and make it 
difficult or even impossible to solve these problems in a mathematical way.
206
 In those 
cases agent-based modeling offers a very powerful alternative; for some researcher it 
seems to be the only one which can be used.
207
  
Agent-based modeling has started to appear in several fields of economics with highly 
different research questions.
208
 The same is true for many fields of business 
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administration where agent-based modeling offers just as valuable a way to approach 
decision problems.
209
 Nevertheless, there are some drawbacks linked to this gain in 
popularity. Since there is no unique form of standardizing agent-based models, many 
researchers work in their own ways making the comparability of models difficult.
210
 
This has the great advantage that many different possibilities will be examined, 
explored and tested. Nevertheless, it requires a larger effort to evaluate the validity and 
the relevance of models and simulations. Therefore, it is crucial to secure the 
reproducibility and the transparency of the model, as well as to specify clearly the 
implementation of the simulation. Unfortunately, this has not always been the case in 
the past.
211
 Consequently, we devote special attention in the next chapter to a thorough 
presentation of the setup, design and implementation of our model along with the 
entire source code in the appendix.
212
  
                                                 
209
 see for example [DeKl10], p. 11 
210
 cf. [PyWe09], 1.2 
211
 see for example [DeKl10] for a critique 
212
 The complete source code is reprinted in appendix A, the additional files used in Repast S will be 
voluntarily provided upon request by the author. 
Individual Risk and Innovative Behavior - Modeling the relationship 
76 
7 Modeling the relationship
213
 
Since we can argue with Schumpeter that the understanding of modern Western 
lifestyles is more and more focused on a culture “in which the economy in its social 
totality does business by making the individuals or groups be economically active”214, 
we will focus on the individuals in this model and their role in the process of 
generating innovations. Our model will try to provide some insight from a micro-
based perspective by focusing on the individual agents and by analyzing the emergent 
structures. This chapter will be used to present the model design and explain its setup. 
There are tendencies in agent-based modeling suggesting that models should also be 
able to offer normative approaches and insights for political questions and topics. 
“ABMs can and should be employed to address policy issues as well. [...] Thanks to 
the flexibility and the power of agent-based approaches, it is easy to conceive 
frameworks where policy experiments are carried out to evaluate the effectiveness of 
different policy measures (e.g. anti-trust policies), for a range of different institutional 
setups and behavioural rules.”215 Corresponding to this idea, the model presented here 
is meant to take a closer look at the consequences of a political decision of voters – to 
individually deal with existential risks or to see them covered by a social insurance 
scheme - on the future orientation of a society. Even though the model is certainly 
artificial and abstract, it may open up new ways to approach this topic and offer new 
insight. 
Every model is connected to some assumptions and hypotheses which are taken in 
order to be able to find any correlations and cause-effect-relationships. Those 
assumptions necessarily simplify the modeled situation and consequently, the results 
can only be partially copied in any real world situation. Nevertheless, establishing a 
model at a 1:1 scale would not be a copy anymore but an image of the real world and 
it would not allow drawing any more conclusions than we already can in the real 
world. Accordingly, we will use our assumptions in order to sufficiently simplify the 
situation so that we can point to some underlying mechanisms and correlations. 
The model, which we will develop here, will deal with two extreme situations where 
we will suppose no social insurance whatsoever on the one hand with agents who face 
their risks on their own and an unconditional insurance scheme on the other which will 
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always pitch in when an individual finds itself in existential distress. The analysis will 
then look at the different innovation potential in each situation corresponding to the 
two very distinct ideas of social life. 
When it comes to implementing the ideas we described above in the model, we have to 
be very thorough as to watch at the proper transformation. Therefore, we will proceed 
very diligently to present the model and its underlying ideas as well as the precise 
implementation.  
7.1 Interest of the model 
Most western economies offer some degree of social insurance and as we have 
discussed in chapter 5 there are very different practices of securing the standard of 
living of members of the society who are in need. On the other hand, the history of 
social security shows that most of those systems have been developed as a reaction to 
similar problems and with the same ideas in mind. Poverty and extreme forms of 
distress which were perceived to be exorbitant in the society – probably compared to 
the predominant standard of living – and which lead to a feeling that society had the 
obligation to help those people. If this was forced upon the system by worker‟s 
demonstrations or by the discomfort of the ruling elites is not important for the 
outcome. Yet, we realize that the logic of social insurances is based on very static 
arguments of fairness and social peace. Those may be very valuable arguments, but 
they will leave the dilemma for each politician that they could potentially endanger the 
economic goals of increasing the overall wealth of the members of the society. 
Therefore, the model which we will develop will approach the question of social 
insurance from a future-oriented perspective and will try to add insight to the idea that 
a social insurance scheme might have a positive effect on the innovativeness of the 
citizens and therefore serve as a motor for future development which will benefit the 
entire society. As a consequence, we could argue that the static dilemma of relocating 
resources for reasons of fairness and social justice, is one side of the coin which holds 
the promise of successful growth in the future on the other side.  
On the other hand, our analysis could have shown that the perceived dissonance 
between social security and an optimal allocation of resources is even strengthened 
when we look at a dynamic situation. Then we would have had to think of new or 
better forms to achieve our goal of social peace and basic protection for those in need 
while aiming for sustainable and advancing development of the economy.  
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The interest of the model is therefore to propose an evolutionary perspective on the 
justification for social security measures and to provide evidence from a dynamic 
modeling environment towards the question of innovation promotion through the 
protection against existential risks. 
We could now propose a model which only focuses on the activity of innovation 
where we leave out the generation of income and abstract from the provision for risks 
in the behavior of the individual agents. There are some advantages that such an 
approach would entail. It could be enough to generate a model of innovation where we 
set up a concept of how risk, uncertainty and other criteria influence the propensity of 
heterogeneous individuals to innovate. This model could already give us a good idea if 
it is possible at all for a government to stimulate innovation by risk management. It 
would ease the burden of defining the behavior of individuals in many decisions such 
as related to their consumption or their risk provision. By keeping the model as simple 
as possible we could better concentrate on the underlying dynamics and their 
foundations in the agents‟ actions.  
Yet, when trying to assess the influences which a social insurance scheme will have on 
the innovativeness of the society and therefore its future orientation, we may not 
overlook that such an insurance will have repercussions on the saving and provision 
strategy of an individual which will in turn influence again the innovative behavior. 
By focusing only on the field of inventing and innovating, we would deprive the 
model of this influence and therefore ignore one of the great advantages of agent-
based modeling which is the integration of those reciprocal cause-effect chains. 
Consequently, it is important to implement the entire life-cycle of the economic life – 
which may be abstracted and simplified more or less strongly – in order to include the 
dynamics of this process even though this adds to the complexity and requires more 
assumptions on the behavior. Still, further models will be able to use those results and 
approaches to relax some assumptions or use different hypotheses to further increase 
the robustness of the conclusions which can be found in this context. 
We will now present the fundamental hypotheses relating to the two different basic 
models and will then explain in detail the setup of the model. 
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7.2 Fundamental hypotheses 
“All theory depends on assumptions which are not quite true. That‟s what makes it 
theory.”216 Whenever we try to explain economic or social outcomes, we need certain 
hypotheses which help us to abstract from the real life cases. Any model has to 
simplify reality otherwise it would not be a model. Following this approach, we have 
used a few fundamental hypotheses around which the simulation has been designed.  
The basic idea of this work is the juxtaposition of the consequences which different 
societal systems have on the innovative activity in the community. Intuitively, almost 
everybody will agree that the form of organization of the public life will have an effect 
on the life and the way of living of the people. Similarly, it is possible to compare 
historically different systems and one will find that there are differences in the 
inventive activity and the speed of technological change.
217
 It is beyond the scope of 
this work to empirically explore the exact influences which the societal structure had 
in each case, but from these two aspects, intuition and historically visible differences, 
we derived the motivation to try to model a correlation between the innovative activity 
of a society and one component of its form of organization, the insurance against life 
risks. 
The innovative activity has been chosen as ultimate goal since it is both in the CNSE 
and in the Neo-Schumpeterian approach the central variable which guarantees future-
oriented dynamics and progress in a society. Without innovation, an economy will 
eventually find an equilibrium state and will end in stagnation.
218
 Innovation, 
therefore, is the driving force behind any improvement of the living conditions of the 
people. Even though not everybody can be an inventor – since you would need a 
certain know-how and high creativity – and not everybody can be an entrepreneur – 
many people will most likely lack the sufficient capital or the risk seeking attitude – 
every society needs a certain amount of inventors and entrepreneurs who will promote 
change and develop new products and services. The realization of innovations will 
create jobs and markets with a future potential – both of which are elementary 
preconditions for the prospects of the following generations. While it is true that not 
every job is in those highly innovative sectors, those are nevertheless the ones which 
drive the development and are able to attract the more traditional industries and their 
employment opportunities. 
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In the evolutionary context, it is important that many new entrepreneurial endeavors 
are undertaken since they will create competition and force the existing companies to 
be more dynamic.
219
 The founders of the new firms generally do not hold a 
sufficiently large stock of capital and may face – especially in the beginning – large 
difficulties obtaining venture capital. This makes those drivers of innovation very 
vulnerable and dependent on future-oriented bankers. The close connection between 
the young firms and the financial markets as well as their consequences has been 
discussed in detail in section 4.2 and 4.3.  
On the other hand, we will use the societal form of organization as a second important 
variable. The central question is if and how much the insurance aspect of the public 
system influences the innovative activity and, as a consequence, how much it 
contributes to securing the future of a social group. “In a capitalist economy, there are 
essentially two methods by which social choices can be made: voting, typically used to 
make „political‟ decisions, and the market mechanism, typically used to make 
„economic‟ decisions.”220 Schumpeter goes even a step further and defines the three 
most important moments for an economy to be: (1) the goal is the carrying out of new 
combinations; (2) the basic phenomenon is the entrepreneurial function and the 
behavior of economic agents; and (3) the means to reaching the goal given the 
situation is the choice of the “social form: authority or credit”221. As a society we have 
therefore two distinct choices to make when discussing those topics. Based on these 
two ideas – the central focus on innovation and the decision about social choice – we 
construct our scenario which is implemented in the model. 
We start from the idea that humans will gather in distinct groups and that these groups 
show different forms of organization. Those groups can most easily be thought of as 
different nations even though this is not a necessary interpretation. It could just as well 
relate to different regional cultures or forms of societal living or even supranational 
networks. The decisive assumption is that all people within one group are also living 
in the same system. This means that all choice processes which are done by moving to 
a different system
222
 have already occurred and that everybody is happy enough with 
the one he is living in. In elections, there can be a choice of tightening or loosening the 
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system‟s welfare guarantee, but at no times will a system switch from one state to the 
other.  
As a reaction to the different attitudes people have towards different risks, different 
forms of insurance have formed just as we have explained in chapter 5. Following this 
analysis, we have chosen two different forms of societal order which will be modeled 
and investigated for their effects on the amount of innovations in a society. In the first 
form, the median vote has been cast for the solution that every individual bears her 
own risks (“Individual model”) and in the other one the individuals will have chosen 
to bundle their risks collectively (“Governmental model”).  
 
The relevant risks fall into all phases of life. We assume that a person will be right 
away aware of her risks and will provide for them. As a child, she usually would not 
need as many resources as an adult to survive, but she will need money she can put 
into her education and training. We will abstract from the thought that generally a 
child is not able to make the supposed risk and preference considerations. The 
important thing is that the money she will use for her survival and her education and 
training are linked to her person. Since every youngster depends therefore on foreign 
resources in the beginning of her life, she will have to receive loans in the individual 
model in the simulation. 
Once she starts working, she will be concerned with her job security and the potential 
threat of unemployment and provide for trying times when there will be no sufficient 
work income to finance her living. Besides, work income might be reduced due to 
health limitations. If the person is struck with illnesses, sicknesses or other 
impairments then she will not be able to generate the same income as in a healthy 
state. 
Furthermore, an individual has to provide for the times when she will be retired and 
will no longer work. It is important to note that pension payments in our case refer to a 
basic guarantee of the subsistence minimum and not to a pension payment as it can 
generally be found in Western societies. The reason that we stress this differentiation 
is that there is a different incentive. While people today are happy when they receive 
their retirement payments for a long period of time, it is still not a desirable situation 
for the person living off the subsistence minimum in our simulation. Therefore, we can 
treat those pension payments just like the payments for the other risks where each time 
an individual has no interest to remain in this situation for a prolonged period of time. 
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From the different forms of facing the risks in societies, we design the two models and 
will explain those in detail here.
7.2.1 Individual Model in the CNSE
In this section, we will show how the individual model will blend into the three
design of the CNSE approach. We will focus on the way 
such a system will interact with the three different sectors, the real or industri
(I), the financial sector (F) and the public sector (P). In this setup, there is no public 
assistance in the case of a realized risk. Every individual lacking the funds to consume 
her subsistence minimum has to apply for a credit and find the nec
she fails to do so, she will starve and die.
In this situation, the capitalistic system is applied to the entire scheme of public life. It 
encompasses all forms of doing business, is present in all social activities and there is 
no influence from outside factors. This does not imply that there is no philanthro
social life in this model;
any private initiative designed to help those in need will have to face the competition 
with capitalistically oriented alternatives. 
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In such a system, creative destruction can fully exploit its beneficial potential of 
abolishing overcome technologies and products. There is no force which limits or 
slows this process of renewal which is solely able to secure a development on a 
growth path for the economy. The unlimited and unconstrained possibilities in this 
organizational design should contribute strongly to a high speed of technological 
change. 
On the other hand, the creative destruction can also harm the society to a considerable 
amount. As we have explained in chapter 4 when introducing the Neo-Schumpeterian 
Corridor, a system can fall into pieces when the speed of change is too high. This 
means that in the present case, the market forces may overshoot and eventually destroy 
the whole system. A situation which we might consider to be best apt at securing a 
positive future development turns out to be in itself catastrophic. Therefore, we can 
expect a stronger “up and down”-process in this simulation. 
All risk provision happens within the system and all money put aside for harder times 
can only be invested in a capitalistic market context. To be clear, this does not have to 
be a bad thing, but the individuals in this model do not have the security which they 
will experience in the governmental model. The system is designed in such a way that 
the money either flows into banks or is invested in funds which can be thought of as 
venture capital companies. An individual who will want to secure herself against risks 
can choose the low risk, low return bank investment or the high risk, high return fund 
investment. The banks will serve as lenders for credits needed to finance the agent‟s 
subsistence level consumption or the additional consumption desired. Their role is to 
serve as financiers of the regular activity which is in no way linked to innovation. The 
investment funds, on the other hand, are designed in a way to correspond to 
Schumpeter‟s banker in its best sense. They will provide the funds needed to realize 
innovative ideas and to implement new combinations. Without their money, the 
inventor would happen to have the necessary funds – and be willing to risk them – in 
order to be able to implement her invention into an innovation. Thanks to the risk-
oriented investment strategy by both the agents, who invested their money in the 
funds, and the fund managers, the inventors can find the necessary financial assistance 
to carry out the innovation. 
Nevertheless, this system does not have any automatic stabilizers that may serve to 
rebalance an overshooting development or serve as a boost in a period of 
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underperformance. We will explain those stabilizers in more detail when describing 
the governmental model. 
From this characterization of the model, we can now focus on the different flux of 
money between the sectors and their interrelation with the agents. In a schematic way, 
we can represent them as follows: 
 
Figure 7-2: Individual model in the CNSE 
The blue arrows represent each a financial flux from the corresponding sector to the 
individual while the red arrows refer to the monetary flow from the agents to each 
sector. The black arrow between the financial and the industrial pillar signifies that 
there exists a certain monetary exchange between those two sectors. Other relations 
between the sectors, which all may be possible, are excluded intentionally from the 
model, since they are not of decisive character for the interpretation of the simulation. 
The exchange with the industrial sector or real sector (I) is on the one hand created by 
the consumption of the individuals. Every agent consumes a certain amount of goods 
produced by the industrial sector. This includes the consumption of the goods and 
services necessary to survive (subsistence minimum) as well as those goods and 
services she consumes for her own satisfaction. The monetary flux for all consumption 
expenditures corresponds to the red arrow in the figure. The thickness of the arrow 
matches the importance of this budgetary position for the individual. 
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On the other hand, the blue arrow going in the opposite direction relates to the money 
which flows from the industrial sector to the individuals. It is mostly made up of work 
income, revenues from entrepreneurial activities and income on investments such as 
dividends.
224
 It may be surprising that the income stream is not considerably larger 
than the consumption stream since the agents will not use their entire income for 
consumption. Nevertheless, since there are funds which are withdrawn in the financial 
sectors used for consumption we have drawn the inflowing and outgoing streams 
between the agents and the industrial sector to be similar. 
The connection with the financial markets (F) is substantial since the agents will not 
only invest their savings in the financial sector, but will also hold their risk provision 
accounts there. Accordingly, we find large flows of money between the financial 
sector and the individual agents. The incoming and outgoing streams are 
approximately of the same magnitude since it can be considered that there are just as 
many people withdrawing their money as there are people saving money.
225
 The actual 
situation in every time step, however, may be very different since the behavior of the 
individuals is not concerted. 
The streams represent the saving and dissaving behavior of the agents as well as 
several forms of income on capital (e.g. interests, proceeds from capital, income from 
lease or other investments)
226
. People have very different saving motives and it is not 
always easy to discern those. We will settle for a differentiation of three different 
types: (1) precautionary saving, (2) special purpose saving and (3) residual saving.
227
 
The category of precautionary saving groups all those reserves which are set up to 
sooth future risks. This includes irregular or infrequent payments, expenses which are 
well into the future such as the money used for living after retirement and money 
which is saved to reduce the fear of unforeseen events. We consider all the savings 
related to the existential risks and to the uncertainty which every human faces as 
precautionary savings. 
We call special purpose saving all those sums where an agent decides not to spend 
them in order to acquire certain specific goods at a later moment, in order to create 
personal wealth or in order to earn interests on the savings. The third category of 
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residual saving includes for example virtuous saving
228
 which is only rooted in the 
belief that saving is a proper thing to do.  
The financial sector will then invest the money in the real sector (black arrow) either 
by spurring consumption because they award credits to the agents who desire to 
consume or by investing in innovative endeavors of creative agents lacking the 
financial means to implement their invention. Therefore, the interaction and 
interrelatedness of the financial and the real sectors is twofold through the 
consumption and savings decision of the household and its implication on the 
concerned agents, and through the financing of innovations. Furthermore, the real 
sector will return dividends and rents on the innovations to the financial sector which 
will then be rerouted to the individual investors. This underlines the strong influence 
of the households on the real sector. 
We have only sketched a dotted line to the public sector (P), since we have not 
modeled this monetary stream explicitly. It is, however, implicitly assumed so that the 
government can provide a general basic infrastructure which will allow us to compare 
the general setup of the societies in either model.  
Furthermore, we can ask the question if a private insurance should be designed 
comparable to an insurance company which will collect a premium from the insured 
member and then spends an agreed amount in the case of a realized risk or if it should 
be thought of like a funds system where the individual cumulates private savings 
which he will use once he needs the money. 
Both options can be found in the real world and both can be implemented. The 
advantages of an implied insurance solution are that no individual will fall entirely out 
of the system. In such a case, the choice of the individual is not fundamentally 
different to the one in the public system. An individual now has the option to change 
insurance companies and it is possible that the insurance company fails. The 
individual would now choose his insurance company based on the personal risk 
perception and we might be faced with the problems of moral hazard mentioned in 
section 5.2. This case can be implemented, but it would limit the insight the model 
could offer and would require us to take more assumptions on the behavior linked to 
the insurances. 
The other alternative, designing the private sector as a capital funds market similar to 
pension funds will work in such a way that the individual saves money for his own 
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 purpose and leaves it in the financial market where it can serve as risk capital. On the 
other hand, an individual may choose to invest his money in a more secure way, which 
will be designed through low risk, low interest loans to individuals asking for credit. 
Once a risk is realized, he will withdraw the money needed and will cover his 
subsistence minimum with those funds. In the case that the 
is insufficient, he will face starvation. 
in the risk provision decision and increases the transparency of the model.
Therefore, we have chosen this
private insurance companies may
7.2.2 Governmental Model in the CNSE
This section will now focus on the opposite organizational design and develop a 
scenario in which the governmental model is situated. 
that the government will 
agent faces a realized risk, she will receive the necessary monetary means to cover the 
damage and secure her own survival by receiving the subsistence minimum. Just like 
in the individual model, we find the real, the financial and the public sector and have a 
look at the interactions and connections between them.
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In this concept, we find a situation which is once again based on the capitalistic system 
and most of the actions and interactions between the agents will be based on 
capitalistic rules and processes. The system is comparable to the Individual system 
except for the social insurance component added through a political model of 
redistribution.  
In that situation, the agents will have voted to have a public system of coverage 
against certain risks in their lives and so there will be a government providing the 
necessary financial means in the case an individual is unable to procure for her own 
living.  
The agents will have the opportunity to vote on the magnitude of social protection by 
increasing or decreasing the subsistence minimum guaranteed by the state. This will 
be implemented through a vote of the median voter. Therefore we generate a situation 
where the members of the society have a direct influence on the amount of 
redistribution within their country.  
Furthermore, we would expect the social insurance to serve as an automatic stabilizer 
in this situation. At times, when many people face difficulties, the government will 
spend considerable amounts as support for those in need and at times, when the 
economy is going well, the money paid for the contribution to the social security is 
taken out of the system and will not spur further growth. This may lead to a situation 
which is less erratic than in the individual model. 
On the other hand, the available risk capital may be reduced due to the fact that some 
of the money which was invested in the individual model is now redistributed through 
the state. Still, the agents in the governmental model do not face an uncertainty as 
pronounced as those in the individual model which could lead to a situation where the 
people in the former will more likely invest their savings in risky positions than those 
in the latter model. 
The situation will likely lead to the following monetary flux between the sectors: 
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Figure 7-4: Governmental Model in the CNSE 
Similarly to the situation in the individual model, the streams between the agents and 
the industrial sector are comparable in size and fairly big. Once again, the stream 
going from the individuals to the firms depicting consumption spending is 
approximately as large as the opposite flux since now the withdrawals from the 
financial sector and the money handed out by the government to those incapable of 
providing their own minimal consumption needs are added to the consumption flux. 
The financial sector is less pronounced in this setup because the individuals will only 
use it for their special purpose saving and the residual savings motives. All 
precautionary saving is substituted by the governmental social insurance coverage. 
Nevertheless, the financial sector is still relevant because of its role as investor in the 
real market which will spur innovation and return dividends and rents to the individual 
depositors and investors. 
The governmental sector has changed in a very significant way because its role is 
much more important now. Every individual with sufficient income will transfer a 
certain amount of money to the state. This sum is used to secure the survival of every 
member of the society through social security payments to all those people who live 
from less than the subsistence minimum.  
While it is fairly easy to imagine the monetary flux towards the public sector, the 
opposite stream can be fairly diverse. On the one hand, it includes direct transfers to 
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the households disposing of insufficient financial means such as for example the 
unemployed or the retired. On the other hand, it covers expenses which the 
government will spend on the quality of life and the infrastructure in a society 
including the aforementioned merit goods. 
From those two basic concepts, we design the model which we will describe in detail 
in the next section. 
7.3 Design of the model229 
The way those models work, it is important to carefully describe the implemented 
routines and their underlying justification because all emergent structures will 
originate from the way the scenario is set up. This means that when analyzing the 
results of the simulation, they will be dependent on the initial design of the model. If 
this design is not explained in a very detailed way then it is difficult to evaluate where 
the resulting conclusions may be applied and for which arguments they may not hold. 
While several different programs and software environments have been created over 
the last years, we have chosen to implement this model in Repast Simphony
230
 
(“Repast S”), which is an agent-based modeling toolkit based on the Java and Groovy 
programming languages. We have chosen Repast S because it is best suited for 
projects rooted in the social sciences
231
 and since it is built for the simulation of 
systems representing living agents in a social environment. Even though Repast S is 
by far not the easiest modeling toolkit on the market, it offers the highest modeling 
power and therefore is best suited to be used in our case.
232
 The biggest advantage 
Repast S offers, however, is that it allows us to present the model and the 
implementation in a way which is understandable even for economists who may not be 
familiar with programming. The way Repast S is designed the simulations can be very 
easily represented and explained thanks to the possibility of a visual model 
development, which illustrates the underlying structures of the model in a very 
intuitive way. This makes it easier for economists who may not be familiar with the 
Java or Groovy programming languages to follow through on the model‟s logic and to 
evaluate its content.   
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Figure 7-5: Graphical presentation of behavior “Rent from Innos” 
Figure 7-5 shows how the procedure “Rent from Innos” is presented in the modeling 
environment. This behavior belongs to the Fund agents and guarantees that the fund 
will receive the return from the successful innovations it financed. 
We can see that this procedure will start by selecting the space and the network which 
are relevant in this step. Then it will define counters which will be used for statistical 
purposes. From the different symbol in the next step, we know that the simulation will 
loop over all those innovations which have been financed by the corresponding fund. 
Since this group includes failed innovations, the next step is to check if the selected 
innovation has been successful. Only then will the fund receive its rent. 
This is done as long as there are still innovations available which have been financed 
by this fund. Once all of them have been analyzed and the rent collected, then we add 
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a debugging task which helps track possible mistakes and, finally, end this routine 
with the inverted “T”-symbol. 
A click on each of these symbols in the Repast environment will show the 
programming code behind it. Consequently, it is fairly easy for an economist to get an 
idea of the logic behind the program. 
7.3.1 Global simulation environment 
The specificity of the model creation in Repast S allows us to explain the model setup 
in a step-by-step approach. We use a proper file to define the overall model 
environment so that we can create the context in which our agents are placed.  
 
Figure 7-6: Design of the model environment 
The first six entities represented in Figure 7-6 show the agents which are present in the 
simulation. They will carry out the actions and generate the development of the 
system. Our agents are the Model Initializer as well as the Humans, Banks, Funds, the 
Public Sector, and Inventions. The former is only used in the first time step to 
instantiate the model and to create the agents which will then interact. The other five 
will be presented in the next section. 
The next element defined is the space in which the agents interact. We have chosen to 
model it as a field with fixed dimensions which we can imagine as a piece of land with 
boundaries to the north, south, east and west. The agents are able to step on any point 
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within this field which means that we do not have to impose a set of places to move to 
comparable to a chess board but that we can allow the agents to move freely to any 
location within this space.  
Furthermore, we have designed the borders to be fixed. While this may sound trivial it 
is an important question in simulations to ask what happens if an agent tries to exit the 
space to one side, say to the east. The first possibility is that it bounces off the border 
just like a billiard ball and sees its movement mirrored in the opposite direction. The 
second option is that the agent exiting the space to the east will reappear on the 
western end of the space and continue with the same dynamics. This will lead to a 
torus of genus one.
233
 The third way of modeling the borders is to see them as a sticky 
fence, where an agent who will try to exit the space to the east will not be able to go 
beyond this line and will stay at the border. Since our model is meant to represent a 
single regional body comparable to a country or a state, choosing the borders to be 
fixed and sticky seems to be the approach which corresponds closest to the model we 
try to represent. 
The next nine positions define the networks which are implemented in the simulation 
meaning the different channels through which agents are allowed to interact. The 
different networks are used to define the relationships between different agents and the 
influences such relations have on the behavior of the agent. 
The first three networks, Inventor, Innovator and Financier, are related to the 
Inventions. Every invention has an inventor and therefore the Inventor-network links 
the invention to the inventor. This helps identify the inventor in case an investor is 
willing to finance the invention. Once an invention has turned into an innovation, the 
innovator network will be used to connect the innovation and the original inventor 
since this is the channel through which the money, which the innovator receives from 
the innovation, is transferred. The Financier network, on the other hand, links the 
invention to a fund which is willing to invest money into the realization of the 
innovation. If the innovation is successful, then the fund will receive its share of the 
innovation rent through this channel. 
The next four networks, Banking, Investing, SavingNet, and ProvisionNet, are linked 
to the savings and investment decision of the individual agents. With every amount, 
                                                 
233
 cf. [Weis10]. Note that such a situation will not lead to a structure comparable to a globe. As an easy 
example, imagine going north on a globe until you are back at the point where you started. If you draw 
the traveled route on a flat map, you will see two lines crossing from North to South since you will have 
travelled on two different longitudes. In a torus you will always stay on the same longitude. 
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which an agent is willing to invest, she has the choice between the low risk/low return 
option at the banks and the high risk/high return option at the funds. Whenever she 
will save money at a bank, her account is represented as a link between the bank and 
the agent in the Banking network. In the case of an investment at a fund, the link will 
be established within the Investing network.  
Since an agent in the individual model possesses two separate accounts where one 
contains all the precautionary savings meant to serve as coverage for the agent‟s own 
risks and the other one includes all other savings, she will have to decide twice on her 
investment strategy of choice. Therefore, we will use the SavingNet network to store 
the savings account and the ProvisionNet to represent her risk provision account. By 
so defining, we can be sure to always refer to the correct account and we do not need 
to open customer accounts at every fund or bank which simplifies the simulation 
considerably. This makes it possible to allow the agents to invest their entire savings at 
funds or their entire savings at banks as well as to split it between the institutions 
depending on the individual risk behavior. 
Additionally, we have implemented a Friends-network which establishes links 
between Human agents. As we will explain in detail in section 7.3.3.7, the individual 
behavior of an agent is influenced by the people in her surroundings. Therefore, we 
have to make sure that this influence can be included which is achieved through this 
Friends-network. The network is set up in the beginning such that an individual will 
know every other Human in her immediate neighborhood. As we will explain below, 
there is a differentiation between simple „friends‟ and so called „cool friends‟. „Cool 
friends‟ will only be identified in the specific rule. 
Finally, we find the Community network which is only important in the governmental 
model since it links the Humans to the Public Sector and allows them to vote, to pay 
their contributions or to receive the social security benefits. This network remains 
unchanged during the simulation since every individual has to be linked to the 
government at all times. 
Agents can also interact with other agents outside of the networks, for example, when 
an agent is looking for a bank that will give her credit. In order to keep stabilized links 
between different actors, we will use those networks allowing us to implement those 
relationships in a very straight forward and intuitive way. 
The next step is to introduce all the attributes and constants which are included in the 
Attributes position in the aforementioned schema.  
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Variable Explanation 
Initial Number Of Humans 
Initial Number Of Banks 
Initial Number Of Funds 
The three variables take the amount of each type of 
agent which we will create at the initialization stage of 
the simulation. The values can be chosen freely 
knowing that the more agents are created the stronger 
are the interaction effects, but also the more 
computational power is required. In our cases, we 
have set the initial number of Humans to 50 and 
created 10 Banks as well as 10 Funds. 
Individual Model This is a variable which can only take the values 
“true” or “false” and signifies if we run the simulation 
as the individual model or the governmental model. 
Theoretically, it is possible to change this value during 
the simulation which would lead to a shift in the 
societal setup used. This option might be interesting, if 
there is a research interest in the consequences of a 
strong change in the political climate. Nevertheless, 
we have not analyzed any runs using this change. 
Subsistence Minimum The initial subsistence minimum is defined 
exogenously and defines the amount of money needed 
by an individual agent to secure her survival in a given 
period. In the governmental model, this value can be 
varied through the voting mechanism in order to make 
sure that the social security contributions from the 
state will grow or decrease. We have defined it to start 
at the value of 8, corresponding to 8,000 €.234 
  
                                                 
234
 In 2010, the income in Germany is tax exempt up to an amount of 8,004 €. [BMF10] Since this may 
reflect the idea of a subsistence minimum as it is used in our simulation, we have chosen to retain this 
value. 
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Influence Merit Goods As we have argued in section 3.2.3, there is a positive 
influence which the public sector can exert in the 
governmental model through the provision or 
promotion of merit goods or other actions with 
positive externalities. We have included this effect in 
the simulation in the propensity to invent following 
the above mentioned example as well as the idea that 
an improved infrastructure will enable more people to 
use their creative potential. This variable is defined as 
a global variable in order to be able to change it in an 
easy way.  
Invention Threshold The invention threshold is defined exogenously as the 
amount of inventive potential which a Human needs at 
a minimum in order to come up with an invention. 
Minimum Work Age The minimum work age is set to be the lowest value at 
which individuals will be allowed to search for a job. 
While this may seem overly strict, it is used to 
integrate the different effect which can be generated 
by a prolonged education span on the wealth 
generation process of the individual agent. 
The value is set to 16 for individuals with the lowest 
level of education. We explain the choice for this 
amount in section 7.3.3.1. 
Maximum Initial Age The following constants are only used at the beginning 
when the agents are instantiated. In order to spread the 
age span in which we find our agents, they will 
receive an age uniformly distributed between 0 and 
this maximum initial age value. 
Average Retirement Age The simulation attributes every agent a certain age at 
which she will retire. This age is set randomly and 
uniformly distributed between 57 and 77 with an 
average age of 67
235
.   
                                                 
235
 67 is chosen to be the average retirement age since this is the current political vision in several 
countries, see for example [SSA09] or [Bund07] as well as our explanation in section 5.1.3. 
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Minimum Death Age 
Maximum Death Age 
Since we fix an age at which the agent will die, we set 
upper and lower boundaries on the age range which an 
agent can reach. We have chosen to set the minimum 
age an individual reaches if no existential risk makes 
him starve earlier to be 60. The maximum age an 
individual can attain is 100. The individual levels float 
between those two values. 
Maximum Education In order to keep the simulation flexible to the 
integration of the education dimension we have 
chosen to set the maximally attainable level of 
education as an exogenous global constant. The 
simulation has been run with three different levels 
according to the classification of “primary education”, 
“secondary education” and “tertiary education” used 
by the OECD.
236
 
Years For Education In order to take into account that it takes different 
times to reach different levels of education, this 
variable takes the number of years of schooling 
necessary until the next level can be reached. We have 
set this value to three. In the basic setting, agents with 
an education level of 1 will have to be 16 to be able to 
work, those who will reach education level 2 can start 
to work at 19 and agents with a level of education of 3 
will have their education finished at the age of 22
237
. 
Average Unemployment The average unemployment rate serves as a value 
around which the true unemployment rate in the 
model oscillates. We have set this value to eight 
percent.
238
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 [UNESCO06], p. 19. Even though the OECD lists seven different levels ranging from “pre-primary” 
to “second stage of tertiary education” we have chosen to limit the simulation to the three main stages 
described above. 
237
 Those values correspond approximately to the values for adolescents starting their apprenticeships in 
Germany in 2008. [BIBB10], p. 2 
238
 Looking at data from Eurostat [Euro09] and the US Bureau of Labor Statistics [BLS10] for the 
unemployment rate over the last years, then 8% seems to be a reasonable average value to use in the 
model. Besides, this value can be easily adapted in the parameter setting during the simulation. 
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Health Probability This value shows the mean of the health levels in the 
population. We have chosen this value to be at 95 
percent which means that an average agent can realize 
95 percent of her potential. This can be either due to 
some days where she cannot work due to an illness or 
a general health state which only allows her to use 95 
percent of her resources.
239
 
Average Risk Provision The average risk provision shows how much an agent 
will save on average from her income to provide for 
risks. We chose this value to be easily adaptable so 
that different scenarios and risk aversion behaviors 
can be modeled. We have set this value to 20 percent, 
which corresponds roughly to the amount which 
Germans have deducted from their gross work income 
as contributions to the social insurance system.
240
 
Average Consumption 
Ratio 
The average consumption ratio is similarly designed to 
serve as an anchor around which the true consumption 
decision of each individual in the respective period 
oscillates. This value has been chosen to be 90 
percent.
241
 
  
                                                 
239
 There is evidence that the average value for the health level of individuals might be higher in the 
governmental model since humans have a tendency of  non-compliance, which could be reduced or 
limited in the governmental model thanks to general measures affecting the health infrastructure. See 
for example [Müll08]. We have not implemented such a difference in this model in order to limit its 
complexity. 
240
 Even though the employer contributes another 20 percent, we have chosen to take only the fraction 
in account which an employed individual finds on her pay slip. This is meant to serve as a starting 
value, since individuals adapt their risk provision behavior during the simulation. 
241
 The savings ratio in Germany has been floating around ten percent in the years between 2000 and 
2007, which means that the consumption ratio amounts approximately to 90 percent, cf. [IW09], p. 64 
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High Edu Inc Factor 
Mid Edu Inc Factor 
Low Edu Inc Factor 
The income always also depends on the level of 
education. Therefore we adapt the randomly assigned 
work income of an individual by her level of 
education according to the statistical distributions
242
 
and by multiplying her work income with the 
corresponding factor. 
Table 7-1: Global constants 
Using those constants and the agents which will be explained below, the simulation 
can be executed and the results can be analyzed. Nevertheless, it is important to 
include the discussion on the execution schedule of the different events within the 
simulation meaning that we have to explain when which agent is allowed to act or 
intervene.  
As we have stressed in section 6.1.3.2, it is important to specify in which order and 
through which mechanism agents are allowed to act. Since agents‟ actions have an 
impact on the environment as well as the behavior of other agents, changing the order 
in which events are executed can change substantially the outcome of the simulation 
runs.  
For our simulation, we have decided that each of the different behaviors which we will 
develop in the next sections has a random priority – meaning that they will be 
executed in a random order – without any single one being preferred over another. 
This is due to the fact that each agent will execute her rules only once during each 
time period but there is no reason to think that any of these rules has to be executed 
before another one. We could argue that the recalculation of the interest rates in the 
banks or the percentage which an individual has to contribute to the social insurances 
should be done at the end or at the beginning of each period, but this is not realistic. 
Banks, funds as well as the government do not schedule to change their conditions at 
January 1
st
 every year, but changes can very well happen at any day during the year. 
Accordingly, it is possible that two agents will have a different savings behavior in 
                                                 
242
 In the data, we find for Germany that people “below upper secondary education” earn 91 percent of 
the average earnings of the population with income from employment, people with “post-secondary, 
non tertiary education” earn 107 percent of the average earnings and all individuals with “tertiary 
education” can expect 162 percent of average earnings. To compare the data, the values for the US are: 
65 percent; 109 percent; 172 percent and for France: 84 percent; 94 percent; 150 percent. [OECD09], 
pp. 144f, Table A7.1a 
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one period even though all of their characteristics are identical just because one is 
acting before a bank‟s interest raise and the other one afterwards.  
This setting may also lead to a situation where the government is trying to balance its 
budget and will nevertheless be faced with a deficit at the end of the year, because it 
was asked to decide very early. Such an approach appears to be much closer to the real 
life stream of events compared to a fixed chain of evolution which would otherwise 
have to be assumed.
243
 
From the environmental aspects, we will now turn to the individuals and their actions 
in the simulation: the agents. 
7.3.2 Definition of agents 
The model is created in an agent-based environment which requires us to define agents 
who are able to act and to react to external stimuli. Furthermore, we can define and 
specify the environment which can be influenced by agent actions. As stated above, 
we have defined the following five types of agents: Human, Bank, Fund, Public 
Sector, Invention
244
. 
The reason for the first three is that Humans are our central actors in the simulation. 
We care to find system characteristics for creating an environment where their 
innovative potential is best stimulated. The Bank and Fund agents represent the 
financial sector and the activities related to it. Furthermore, the Public Sector is 
implemented as an agent due to its two predominant functions: offering a sensible 
form of social insurance and holding elections in certain intervals. Finally, the real 
sector is reduced to the inventions since all other activities are indirectly implemented 
in the Humans. Inventions however have to be made and can be transformed into 
innovations if Humans dare to accept the risk and uncertainty connected to them and if 
they can provide sufficient financial resources – either by themselves or through a 
financial investor implemented in the Funds following the idea that “[t]he central 
actors in this process are entrepreneurs and investment bankers, who create „new 
purchasing power out of nothing‟”245. 
                                                 
243
 We also stress that the agents in each category (Humans, Banks, Funds and Inventions) are called in 
a random order which can change in every time step. This is important whenever the simulation is run 
on serial computers where agents can never act simultaneously, because we would otherwise insert 
patterns which are only due to the execution schedule. See also [EpAx96], p. 26 
244
 To avoid misunderstandings, we will capitalize all agents in this thesis. This means that “Public 
Sector” always refers to an agent and “public sector” characterizes the economic institution. 
245
 [Mccr08], p. 96: “Die Hauptakteure in diesem Prozess sind Unternehmer und Investmentbankiers, 
die „neue Kaufkraft aus Nichts‟ schaffen.” 
Individual Risk and Innovative Behavior - Modeling the relationship 
  101 
7.3.2.1 Human agent 
We have modeled an agent who is living her life in a very step-by-step form without 
much planning ahead and without an overall optimization strategy. While many 
economic models refer to optimization as the underlying behavior of humans and use 
the enormous set of utility maximization methods to analyze, predict or direct the way 
how people behave in certain economic decision situations, this may not be plausible 
for an individual in the situation where the decision matrix grows more and more 
complex.
246
 This is only possible when very few options are compared which are easy 
to grasp for a human mind. Once the offered bundles between which an individual has 
to decide grow too large, it might be impossible for him to compare the utility levels 
which he will gain from choosing either of the alternatives. Even choosing the optimal 
consumption bundle worth 100 € from a super market may be a choice where it can be 
argued that an individual will be able to maximize his utility level. Yet, in our model 
we add interaction with other individuals to this situation of choice which will further 
complicate the decision structure for the agent. Additionally, the agent is embedded in 
a dynamic model with historic time meaning that she would have to derive her optimal 
decision, taking the time as well as the history of her experience into account. Last but 
not least, the uncertainty of the life in the model adds to the difficulty of making an 
optimal, utility maximizing choice even if all other difficulties could be controlled for. 
Therefore, we have implemented the agent to use a satisficing behavior by assessing 
each individual decision singularly and without an idea of maximization
247
. 
The individual‟s life will run in a very structured version as we will explain in section 
7.3.3. She will have to take several decisions in each year and her choices depend on 
her current situation as well as her environment. Our model runs generally with 50 
agents which are distributed randomly in the space of the simulation. 
An agent is created with a set of characteristics which we can group together and 
speak of its „personality‟. This means that the values of each of these traits will 
influence the way she acts and reacts in each situation during the simulation. We will 
present those here: 
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 see for example [Pott00], p. 33 
247
 this is comparable to the approach taken by [GrPH01] 
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Variable Explanation 
Age The agent will be initialized having a certain age and we will increase her 
age in every period. This means that each period can be considered 
representing one year. 
The age of the agent will be used for her decision about learning, working 
or retiring. Furthermore, an agent will seek friends in her own age group. 
Retiring 
Age 
The retiring age of the individual agent is set within a 20-year span evenly 
distributed around the average age for retirement which we introduced 
above. The reason that an agent will retire early or late can be manifold, 
but they are not modeled here. Since the agent does not know her retiring 
age, and the veil of ignorance is not lifted until the very moment, it will 
not influence her behavior. Consequently, we could just as well assume 
that some random events during her life determine the retiring age. The 
simulation would only change if we would like to allow the agent to 
influence endogenously the moment when she retires.  
Death 
Age 
In a similar way to the retiring age, the age at which the agent will die is 
also set at the initialization of each agent. It varies in this simulation 
between 60 and 100. An agent can only die earlier if she is unable to 
provide for her existential needs, which means that she possesses less than 
the subsistence minimum and has not been able to receive a credit.  
Consequently, accidental deaths like car accidents are not modeled in this 
simulation because they would not add any explanatory power to the 
relationship between social insurance offering and innovativeness. Those 
events can be compared to some random occurrence which limits or 
nullifies the innovative capacity of an individual. 
Work 
Income 
The Human agent also is attributed an income which she will receive when 
working. In order to keep it simple, we set the work income at the moment 
of initialization. The income is then allowed to oscillate around this value 
during the course of the lifetime. The income calculation is achieved using 
a log-normal distribution around a mean of 40.
248
 This value has been 
                                                 
248
 In the simulation, we use the values for  of 3.35 and for  of 0.47 which relate to a mean of 32. This 
is due to the fact that we do not allow a work income which is below the subsistence minimum. 
Therefore, we add the subsistence minimum amounting to 8 in our default setting to each individual‟s 
work income. 
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chosen according to the data for Germany, where the average income 
resulting from employed work amounted to 3.182 € per month249, leading 
to almost 40.000 € per year. Since we chose to understand a period in the 
simulation as a year and to reduce monetary terms to be comparable to 
thousand €, we set the mean income to 40.  
The log-normal distribution seems to best mirror the income distribution in 
a society
250
, because of its specific characteristics. Opposite to the normal 
distribution which follows the well-known symmetric bell-shape, the log-
normal distribution has a skewed form where the mean in the distribution 
is rather low compared to the overall span of possible values. Income in a 
society can reach very high values but the mean income is rather towards 
the low end of the range. Besides, we can use the log-normal distribution 
in cases where the values cannot be negative which is certainly true for the 
work income an individual can earn. Therefore, each individual receives a 
value for work income which is log-normally distributed. Since work 
income also depends on the educational level
251
, we multiply the value of 
the variable Work Income of the individual with a factor corresponding to 
her education. This reflects the fact that work income increases with 
education. Since the OECD-data also looks at three levels of education
252
, 
we can easily attribute each of these levels to the education levels of 1, 2 
and 3 in our simulation. Therefore and according to our explanation in 
section 7.3.1, the work income is adapted by the factor corresponding to 
the education level group of the individual in question.  
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 [IW09], p. 56, Table 6.4 “Bruttomonatsverdienste der Arbeitnehmer” 
250
 see for example [Blüm75] or [LiSA01] 
251
 [OECD09], pp. 144f, Table A7.1a 
252
 Note, however, that in the quoted study, the three levels retained are “below upper secondary 
education”, “Post-secondary, non-tertiary education” and “All tertiary education” 
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Tinkerer As we have explained in section 4.2, some people have a certain 
inclination towards being creative or inventive. This personal trait is 
subsumed in the tinkerer property of an agent. It can take the values 1 or 
0 depending if an agent has a tendency to engage in creative thinking. 
This does not mean that someone without this predisposition cannot 
come up with an invention or be innovative, but having this „tinkerer-
gene‟ will increase the probability for an agent to come up with an 
invention. 
Experience The experience variable in the agent reflects the number of years she has 
been working, so that we have a measure of the professional routine 
building and expertise for each agent. 
Education As we have explained in section 7.3.1, we have defined three different 
educational levels in the simulation. Upon initialization, each agent is 
attributed a certain level which cannot be changed unless when the agent 
dies. Once again, the agent does not know the level she will attain and 
therefore we do not have to control for behavioral influences such as her 
effort in school or her aspirations for a work career. There is one aspect, 
however, where the education is taken into account even though the 
individual may not yet have reached the level and that is the inventive 
capacity. In order to calculate the propensity to invention, the educational 
influence for each individual is included based on the final level. While 
this certainly simplifies the model, it may not overly distort the 
simulation because we can assume a certain drive, motivation and 
curiosity for a student to reach higher educational levels and those may 
be the same characteristics which support the creativity and 
inventiveness in the individual. 
We assign educational levels not uniformly, but based on data from the 
OECD study
253
, which finds that 30 percent reach the lowest level, 44 
percent achieve upper secondary education and 27 percent will attain a 
tertiary level education
254
. 
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 [OECD09], p. 28 
254
 Since the values add up to 101 and the source does not give more details, we reduce the tertiary level 
education to 26 percent. 
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Risk 
Aversion 
The individual‟s risk aversion is set at the beginning of the simulation to 
a value uniformly and randomly chosen between zero and ten. Through 
interaction and experiences during the course of the simulation, the 
value of the individual risk aversion will vary. 
Time 
Preference 
Each individual has a certain time preference which is also defined in 
the initialization process and set to a value between zero and ten. 
Similarly to the risk aversion characteristic, this value is subject to 
changes during the simulation due to environmental stimuli in the peer 
network. The time preference also reflects the future optimism of the 
individual. The lower the value, the more the agent is willing to forego 
today‟s consumption for one in the future. 
Cool 
Friends 
An individual will retain the amount of cool friends she has since this 
will have an effect in her inventive behavior. Agents have two categories 
of friends (regular friends and „cool friends‟) which have different 
influences on the individual‟s behavior. 
Agents do not look for new friends but rather try to strengthen their 
network of cool friends by moving closer to those individuals in their 
network. In section 7.3.3.7, we present the rule how agents make friends 
and how „cool friends‟ are differentiated from „regular friends‟. 
Happiness Each agent will start with a certain indicator for her happiness and she 
will update her mood regularly depending on her experiences and 
stimuli in her environment. The happiness will also be included in the 
inventive propensity as we will explain later. 
Health The health level which is randomly attributed follows a Poisson-
distribution with a mean health level of 95 percent.
255
 The level is then 
allowed to fluctuate during the simulation and will influence the 
individual in different aspects, such as it impacts the achievable work 
income or the risk aversion of the individual. 
  
                                                 
255
 The Poisson distribution is often used in health related studies (see for example [Shaf06]) because 
small health infractions are common while larger ones have a very small probability. In a society, most 
people will have a high health status but some will have a lower one. We estimate values with a mean of 
5 and subtract them from the perfect health level of 100. Therefore, health will vary between 100 and 0 
with a mean of 95. 
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Retired? We will also track the working status of the individual and set the two 
variables “retired?” and “unemployed?” to true if an individual is 
retired or if she is unemployed. She will be retired upon reaching her 
individual retiring age and she may be unemployed if she is unable to 
find a job according to the routines described in section 7.3.3.1. 
Unemployed? 
Table 7-2: Variables of Human agents 
At this point we can also stress that the simulation is focused around the individual 
agent as an actor and that there is no implementation of firms or companies. Even 
though there are many arguments which support this choice, adding companies to the 
simulation would necessarily add an enormous amount of complexity but could help 
design the real sector in a more realistic way. Nevertheless, we will leave this for 
further research. 
The reasons why we feel that using the individuals also in the innovative endeavor is 
that “[e]ight out of ten new entrepreneurs work alone”256 and that even the influential 
GEM-studies use the individual as their focal point for the analysis of entrepreneurship 
because “[n]ew firms are, most often, started by individuals. Even in established 
organizations, entrepreneurial attitudes, activities, and aspirations differ in each 
individual.”257  
This is the general setup of the Human agent and we will present the rules which 
govern her behavior in section 7.3.3 after having introduced all other agents which we 
will use in this simulation. 
7.3.2.2 Bank agent 
Since the model we present here is the first implementation that we know of which 
tries to implement the three sectors into a micro-founded agent-based model and since 
we try to stick to the KISS-approach by keeping the simulation as simple as possible 
and justifiable so that it can be well understood and extended in future projects, we 
have chosen to set most detailed attention into the design of the Human agent and to 
specify the additional actors in the simulation only to the most necessary degree.  
The Bank agent fulfills the function of granting consumption credit to the Humans and 
of providing a low-risk/low-return option for individuals to save money. The bank will 
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 [Destatis06]: “Acht von zehn Existenzgründern arbeiten allein“ 
257
 [BoLe10], p. 13 
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have to make sure that it can only lend out as much money as it has received from the 
agents who deposited their savings and that it sets an interest rate which it can afford. 
The Banks are designed to have the following variables: 
Variable Explanation 
Interest 
Rate 
Arguably the most important variable for a Bank is the interest rate it 
offers to the customers as the return on deposited savings. This rate will 
be paid on money an individual will invest at this bank. 
In the case of a credit request, the bank will charge the individual an 
interest rate which is one percentage point above this rate in order to 
simulate in a very easy and transparent way the integration of transaction 
costs. Furthermore, this is meant to model the interest spread which is 
observable on the market and make it relevant for the agent‟s behavior. 
The interest rate is set to three percent at the beginning of the simulation 
and each Bank can adapt it once in every period by increasing or 
lowering it by one percentage point. Nevertheless, we require the interest 
rate to be positive or zero. 
Interest 
Payments 
In this variable, the Bank stores the amount of money it had to pay in 
interests to investors who deposited their savings at the bank. 
Interest 
Receipts 
Accordingly, the variable Interest Receipts stores the amount of money a 
Bank receives in interest payments from the individuals who received a 
credit in the previous period. As stated, the interest rate negotiated for 
credits is always one percentage point above the general interest rate. 
Client‟s 
Credits 
This variable maps the stock of credits lent out to customers. It is 
changed whenever an individual will receive a new credit and is lowered 
when the credit is repaid. Therefore, it reflects the true amount of credits 
awarded at every time.
258
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 The other option would be that once a year the bank updates its accounts and will set a new lending 
strategy. This situation would be in line with the adaptation process of the interest rate which also only 
happens once per period. We have chosen to allow it to take all changes directly into account and to 
only adjust the interest rate once, since we feel that this relates better to a simplified view of the banking 
decision structure: handing out a credit depends directly on the amounts awarded so far and the amounts 
available. Adapting the interest rate may follow more long-term oriented goals and strategies, and does 
not depend on single credits awarded. 
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Client‟s 
Savings 
The variable client‟s savings is also updated as often as an individual 
deposits or withdraws money from her account. Furthermore, this variable 
is used together with the next one – credit requests – to calculate the 
interest rate. 
Credit 
Requests 
Whenever an individual demands a credit, then the amount requested is 
stored in this variable. This is used so that the bank can evaluate its 
interest strategy, because if there are too many credit requests and the 
bank does not have enough deposits to accept them, then it should 
increase the interest rate in order to receive more savings from individuals 
and to reduce the amount of credit demanded. 
On the other hand, in a situation where the bank holds sufficient money 
from deposits but cannot find customers willing to buy a credit, it will 
have to lower the interest rate to become more attractive to those 
demanding a credit and to reduce the cost generated by the interest 
payments on the deposits. Besides, this may reduce the amount of money 
deposited at the bank, but since there are no sufficient credit requests to 
lend money out to, the bank could not use it productively and therefore 
hardly forgoes any future business. 
Table 7-3: Variables of Bank agents 
In the general setup, we define ten banks at the beginning and grant individuals the 
permission to start a new bank when they live too far away from the next bank. 
7.3.2.3 Fund agent 
Following the implementation of the Banks, we will present the setup of the Funds 
agents, since they are the second actor in the financial market. Their activity is focused 
on receiving a high rent by investing in innovative endeavors. Consequently, this 
strategy is also linked to higher risk and the individuals cannot be sure that they will 
earn any interest on their funds and they may not even receive back the invested 
money.  
Similarly to the Banks, the Fund agents are designed as simply as possible in order to 
keep the simulation transparent and understandable. Nevertheless, their setup is much 
more complex since we cannot make the same assumption as for banks concerning the 
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stock of capital available. We explain those differences in detail in section 7.3.3.10. 
Here, we will present the variables which characterize each Fund: 
Variable Explanation 
Interest Rate Since the Fund cannot guarantee an interest rate to the investors, it 
will always ex-post calculate the return it received on its investments 
and will hand out half of it as interest to the individuals who have 
invested their money in the Fund. The interest rate is set to three 
percent in the first period in order to have a balanced situation 
compared to the banks and it is allowed to float freely, but cannot be 
negative. 
Interest 
Payment 
This variable stocks the amount of interest paid out in a period and 
takes it into consideration before the fund starts her new investment 
cycle. 
Capital Stock The capital stock is the amount of money which the fund possesses 
and it may well turn negative. Client‟s investments are added to the 
capital stock and their withdrawals are taken from the stock. Besides, 
investments will be financed with money from the stock, and one half 
of the rents from innovations is fed into it. Therefore, it reflects the 
amount of money which is still available at the Fund. 
Client‟s 
Savings 
This variable shows the amount of money which individuals invested 
in the current period.  
Cumulated 
Client‟s 
Savings 
The variable “Cumulated Client‟s Savings” is the sum of savings 
which are still invested at the fund. When interest payments are made, 
then the Fund will have to calculate them based on this variable since 
it reflects the amount of money entitled to profit from the investment 
returns. Whenever a client withdraws her money from the capital 
stock, the initial amount she had saved is also withdrawn from this 
variable‟s value. 
Invested 
Money 
We use this variable only for statistical means in order to track the 
amount of money which a Fund has invested in innovation projects. 
Rent from 
Innovation 
Each successful innovation endeavor will lead to a rent for a period of 
up to twenty years. The rent is always split in half between the 
inventor and the financier. This variable stores the amount of rent the 
Fund received in the current period. 
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Low Interest 
Years 
A fund which has not been lucky with her investments may think 
about redefining its strategy and its orientation. In order to decide if 
its latest developments have been successful we count the years 
marked by a return rate less or equal to zero percent. 
Negative 
Years 
Similarly, a negative capital stock is a major problem for a Fund and 
therefore, we count the years with a negative amount of money 
available. In case this number grows too big, then the fund can be 
wound up and removed from the simulation. 
Table 7-4: Variables of Fund agents 
Even though the CNSE-approach includes explicitly the intra-sector interaction as 
important, we have chosen not to allow banks and funds to interact in order to reduce 
the complexity. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the current financial crisis, exactly 
this interaction can lead to dangerous bubbles and increased risks as well as 
uncertainty in the market.  
We start our simulation with ten funds. There is no possibility to found new ones but 
as we will explain in section 7.3.3.12, Funds are allowed to fail and consequently it is 
possible, that the amount of funds reduces over the course of the simulation. 
7.3.2.4 Public Sector agent 
The Public Sector is defined as an agent since this allows us to make it independent 
and better identifiable in the simulation. Furthermore, the model setup facilitates the 
interaction with the Public Sector if we define it as an agent. Not surprisingly, in each 
simulation run there is only one Public Sector agent. The model allows however for 
the inclusion of several such agents which could open the simulation to create regions 
with different societal choices and therefore might allow a direct comparison of the 
governmental and the individual system. 
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The variables in the Public Sector are the following: 
Variable Explanation 
Subsistence 
Minimum 
The subsistence minimum is the amount of money each individual 
needs in one period in order to survive. As we have explained in 
section 7.3.1, it is defined to start at 8 corresponding to a value of 
8,000 €. During the course of the simulation in the governmental 
model, the individuals are invited to vote on the size of the 
subsistence minimum which is linked to the social contributions. 
Therefore, by raising the societal subsistence minimum, the 
government will have to pay this amount to those people who are 
unable to provide it for themselves. Consequently, the vote of the 
median voter can also lead to a reduction of the minimal amount of 
money provided for by the government. 
Rate of Social 
Contribution 
In order to be able to financially support those agents in need, the 
government needs funds it can hand out. Each agent who receives 
revenue above the subsistence minimum will have to pay a 
percentage of this money to the government as contribution to the 
social services. The rate of social contribution defines this 
percentage and is set by the government with the intention of 
keeping the budget balanced. A change in the amount which is 
collected or handed out can only occur through the voting 
mechanism by changing the subsistence minimum. 
The rate can be adapted once a year and it will take the last years 
into account in order to limit constant changes in the percentages. In 
the beginning it is set to the value of the average risk provision in 
order to have both the governmental and the individual model start 
from an identical state. 
Current Social 
Receipts 
The Public Sector will use the amount of money it received in the 
current year in order to estimate if the rate of contribution is 
adequately defined. This variable takes all the money which is paid 
by the Humans in the current period. 
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Social 
Receipts 
In order to make sure that the government can have a balanced budget, 
we also track the cumulated amount of social receipts over the years. 
The important task is not that the budget has to be balanced in every 
period, but that the behavior of the politicians (and therefore the 
Public Sector) is restricted to having to aim for a balanced budget. 
Current 
Social 
Expenses 
Similarly, we define the variables which map the expenses of the 
government. This variable “Current Social Expenses” takes the 
amount of money spent in the current year to people who need some 
support in order to provide for their living. 
Social 
Expenses 
In the variable “Social Expenses”, we cumulate all the amounts spent 
since the beginning of the simulation in order to be able to compare 
this value to the amounts received. 
Inheritance Whenever an agent dies, her offspring will inherit her wealth.
259
 In the 
case that the wealth was greater than zero, then the offspring will have 
to pay an inheritance tax of 50 percent, which means that the newborn 
will start better into her life than other children, but that it cannot 
possess the same resources as its parent. 
If the wealth of the individual was negative, then the offspring will not 
accept the inheritance and the government will have to bear the debt. 
Therefore the account “Inheritance” adds to the budgetary restrictions 
of the government. In most simulation runs, however, the balance of 
inheritances turned out to be positive and therefore the burden on the 
public budget is rather an advantageous way to ease the pressure on 
the budget. 
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 For a justification and a detailed explanation of the death and reincarnation procedure, see section 
7.3.3.7. 
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Bad Year In order to be able to qualify the rate of social contribution as 
appropriate, we have to record the budget influences in each year. This 
means that if the social expenses exceed the receipts, then we record a 
bad year. If the receipts are larger than the amounts which the Public 
Sector had to spend, then we record a good year. In the event that the 
receipts are more than twice as large as the expenses, we note an 
excessive year. The reaction to a series of excessive years is much faster 
than to a series of good years. 
Good Year 
Excessive 
Year 
Table 7-5: Variables of the Public Sector agent 
Note that all those variables as well as the behavior of the Public Sector agent are only 
relevant in the governmental model.
260
 All public activity which is assumed to take 
place in the individual model is also present in the governmental model and therefore 
cancelled out of the simulation. Specifically including the provision of basic public 
goods could further enhance the model. 
7.3.2.5 Invention agent 
The only agent for which we cannot imagine that some human will take decisions is 
the Invention. It is defined as an agent because each individual invention is a distinct 
object and this makes it easy for us to keep the connection between inventor, financier, 
innovation and invention. The simulation always starts without any inventions since 
they have to be created by the Humans. Once an Invention is made, it will have the 
following attributes: 
Variable Explanation 
Rent Each invention is assigned a certain rent upon creation. This will be the 
amount of money it will return in the first period if it is successfully turned 
into an innovation. No individual knows how high the rent of the 
innovation will turn out to be. Funds will know the rent, however. 
It is randomly set and follows a Poisson distribution with mean 25. 
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Cost The value of this variable is also set at the beginning of the simulation and 
it takes the amount of money which the inventor has to pay to try to 
realize the invention or which the financier will have to invest.  
The cost of the implementation of the invention is randomly set and 
depends on the rent. It can take any value between half the rent and 
double the rent. While this span is arbitrarily chosen, it guarantees that the 
invention has a positive overall return even if the financier is a fund and 
therefore only receives half the rent. Only if we make sure that the return 
is positive can we assume that an investor is willing to finance the 
innovation. Otherwise we would have to add a new evaluation mechanism 
which could only lead to the rejection of the invention which is a similar 
situation as if the agent did not create an invention. Therefore, we do not 
feel that a considerable explanatory power is lost by this assumption. 
Weight A new invention is assigned a weight of one. Every period it is reduced by 
five percentage points so that it will equal to zero after twenty years. The 
reason for this is that an innovation may not be as valuable towards the 
end of its life cycle as in the beginning. While there are certainly some 
innovations where the opposite is true, this assumption simplifies the 
characterization of inventions. 
The innovator as well as the financier will receive in each period the 
weighted rent where we use this variable as the weight. 
Financed? There are three variables which show the state of an invention. If it is not 
financed, then it is interesting for a Fund which may have the financial 
means to carry out the implementation of the innovation. Once this 
process has been started, the value of this variable is set to “true” because 
we define that each invention can only be financed once even though it 
may have failed at the first attempt. 
Failed? If it has been financed and the individual has been willing to take the risk 
of the implementation, then it is possible that the invention failed. A failed 
invention is no longer of interest for funds and the inventor will not be 
able to receive any rent from it. 
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Success? Once the implementation of an innovation worked, then this variable is set 
to “true”. Consequently, the innovator agent and the financier will each 
receive half of the weighted rent every period. 
Table 7-6: Variables of Invention agents 
Finally, inventions are used to inspire the inventor to come up with new creative ideas 
and implement them. Once the inventor has died, however, and the weight of the 
invention is zero, we remove it from the simulation context. 
After having presented the general setup of the simulation and the design of the 
agents, we will now turn to their behavior. 
7.3.3 Presentation of rules 
An agent-based model offers the possibility to focus on the individual behavior of the 
micro agents in a given environment. It is not necessary to conceive a system which is 
reducible to a mathematically solvable functional form or to resort to data analysis 
which is by definition fixed to a specific set of historical outcomes. Instead, an agent-
based model can be created from rules applied to the agents and the emerging structure 
can be analyzed. Therefore, the only condition we have to impose on those rules is that 
they have to be plausible and consistent meaning that influences should not be counted 
twice in different rules or variables should be passed on correctly. Other than that, the 
interest of the model lies in the macroeconomic structure which emerges from the 
simulation, so that it is not necessary to foresee the outcomes and tailor the simulation 
towards it. On the contrary, it is much more possible to run the simulation with 
different setups and consider the effects certain changes have on the results. Therefore, 
we need to pay special attention to the choice of rules in the model. 
The entire simulation is based on 15 rules which are implemented in the agents. An 
agent rule is a specified set of behaviors an agent can or will implement in certain 
situations. These rules are following the aforementioned principles and ideas and are 
designed in such a way that they should mimic the economic behavior. A list of all 
rules can be found in appendix B. We will now discuss each one of them in its details, 
showing and explaining its setup, its functioning and the reasons that lead to such a 
design. Overall, the rules only vary parametrically between different agents of the 
same class but not structurally. This is in line with the setup in the Sugarscape
261
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model where the algebraic form of the rules will not change over the course of the 
simulation but the parameters which will be fed into them certainly do so. This means 
that, for example, the rule for generating the revenue is the same for each Human 
agent, but the input factors “work income” or “savings interest” can vary both across 
different Humans as well as over time for an individual Human. 
In this section, we will first introduce all rules which Human agents have to follow, 
and then we will present the rules applying to the Public Sector agent and the Bank 
agents as well as the Fund agents. Finally, the rules of the Invention agents will be 
discussed. 
There is a specialty about the rules for Humans, since every Human will call each of 
the rules once every period. This means that she will first update her variables 
(7.3.3.7), generate her revenue (7.3.3.1), then use either the social (0) or the individual 
risk provision rule (0), save or consume her money afterwards (0) and decide on her 
innovative behavior (0)
262
.  
7.3.3.1 Revenue generation 
As we model the lives of individual human beings, we have to make sure that every 
agent will have the opportunity to earn her own living at some point during the 
simulation. This process is integrated in the rule Generate Revenue: 
Generate Revenue Human (1) if human is neither retired nor unemployed nor too 
young to work then receive work income depending 
on health level 
(2) receive rent from innovations 
(3) add or subtract interest payments 
(4) pay back credit from earlier period263 
Table 7-7: Human rule "Generate Revenue" 
For every rule, we will present the name used in the simulation in the first column and 
the agent this rule is linked to in the second column. The third column then contains 
the major steps which are executed in each rule. They will be called in the order listed. 
In this rule, we run through the different sources of income the agent receives. While 
the German tax code knows seven different sources of income
264
, we group most of 
them together to form a position called “work income”. This position contains all 
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 We change the order of presentation and explain the rule for updating the variables at the end, since 
we feel that it is easier to understand the update process once the behavioral rules are laid out. 
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 The credit has to be paid back directly so that the savings accounts can be balanced. Otherwise we 
could have the problem, that a bank could go out of business because it lacks the funds to pay out the 
savings invested.  
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those forms of income which the individual may earn when she is healthy and able to 
work. It includes the income paid by an employer as well as the profits an entrepreneur 
can reap from his business. It can be understood as those forms of income that will not 
be included in the other two categories: the rent from innovations and the interest 
payments from banks and funds.  
The work income is then defined as a certain amount of money which the individual 
receives under certain conditions. The work income each individual agent can reach is 
assigned following the logic we have explained in section 7.3.2.1. In the rule 
“Generate Revenue”, the individual will receive her work income depending on some 
environmental and personal characteristics. First of all, the agent has to have her 
education accomplished. This means that a Human who is too young will not be able 
to work and in order to keep the simulation simple this implies that she will also not 
have a work income. 
If the individual is old enough to work, we will make sure that she is not retired. 
During the initialization of an agent, she receives an age at which she will retire. If the 
agent has reached this age, she will be retired and her work income will be zero. The 
fact that this age has been set in the beginning without taking her environment or her 
life path into consideration is not a limit to the simulation, since the agent herself is 
not aware of this age barrier and it does not influence her decisions in the years before. 
Consequently, the start into retirement is an event the individual cannot time very 
well. While there are work lives and careers where the age of retirement can be 
estimated fairly confidently, there can always be incidents which may require a person 
to stop working earlier or to continue earning money. The simplification in setting a 
given retirement age for every Human is therefore an assumption which does not 
necessarily make the simulation less realistic. It rather takes into account the 
unpredictability of the different turns each life may take. 
For an individual who is old enough to work and who is not yet retired the only danger 
for the work income is unemployment. Becoming or staying unemployed is a random 
event. For an agent who has been unemployed in the preceding period, the risk of 
staying unemployed is twice as high as for someone who used to have a job. For each 
one, we find a random number between 0 and 100. If this number is lower than the 
average unemployment rate, then the Human is unemployed. This will lead to a 
randomly fluctuating unemployment rate for the simulation‟s population. Since we 
have not modeled the industrial sector, we have no indication why this rate should be 
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changing at certain time steps. A random oscillation is then preferable to a constant 
rate, since the random change in the unemployment rate seems to be more realistic. In 
a more elaborate and more complex simulation which actually models the industrial 
sector, the unemployment status of every individual might depend on intrinsic 
characteristics of this Human. In our case, adding such a functionality, such as for 
example making an uneducated or an older individual more likely to be unemployed, 
would not add much insight to the simulation because there are additional factors 
which significantly influence the likelihood of an individual to become unemployed 
such as her work attitude or the economic situation in her specific sector of 
employment. The last two are not available in the current simulation setup and 
therefore choosing only a few characteristics which influence the unemployment status 
of each Human will not make the simulation results more reliable. 
If the individual is not unemployed, not retired and not too young to work, then she 
will receive her work income depending on her health status. The health status for the 
current period is set at the beginning of each year in the rule “Update Variables” and 
ranges from 100% to 0%. An individual who is 90% healthy will accordingly receive a 
work income of 90% of her “work income” value. Since most modern economies have 
systems in place where a low number of health related absence is not punished by an 
income reduction, this assumption should be interpreted with caution. The precise 
work income of every person varies over the years also depending on the health of the 
worker. In some years, an individual has the opportunity to earn more and in other 
years, her income may suffer. This variability in the work income is now entirely 
reduced to being health related. It can be argued that this assumption is rather strong 
but since we have not modeled the industrial sector in detail and since we 
consequently do not have specific insights in the reason why the work income for the 
individual might vary, we could not include other factors influencing the precise 
amount in each period. Therefore, we do need a random term which will generate an 
oscillation in the amounts the individual is earning per year. The health values are 
calculated including a randomization. Consequently, we do not feel that this 
simplification in the generation of the work income of the individual is overly 
simplistic. 
After having received her work income, the individual will reap the profits from her 
innovations. Each innovation has a fixed rent which degrades over time. Every period, 
the value of the rent is reduced by five percentage points. The inventor will receive 
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half of the rent and the financier the other half. In case that the inventor has also 
financed the innovation, she will receive the entire rent. Programmatically, this 
behavior is implemented in a combination of actions taken by the agent as well as the 
invention, since the agent calls the “Pay Rent”-rule of each of her successful 
inventions and the invention will then return the corresponding rent.  
In the next step, the individual will receive her savings‟ or investments‟ interests or 
will have to pay interest on her credits. The banks always demand an interest rate 
which is one percentage point above the interest rate they offer their customers. The 
calculation rules for funds and banks are explained below in the rules “Calculate 
interest rate”. For the agent, the interest received is added to the revenue from the two 
other sources and the interest paid is deducted. 
The last step in the process of generating the revenue for the individual is that if she 
had a credit during the last period she will have to repay it. We use this strategy to 
make sure that a bank cannot fail and that we can consider the bank savings as low-
risk investments. Each individual will have the opportunity to receive a new credit 
during the course of the year in order to finance her consumption behavior. Therefore, 
it is possible that an individual can receive a credit for several consecutive periods. If 
we had allowed banks to negotiate long-term credit contracts, then we would have to 
make sure that an agent who wants to withdraw her savings can be served by the bank. 
Otherwise it could be possible that her savings are lent out to other individuals and she 
will not be able to use her money. Including this functionality into the simulation 
would add an enormous amount of complexity. The solution proposed in our model 
has the advantage of being simple yet allowing the credit market to be working 
properly and in a balanced way. 
7.3.3.2 Risk provision 
The next step an agent will take is to provide for the life risks we included in this 
simulation. There is a growing strand of literature arguing that a life in poverty is not 
only marked by an insufficient income but also by the lack of the possibility to 
participate in social life.
265
 It is therefore important to define the risks an agent will 
face in the simulation and the ways the individual can react to them or protect her from 
them.  
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An individual will face multiple risks which can include losing money because she 
will be unemployed, but it can also happen that she falls on a snow-covered pavement 
and breaks an arm. Possibly, her income situation will in no way be affected by this 
injury, and therefore no revenue focused insurance system would help her. 
Nevertheless, she might have to use part of her income to cover the cost of regaining 
full health and, consequently, has a lower amount of money available. Besides, we 
could imagine a case, where situations are not touching at the disposable income and 
still the utility of life is reduced like for example when a person has to move into an 
area which she feels less comfortable in. Each government will have to decide in 
which cases the society should step in and help the individual and to which degree and 
in which form it should try to soften the consequences from a realized risk. 
In this simulation, we have chosen to consider risks mostly from a monetary 
perspective. It would have been possible to implement utility characteristics for the 
individual which could then influence the overall happiness and by consequence, the 
innovation propensity or welfare in general in a society. However, following the 
approach to keep the simulation simple, this idea has not yet been implemented. As of 
now, the model only takes monetary effects of risk realization into consideration and 
will only try to cure those effects by monetary terms. There is, however, a certain 
influence which the public sector may have on the creativity and the inventiveness of 
the individuals linked to the provision of social insurance. We will explain this in 
detail below in section 7.3.3.6. 
Furthermore, we will have to look at the provision the individual takes for her risks. 
Depending on the willingness and the degree of help of a society, an agent will take 
different decisions on protecting herself against those risks. Therefore, there are 
different rules for the individual and the public model. We will present both in the 
following paragraphs. 
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7.3.3.3 Social risk provision 
In the public model, we know that the government will help the individual if she is 
unable to cover her subsistence minimum. On the other hand, each Human is obligated 
to contribute to the social insurance funds which will then be used to help those 
fellow-countrymen in need. 
This is summarized in the following rule for risk provision in the case of the public 
model: 
Social Risk Provision Human (1) if  Revenue > Subsistence Minimum then pay 
percentage of contribution required 
(2) if  Revenue < Subsistence Minimum then receive 
difference from social insurance 
Table 7-8: Human rule "Social Risk Provision" 
The idea of the public model is that the individual agent will not have to analyze her 
individual risk or provide for it on an individual basis. Instead, the social system will 
protect her in case her income is insufficient to cover her subsistence minimum. On 
the other hand, the agent will have to contribute to the public funds if she has enough 
money. 
In the present form, the individual who earned a sufficient income will first consume 
her subsistence minimum, which is designed to be exempt from the contribution. The 
reason for the exemption is that an agent, who will pay a contribution to the social 
funds, might then lack the money to finance her own subsistence minimum and will 
then require the support from the society again. This is comparable with a tax 
exemption for low incomes in many countries
266
 and is reflected in the discussion on 
fairness in the public health literature
267
. The current subsistence minimum is set 
endogenously in the voting process described in the rule “Set Subsistence Minimum” 
implemented in the Public Sector. 
There is a long literature on the question how a premium-based insurance system 
should be designed
268
. There is a discussion on systems with fixed premiums per 
individual since the risk of a person to be in distress is not necessarily linked to her 
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income. Furthermore, there are debaters in favor of a system with a fixed percentage 
of income which an individual has to pay. The argument put forth is that every 
individual has to pay according to her “capacity to pay”269. Third, it is possible to 
include the social insurance contribution in the progressive tax system. This would 
imply that a person who earns more will also pay a higher percentage of her income 
towards social contribution therefore reducing the burden for those members of 
society with a lower income. 
The way our simulation is set up, every individual will pay the same percentage of her 
income towards the Public Sector. In order to keep the model simple, we have chosen 
to refrain from implementing a progressive contribution rate depending on the income. 
An individual whose revenue is not sufficient to consume the subsistence minimum 
will receive a contribution from the state. The contribution will raise her to the 
subsistence minimum. There are several issues related to this decision. 
The first question we have to ask is if we should include the savings of the Human into 
the calculation of the contribution she is entitled to. This would imply that an 
individual with an insufficient income but high savings will have to first use her 
savings before she can receive the social insurance payments to cover her subsistence 
minimum. The discussion in Germany has just been restarted during the 2009 federal 
election campaign when all five parties which have been elected called for a higher 
amount of savings to be disregarded for the calculation of social benefits.
270
 At first 
glance, it seems to be the best choice, to design the model such that the Human will 
have to exhaustively use her savings before receiving a subsidy from the state. This 
implies that an individual will only receive help and support from the society when she 
is really not able to care for herself anymore. In our model, however, we aim at 
simulating a world where the government covers the essential risks an individual is 
facing during her lifetime. From a behavioral perspective, she would not have a high 
incentive to save if she might risk having to use her savings in a period of financial 
distress. Besides, we have assumed that the public model allows the individual to 
ignore the provision aspects of savings since it is covered by the public insurance 
system. Consequently, the savings stock an individual forms is not meant to be used 
for helping to overcome situations in which the available financial means are 
insufficient. It is therefore necessary to disregard the savings of an individual in the 
public model when calculating the social contribution from the state. 
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Secondly, we have to take a look at the incentive effects of the welfare system which 
we have modeled on the individual‟s propensity to accept a new job. Regardless of the 
behavior or the effort an agent has undertaken to be able to support herself in a period, 
she will receive social benefits if she is unable to cover her own subsistence minimum. 
This may lead to moral hazard behavior of agents who will be content with the 
benefits they receive. Besides, they do not have any incentive to accept a job which 
pays less than this social minimum.  
The subsistence minimum in our simulation only allows the individual to satisfy the 
basic existential needs. Consequently, any work income above this threshold earned 
by an agent will make her better off on a monetary scale. Since the average work 
income is 40,000 €, we can hypothesize that a subsistence minimum of 8,000 € will 
hardly distort the work effort for the majority of the population. 
The groups for which it may be interesting to show moral hazard behavior and to shirk 
the effort of finding a new job are those who have very low paid jobs or who do not 
earn enough money because of their health status. From the simulation setup we know 
that any income of a healthy person is above the subsistence minimum. Therefore, 
there is only a very small amount of agents who might be tempted by trying to come to 
terms with living off the subsistence minimum. Some of those will prefer to work and 
earn the additional money, and some might certainly fall prey to moral hazard 
behavior. 
Nevertheless, since the latter group is very small in this simulation and since we find 
moral hazard behavior endogenously implemented in the inventive activity, we have 
not added a shirking behavior to the working decision of the agent. 
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7.3.3.4 Individual risk provision 
The counterpart to this social risk provision rule is the rule which explains the agent‟s 
behavior in the individual model. We have implemented it as follows: 
Individual Risk 
Provision 
Human (1) if Revenue > Subsistence Minimum then  
a. if satisfied with returns then pay money 
into one‟s own provision stock 
according to risk aversion and time 
preference. 
b. if dissatisfied with return then move 
entire provision stock to different bank 
and pay money into one‟s own 
provision stock according to risk 
aversion and time preference. 
(2) if Revenue < Subsistence Minimum then  
a. take money from the risk provision 
stock and from other savings if 
necessary to add up to the Subsistence 
Minimum 
b. if Money left Available < Subsistence 
Minimum then try to get a credit from 
the financial market 
c. if no credit available then die of 
starvation 
(3) deduce subsistence minimum in all cases 
unless death 
Table 7-9: Human rule "Individual Risk Provision" 
An agent will first compare her revenue to the subsistence minimum. If it is sufficient, 
then she will satisfy her basic needs and therefore spends the subsistence minimum. 
The second step is to invest a part of her left over money into her risk provision 
account, so that she can care for herself if the revenue should be insufficient in a later 
period.  
In order to provide for herself, she will save a certain percentage which depends on her 
risk aversion and on her time preference. The higher the risk aversion, the more the 
individual will save out of her precautionary savings motive in order to be better 
protected in the event of a realization of an existential risk. It is quite the opposite with 
the characteristic time preference of the agent. The higher the time preference the 
more she values consumption today and the higher are the opportunity cost of saving. 
A higher time preference of an agent will therefore lead to a lower percentage of risk 
provision. In order to reduce complexity where possible we have not included the 
actual revenue into the decision to provide for her risk. There are different strains of 
thought to be respected if this behavior should be respected as well. An individual 
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with a higher income might save a lower percentage of her revenue since she might 
fear a similar cost related to a realized risk as someone with a lower income. 
Consequently, she will reach this amount in her risk provision account faster. 
On the other hand, she might be willing to save a higher percentage of her income for 
the risk provision since she aspires to have better care in case of a realized risk and 
since she can more easily cover her consumption wants beyond the subsistence 
minimum. The current implementation is also in line with the design of the social 
model which therefore adds to the comparability and the transparency in the model‟s 
outcomes. 
The individual will then invest the money she wants to save to protect her against the 
imponderability of life at a bank or a fund. Before doing so, she might, however, look 
for a better bank or fund to save her money at, if she was unhappy with the interests 
that were paid in the previous period. The only criterion for her choice is the interest 
rate. The agent accordingly looks at all the financial institutions which she can see in 
her surroundings. Depending on her risk aversion and the interest spread between 
banks and funds, she will choose either of the two types of institutions (bank or fund) 
and then select the bank or fund with the highest interest. This decision will be 
explained in detail in section 7.3.4.2. The bank can then use the money to hand out 
consumption credits as explained in the rule “Award Credit” in section 7.3.3.11, or the 
fund will use the money to invest in innovative projects. The individual has now 
provided for her existential needs as well as her life risks, therefore she can use the 
remaining amount for consumption or savings purposes or she might use it to finance 
her own innovations.  
On the other hand, we can have the situation where the revenue of the individual is 
insufficient to consume the subsistence minimum and therefore to provide for her 
basic needs. In this case, she will have to attack her savings and her risk provision 
account. The first reflex is to empty the savings account. The agent will take all this 
money which she had set aside to fulfill future consumption wants to overcome her 
present difficulties. Besides, in the case of a risk realization, she will try to reduce the 
risky positions in her portfolio and keep the less-risky resources as a guarantee for 
future hardships. 
If the savings in the savings account are not enough to cover her subsistence 
minimum, then she will tap on her risk provision account and withdraw the remaining 
amount. In both cases, she has used her savings to cover the basic needs and therefore 
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she has no more funds available to consume or save more and she cannot finance any 
of her own inventions.  
It is possible that her entire savings – combined from the savings account and the risk 
provision account – are too low to finance the most elementary consumption. Any 
agent who is too young to work will be in this detrimental situation. Unless she 
inherited means from her parents, she will be faced with a situation without income 
and without resources to cover the subsistence minimum. 
In this situation, she can turn to the banks to ask for a consumption credit which she 
will be awarded if the bank has sufficient funds available. The policy of handing out 
credits is explained in detail in section 7.3.3.11. In order to find the most preferable 
bank, the agent will take quotations from each bank in her field of vision and then 
chooses the one with the lowest interest rate. If no bank offers a credit, the agent will 
die due to starvation. This may seem to be a very harsh and crude assumption, but it is 
the long-run consequence of any system that leaves the individual to her own fate. The 
model therefore does not know of neighborly help or agents who will support an 
individual in existential difficulties.  
7.3.3.5 Save and Consume 
It is difficult or maybe even impossible to capture all the factors that influence the 
personal consumption and saving decision of an individual. “Personal saving is 
inherently a dynamic process that depends on expectations about future income and 
retirement benefits in ways that cannot be fully captured by the current income level 
and the actuarial present value of social security benefits. Such things as the changing 
demographic structure and the anticipated changes in real net-of-tax rates should in 
principle be included but cannot generally be measured or summarized adequately.”271 
Therefore we have to simplify the consumption and saving behavior of an agent if we 
want to be able to include it in the simulation.  
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The rule which the agent follows when deciding on her consumption and savings 
behavior is set as follows: 
Save or Consume Human (1) compute savings ratio by varying average 
consumption ratio with 
a. amount of savings relative to revenue (+) 
b. time preference (+) and  
c. offered interest rate (-) 
(2) compute amount consumed from amount available 
(3) if remaining amount > 0 then place remaining 
amount in savings account and find bank to invest 
money 
(4) else look for bank to lend the money 
Table 7-10: Human rule "Save or Consume" 
When an individual has satisfied her basic needs and is still left with money, she will 
have the choice of consuming or saving it. When modeling the consumption process, 
we have to start at the decision of the budget for immediate consumption.
272
 Only in 
the subsequent steps will an agent decide on which products to spend her money or 
where to save it. The Human in the simulation will behave accordingly and first 
compute her consumption ratio.  
The individual consumption rate will oscillate around an average consumption rate
273
 
in order to calibrate the model. Each agent will then value her savings and her debt 
against the revenue. The higher the ratio of her wealth to income, the more she is 
willing to consume. This means that an increase in savings will also raise the 
consumption rate of the individual, where the consumption rate is then multiplied with 
the disposable income to calculate actual consumption. In the case of an increase in 
revenue, however, the consumption ratio will fall. This may or may not result in a 
reduction in consumption. There is a large literature on the influence of income on the 
consumption behavior.
274
 While there are many theoretical approaches to how an 
increase in income should replicate in the consumption behavior, the data does not 
always follow those theories. The setup in the simulation follows the results from 
empirical studies and takes into account, that an individual with a higher income will 
consume a smaller share of her disposable income.
275
 This is also in line with the 
KISS-approach of the model. 
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Furthermore, the higher the time preference of an individual, the higher will be her 
consumption rate in the current period. Humans with a high time preference assign a 
strong value to today‟s consumption and face therefore higher opportunity cost when 
they have to postpone this consumption to a later moment in time. Often, time 
preference is supposed to decrease with age and increase as an individual is retired. 
This follows empirical findings that age has a considerable impact on time 
preference
276
. We have decided not to vary time preference with respect to age in order 
to keep the model as simple as possible. This is due to the fact that there is still a 
debate how and according to which factors time preference is changing. In the future, 
varying the measure of impatience with respect to age could render the model even 
more realistic, and as we explain in section 7.3.3.7, the time preference of agents is 
influenced in the simulation because of the interaction with other agents in their 
friends-network. 
We have also taken the decision to ignore the risk aversion of an agent as a decisive 
input factor for her consumption behavior. While it is fairly undisputed that risk 
aversion and risk behavior do influence the savings decision of an agent
277
, it is not 
clear if it has to be integrated in the savings decision in this simulation. The 
precautionary savings motive has already been covered when an agents reaches the 
decision rule about saving and consuming. This means that she has already had the 
opportunity to provide for her risk and should not have to worry about it anymore. 
Nevertheless, we can argue that risk aversion does play a role when an individual has 
to decide about her savings behavior. There are two motives which could surface: a 
high risk aversion could make her choose to consume less today to buy better products 
in a subsequent period. So, instead of buying a regular TV today, she might choose to 
save the money to buy a better TV in the next period or use the money in case 
something unexpected happens. On the other hand, a high risk aversion could make 
the agent be afraid of changes in the future and therefore she is more akin to 
consuming today. Maybe a consumption option could vanish or the desire for a 
product disappear. For example, this could be the long sought boat cruise where an 
individual is afraid that her health status could worsen while she is saving up for the 
event. The risk aversion could therefore have positive and negative implications on the 
consumption ratio. In order to keep the model simple, we chose to leave it out entirely 
of the consumption decision of the individual. 
                                                 
276
 see for example [Bish04] 
277
 see for example [Knol08] 
Individual Risk and Innovative Behavior - Modeling the relationship 
  129 
Even though Keynes has not been favorable to adding the interest rate into the 
equation on the consumption decision
278
, the classic IS-curve maps this correlation in 
a very explicit way. In the simulation, we follow this approach that an individual will 
save less the more interest the banks offers her. With an increase in the interest rates, 
the opportunity cost for consuming an additional euro increase as well. Therefore, she 
will save more. The agent will take the rates of banks and funds into account when 
deciding on her consumption ratio. The higher the interest offer by funds and banks is 
the lower will be the percentage of her income which an agent will consume. Every 
individual will have her individual average interest rate, because she will calculate it 
from the financial institutions she can see in her environment. Since no individual has 
perfect information, otherwise comparable agents may take different consumption and 
savings decisions only because they are offered different interest rates in their region. 
Once the consumption ratio is defined, the agent will calculate the amount she wants 
to use for consumption. Since we have not modeled the real sector in detail, it is not 
important where the agent spends her money. We also do not inquire if it is spent on 
innovative products. The only importance in the demand equation is the time when the 
income is spent by an individual. If the Human possesses enough money to fulfill her 
consumption desires, then she will spend it and save the remaining amount. This could 
also imply that she takes money from her savings account and uses it for consumption 
purposes in the current period.  
In the case that she would like to consume more than she has, she will have to apply 
for a credit. This is a fairly straightforward task in the individual model since the agent 
contacts all the banks around her and checks for the best quote. She will then choose 
the bank with the lowest offer until she finds one who is willing to lend her the money. 
The consumption credit will have to be paid back at the beginning of the consecutive 
period. 
In the governmental model it is less clear, however, if agents should have the right to 
take out a loan on consumption wants. An indebted individual always faces the risk 
that she is unable to repay the credit. This will certainly have repercussions on her risk 
behavior and probably her economic behavior in other fields as well. Since we have 
taken the assumption that Humans in the governmental model can see all their 
existential risks covered by society, it can be argued that they consequently do not 
have the right to take out loans from banks. 
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In this model, we have taken the opposite strand of thought. Even though an individual 
has all her basic needs covered and insured, she may want to consume more money 
than she holds in a certain period. The increased risk of accruing too much debt will be 
met by introducing the possibility of filing for personal bankruptcy in her lifetime 
which will then deny the agent any more consumption credit.
279
 We also discuss the 
issue that this will not create a negative incentive to take out excessive debts in section 
7.3.3.7. The agent can therefore follow the same consumption behavior as in the 
individual model. This adds transparency and comparability to the model. 
Besides, there is a model-related reason which also points towards allowing agents in 
the governmental model to ask for credits. If the banks had no credit request they 
could not offer any interests on the low-risk savings market. Therefore, the financial 
sector would have to be entirely redesigned which would further complicate matters 
without adding insight to the model‟s outcome on the relationship between innovation 
and social insurance schemes. Nevertheless, a researcher building upon this model has 
to keep this influence in mind when adapting the model. 
7.3.3.6 Innovate 
Each individual will then have the opportunity to invent and innovate. As we have 
outlined earlier, not everyone feels comfortable or is creative enough to think of an 
invention. Besides, not everybody who invents something has the ability or the 
potential to implement it as an innovation. The entire innovative activity is designed in 
this rule and will be explained below: 
Innovate Human (1) Compute invention propensity according to her 
education, work experience, innovation experience, 
network stimuli, her happiness, merit goods,  her 
tinkerer propensity and her risk aversion 
(2) if an invention is made then compute financing 
propensity according to her wealth and the cost of the 
innovation 
a. if willing to finance then compute risk 
propensity according to risk aversion, risks 
privately borne and innovation experience 
i. if willing to risk then carry out 
innovation 
1. if successful then add 
innovation to portfolio 
Table 7-11: Human rule "Innovate" 
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As we have explained in chapter 0, the focus of the work is on the individuals and 
their role in the innovation process. This means that we restrict the innovative activity 
to the individual entrepreneur as well and not to a firm-like conglomerate of several 
actors. The reasons which lie behind this decision have been discussed above so that 
we will now present the actual implementation and design of the entrepreneurial 
activity in this section. 
In order to become innovative, an entrepreneurial agent needs an invention which can 
subsequently be marketed. The process of implementing an innovation is therefore 
split into three separate and subsequent steps which have to be accomplished: 
inventing, financing the invention and risking carrying it through. Nevertheless, not all 
the steps have to be taken by the same individual. 
So in a first part, we will explain how an individual can come up with an invention. 
The characteristics of the individual inventor, of her environment and of the 
circumstances surrounding the invention are important when it comes to modeling the 
way inventions are created. It is important to stress that the inventor and the innovator 
do not have to be identical and often enough they are not the same person. In our 
simulation, however, we will define them to be identical for reasons of simplicity. A 
more complex model could certainly allow for the possibility that an individual who 
has a propensity to being innovative will buy the invention from someone who is 
creative and inventive but not willing to carry out the innovation. In the abstract form 
of our model, we feel that the argument is not hurt by requiring each entrepreneurial 
innovator to have to find an invention first. 
While it is difficult to find a general rule to describe how people become creative and 
find inventions, we will outline and discuss the design which we use in the simulation 
and the reasoning which led to the implemented setup. Modifications in the modeling 
of this rule could be used to include different theories on how innovation occurs in an 
economy and a society. 
In order to model the process of invention, we have chosen to set up a system where 
we include all factors which influence the creativity and inventiveness of an individual 
and then calculate her propensity to invent. If a random value between zero and this 
propensity to invent is above the invention threshold which is exogenously chosen, 
then the Human finds an invention in the given period. This means that the better the 
qualifications are, the higher is the probability for an individual to be inventive, yet 
there is no certainty to find an invention. We will now present the factors which 
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influence the inventiveness of an agent and will then present how an individual can 
manage to transform her invention into an innovation. 
The first characteristic we take into account is the education level of an agent. There is 
considerable evidence that the higher the education of an individual, the more she is 
likely to be creative. “Overall, the correlation between a measure of human capital and 
technological productivity can therefore be empirically confirmed”280. Higher 
education will increase the capabilities of an individual to see similarities and linkages 
between different aspects or to find more elaborate solutions to certain problems. 
Though this does not mean that a person with higher formal education will be an 
inventor and those with lower education achievements will not, it only states that the 
increased level of education increases the likelihood of an individual to become an 
inventor. Consequently, it is not sufficient for an entrepreneur-to-be to be smart
281
, but 
this makes the task easier.  
The next aspect, we take into consideration is work experience. While the educational 
level helps us estimate the amount of knowledge a Human has access to and has been 
confronted with, work experience is a measure which shows us how much she may 
have learned in her job. The more experience an individual has, the more she is able to 
judge if creative ideas related to her field of activity are worth being explored.
282
 
“Looking at the results from the literature review carried out for each country, the 
slogan could be „nobody is born an entrepreneur‟. Level of education and previous 
experience are essential factors“283. When an individual knows the tasks she is 
fulfilling well and how they blend together with the general production process, she is 
able to find those points where a simplification or improvement could be achieved at a 
reasonable cost and with a valuable effect. “Specialised labour builds up enough 
experience through learning by doing from which to create inventions as a problem 
solving exercise”284. 
As a next step, we have included the experience in inventions into the propensity to be 
creative. An individual who has already invented certain things, processes or methods 
is likely to have all those characteristic traits which make a new invention likely. 
Furthermore, she knows how to carry through a creative process so that she can reach 
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a state where the invention is usable. The success and the failure to invent and find 
new solutions will increase or respectively decrease the search intensity of an 
individual.
285
 Since we have not modeled a failed process of invention, we can only 
take the successes as stimulating events into consideration.  
One of the aspects which influence people to become creative and to try to find new 
things certainly is due to their surrounding environment. Human beings are part of 
their peer group and their network and there are effects of interaction, assimilation and 
differentiation which are induced by the network. The indirect effects are modeled in 
the rule “Environmental Influence” where the preferences of an individual can change 
according to her peer group. We explain the detailed methods of this rule in section 
7.3.3.7. 
We have also included the very direct effect of the size of the network of the 
individual as a relevant criterion for her inventiveness. The peer related effects can 
stimulate creativity in the individual and can open up idea-spaces which are seemingly 
unrelated. “The larger the network of people from whom we can learn, the greater the 
prospects for invention”286. Accordingly, we have included the size of the network of 
those friends which an individual considers to be important for her into the equation to 
create her inventive potential. The choice is made for the more important friends
287
 
because the more valued a contact is the higher is her influence on the friend. In this 
first step, we do not investigate if the network of friends is inventive or innovative.
288
 
We follow the logic that an agent who is exposed to many different ideas as a 
consequence to having a large network is more likely to see coincidences which others 
do not.
289
 So, it is not necessary that the friends and acquaintances be very creative for 
the individual to increase her own inventiveness.
290
  
Additionally, we take the happiness of the individual into account. The happier an 
individual is the more likely she is to be creative because she does not have to worry 
about other things in her life. Happiness can also open up the possibility of thinking 
outside the box and trying new ideas.  
                                                 
285
 [Witt87], pp. 162f  
286
 [Swan09], p. 119 
287
 In section 7.3.3.7, we explain how a friend can become a “cool friend”. 
288
 cf. for example [Ogle07b] 
289
 cf. [Dono10] 
290
 Note that we have included the innovativeness of the friends-network in the decision whether an 
individual is willing to assume the risk of realizing her innovation. This effect is presented below in this 
section. 
Individual Risk and Innovative Behavior - Modeling the relationship 
134 
The subsequent point is that we included the provision of merit goods, where we 
consider all the expenses and provision the state is able to offer its citizens in the 
governmental model thanks to the social insurance contributions. They include 
infrastructure expenses, service offers as well as the provision of certain amenities 
such as health regulated expenses and regulation or publicly run hospitals at certain 
distances. Furthermore, they may include publicly funded programs for reintegration 
into the labor market or services for the elder. We have tested the model with this 
factor included and without it and find in both cases that the inventiveness and the 
average income are statistically significantly higher in the governmental model. A 
detailed analysis of the outcome can be found in section 8.2. The reason for including 
this influence is that a government will not only provide social insurance in monetary 
terms but that it will also use this money to provide goods and services for the citizens 
which can increase the welfare of the members of a society.
291
 In such a situation 
where an individual can benefit from the provision of certain public services, she 
might be more creative. The argument follows a similar logic as the one for including 
happiness above since the better the provision of goods and services in the public 
space, the less a Human has to care for such things herself or bother with difficulties 
which might not be standardized or trivial in the absence of a public influence. 
Consequently, she can concentrate on other things where she might be more creative 
and have more insight. Examples for such influences may be a working infrastructure 
of different services or roads which are in good shape, furthermore public safety and 
the different degrees of comfort which people may feel with regard to homeless people 
or beggars. Social insurance can provide for a certain standard in the life of the people 
which may give them the possibility to focus on their creativity. 
On the other hand, we just argued that we ignore the taxes in the model since we 
assume that in both situations – the individual model and the governmental model – 
the state provides a certain basic level of public goods such as roads and clean 
drinking water in order to be able to compare the results of the model. We can now 
argue whether the merit goods influence in this rule is contradicting this similarity in 
basic public services. We feel that it is not problematic to use this influence since there 
is a large range of additional public provision available to the state in the 
governmental model which can lead to additional benefits for the population and 
which enable the individual to exercise her creativity more easily.  
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Furthermore, the inventiveness of an agent is also dependent on her so called personal 
characteristics and disposition towards inventions, creativity and new approaches. As 
we explained in section 4.2, the personality of the innovator is very important. There 
have been many specifications of how such a personal tendency, which Schumpeter 
called “entrepreneurial genus”292, can be described. It relates to the fact that two 
people can share most externally visible and measurable endowments but that they 
nevertheless have a different personality when it comes to novelty.
293
 The one trait 
which is important in this rule is the inclination towards being creative which we call 
„tinkerer‟-characteristic in the simulation.  
In the simulation, an agent who does not have this disposition towards inventions and 
innovations can nevertheless be creative and come up with an invention. But this 
„genetic‟ predisposition increases the probability of an individual to be inventive and 
is consequently part of the invention propensity calculated for each Human. 
Finally, the risk aversion is an essential criterion when it comes to the willingness of 
an individual to strive for an invention.
294
 The creative process is unforeseeable and it 
is unpredictable. This means that a person who is willing to invest herself in such a 
process can never be sure that she will eventually reap a profit from the endeavor or 
that she will even bring the project to a fulfilling and satisfying stage. At this point in 
the simulation, we include risk aversion into the propensity to invent in such a way 
that an individual with a medium risk aversion will have the highest probability of 
being inventive. It is not the tendency towards accepting to take the risk of the 
innovation, but it is the general disposition towards risk which makes an individual 
more apt at inventing. A very risk adverse person will be less likely to take on an 
unsecure costly endeavor of creating something new. On the other hand, a person who 
is a risk seeker may not have the perseverance to carry the invention through until it is 
marketable. She may look for new thrills before having finished the last project. 
Therefore, we increase the propensity to invent for those individuals with a moderate 
risk aversion. 
From those factors, we establish a measure of invention propensity and compare it to 
an invention threshold. Only if a random number between zero and this invention 
propensity is above the threshold, the agent finds an invention. The threshold for 
inventions can be exogenously set which increases the possibility to test the model for 
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robustness in the inventiveness. This means that we can test if social insurance has 
comparable effects on innovativeness, if invention is easier or more difficult. We have 
tested the model with three different threshold levels (40, 60 and 80). From the results 
we can infer that the harder it is to find an invention, the larger is the advantage of the 
governmental system. Nevertheless, the lower the threshold and the easier it is to be 
inventive, the more innovations are generated and the higher is the average income in 
the society. 
For reasons of simplicity, we assume that the process of finding an invention does not 
entail any costs for the individual. This is due to the fact, that every agent processes 
the rule “innovate” even though she may not at all be inclined or capable of finding an 
invention. Then she should not have to face any cost linked to this process. 
Besides, for all those who do find an invention, the cost factor will be treated when it 
comes to financing it to turn it into an innovation. The cost she will have to bear then 
can be understood to include all the costs linked to the inventive and the marketing 
processes. If the agent cannot implement the invention, it can still be realized through 
the help of an investment fund who will then cover the cost and therefore the inventor 
once again does not have to bear any cost of her invention. Including a cost for an 
invention would consequently only influence the simulation in the case of an invention 
which will never be carried out. We decided that this case did not justify rendering the 
innovative process even more complex by setting a cost for this invention and having 
to include it in all subsequent calculations for the agent and the investment funds. 
Once an agent has found an invention, she will see if she is able to finance its 
implementation. We used a very simple and transparent procedure to do so, because if 
the sum of the agent‟s savings exceeds the cost of carrying out the innovation, then we 
consider her ready to finance it. It can be argued that she will be able to receive a 
credit from the banks to finance it if the invention is promising, but then we have a 
similar situation as when an investment fund steps in as financier. Consequently, such 
a situation would not add considerable insight to the simulation‟s results. 
Besides, it could be possible that an agent who has made an invention will rethink her 
consumption behavior and save for a subsequent year so that she is able to implement 
the innovation at a later point in time. While this seems to be very intuitive and 
understandable especially for those inventors who do not seek the support of strangers, 
it would require another set of strong assumptions on the behavioral change incurred 
by the desire to finance the proper invention and on the subsequent consumption and 
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savings decision. It could then be argued that such a situation also leads to an 
increased supply of working hours and easily we would have to add a new set of 
complex rules to the simulation. So, we have not implemented this possibility in order 
to keep the model as easy and transparent as possible.  
Therefore, we consider the financial capacity of the inventor in the very moment of the 
invention and if she can bear the cost of implementing it, she will next consider the 
risk linked to it and assess it. As we have discussed in sections 0 and 4.3, the risk 
borne by the entrepreneur is not directly linked to her function as innovator but rather 
to her acting as capitalist and financier of her own innovation endeavor. Therefore, in 
this situation where an individual is willing to finance the implementation of her 
invention, we also have to look at her willingness to bear the risk. 
Consequently, whenever the inventor takes on the role as financier, then she will also 
have to reflect on the risk connected to the invention and judge if she is willing to 
accept the possibility of the innovation failing and her being liable for the cost of it.  
Comparable to the situation in the first step where we took several characteristics of 
the agent into account in order to calculate her propensity to invent, we will now look 
at those aspects which are important when she has to decide if she is willing to assume 
the risk connected to an innovation. 
First of all, she will have to consider her risk aversion where it follows from our 
discussion in section 4.2 to consider an individual with a higher risk aversion less 
likely to be willing to realize the innovation. Nevertheless, we have integrated a 
random factor into the risk aversion of the individual which allows the value to be 
increased or decreased by 20 percent. This can be seen as the different assessment of 
the innovation endeavor compared to other risks an individual faces in her life. There 
might be some people who will be fairly risk adverse when it comes to securing their 
standard of living and protecting them from existential risks, but who are willing to 
accept the risk connected to the innovation. On the other hand, it could be that a 
person is not too risk adverse in the everyday routine when dealing with uncertainty 
she is used to, but when it comes to the new and unfamiliar situation of risking an 
innovation, she is less inclined to bear the risk. Finally, the risk aversion might just be 
influenced by some event of the exact day when she has to take the decision of 
implementing the innovation.  
Furthermore and relating to our overall question, it is important for the decision of an 
individual to engage in a new uncertain endeavor to qualify the risks and uncertainty 
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she already bears. So we incorporate into the risk propensity the state of the model – 
individual or governmental. An agent who is rather risk averse
295
 will be more inclined 
to risk an innovation in the governmental model where her existential risks are secured 
through a social insurance scheme. An agent who is more risk seeking
296
 will focus 
more on the incentive to innovating which is higher in the individual model because 
her innovation rent is not subject to the redistributive system of contribution in the 
social insurance setup. Therefore, the state of the model can induce the risk taking if 
the individual feels comfortable with the public setup of existential risks. 
Additionally, we include her innovation experience into the risk propensity equation. 
The more innovations she has successfully carried out, the more she will be willing 
and ready to bear the risk of a new innovation since she can better judge the challenges 
awaiting her and the difficulties which can arise. Furthermore, those innovations 
which have been attempted but failed will not reduce her inclination towards starting a 
new innovation endeavor on her own. Neither will those inventions where she could 
not finance the realization or where she could not find an investor influence her risk 
decision. 
It could also be argued to include those experiences in the opposite way, namely that a 
successful innovation reduces her willingness to carry out another one and that the 
failure of an innovation will have an influence on her willingness to realize an 
innovation in the next situation. We have chosen to implement it as described for two 
reasons. On the one hand, we follow Schumpeter‟s observation that an entrepreneur 
does not stop when he successfully secured his standard of living but that there are 
many reasons why he continues to try to be successful.
297
  When he therefore has the 
opportunity to carry out another innovation, he will see the opening as a chance and 
not as a burden linked to additional work and implementation obstacles. 
On the other hand, there are two opposite strands of argumentation in the case of a 
failed innovation endeavor. The first strand argues that we could make the agent more 
risk averse because a burnt child dreads the fire. So, only if her risk aversion has 
decreased since the last approach, she would dare assuming the risk again. The second 
strand goes as follows: from the failed approach, she has learned to avoid some 
mistakes and has grown more aware of the difficulties awaiting her during the process 
of implementing the innovation. So, when she is faced with the decision about risking 
                                                 
295
 This means that she has a value for her risk aversion characteristic between 6 and 10. 
296
 This means that she has a value for her risk aversion characteristic between 0 and 4. 
297
 [Schu34b], pp. 135f 
Individual Risk and Innovative Behavior - Modeling the relationship 
  139 
a new endeavor she might feel more secure and therefore be even more inclined to try 
the realization. Besides, she could just feel all the more so the urge to make the project 
succeed.
298
 “The striking thing about the innovators who succeeded in making our 
modern world is how often they failed. [...] No one likes failure, but the smart 
innovators learn from it.”299 Consequently, we could argue in both directions which 
influence outweighs the other, but for reasons of simplicity we decided to leave the 
failed innovations out of the risk decision. 
Furthermore, having people in the environment who have realized an innovation 
certainly has a positive impact on the individual, since she can experience the 
difficulties as well as the success related to the implementation of an innovation. 
Furthermore, it might make her more confident to pursue her own innovation. “Not 
only provides the social network the opportunity to have access to additional and 
complementary endowment factors, networks have a crucial influence on the actual 
entrepreneurial decision to start a venture itself.”300 This means that if she can see 
others in her environment successfully implement an innovation, she may feel less fear 
to misjudge the overall economic situation or the difficulties related to an innovation. 
Once again, we have to take a closer look at the cost of the implementation of the 
innovation. Independent of the achieved state of the innovation – if it is successful or 
if it failed – we model them as a certain amount of money the capitalist has to pay and 
do not differentiate how far into the process the carrying out of the innovation came 
when the inventor realized that it was not feasible. We could discuss if the amount lost 
by carrying out the innovation should correspond to a certain fraction of the 
innovation‟s cost. Since we do not specify the nature of the invention, this process 
would not add the slightest insight. We can always consider the money invested into a 
successful innovation endeavor as the full cost of the project which arises as a 
consequence of the implementation and we can consider the money lost in an 
unsuccessful innovation project as the amount of funds spent up until the moment 
when the venture is abandoned. Since the same invention cannot be successful and 
unsuccessful at the same time, interpreting the situation in such a way does in no way 
introduce a contradiction into the simulation. 
Besides, we did not take the rent of the invention as a factor for her decision into any 
of the equations. This is due to the fact that the rent is inherently uncertain and not 
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foreseeable. Certainly, an agent will have a certain idea of the amount she can gain 
through implementing an innovation, but there is no guarantee that this expectation is 
close to the amount actually realized. It could be that the innovation will not work on 
the market even though the prospects are fantastic because someone else has 
independently worked on the same idea and implemented it before our innovator. 
Then the rent could drop to zero. On the other hand, some innovations develop a 
potential which was unexpected because users find a different utilization and attribute 
it a higher value.
301
 This means that if we included an expected rent of the innovation 
into her decision matrix, then this value would randomly bias the agent‟s behavior and 
not necessarily add much insight. Therefore, we have chosen not to integrate this value 
into the agent‟s decision process.  
Finally, an agent who has found an invention, who holds the financial means to 
finance its realization, and who is willing to assume the uncertainty connected to the 
implementation, will then carry out the innovation. The success of the project then 
depends on his ratio of successfully implemented innovations to implemented 
innovations as well as chance. There are random effects which will make an 
innovation work and there are influences which may arise and destroy the innovation 
unexpectedly. Nevertheless, an individual who does have experience with successfully 
implementing innovations is supposed to have a higher chance of victoriously carrying 
out an innovative endeavor because she is aware of some pitfalls and possible hurdles 
on the way. Again, we did not include the failed innovations because they can have a 
supporting effect because the individual knows where to be sensible and cautious, but 
they can also show that the agent is not able to grasp some essential criteria necessary 
for successfully implementing an innovation. 
At the end of this rule, a successful innovation will lower the risk aversion of the 
individual because she has just found her decision on taking a risk to be right ex-post 
and since she can be certain of reaping a benefit from the innovation she might feel 
less adverse to other risk. A failed innovation on the other hand, will increase risk 
aversion in an individual since she lost the money invested in the project and since her 
risk assessment proved to be wrong from an ex-post perspective. So she will be more 
cautious in subsequent risk decisions. 
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7.3.3.7 Variable update and environmental stimuli 
After having modeled the revenue generation, the risk provision behavior, the savings 
and consumption decision as well as the innovative activity, we have to update some 
variables related to the agent as well as to incorporate the environmental stimuli which 
she receives from her network and her surroundings. This is done in the rule “Update 
Variables”. 
Update Variables Human (1) Set new values for age, health, risk aversion, 
experience 
(2) if age is above DeathAge then be reborn 
(3) Update environmental influences 
a. friends network 
b. financing of inventions 
(4) if we are in the governmental model then set voting 
behavior 
Table 7-12: Human rule "Update Variables" 
The first step in this rule is to update those values which increase due to the time 
elapsing. This means that we increase age by one and we increase the working 
experience by one if the agent has been employed in the relevant period. 
Furthermore, we update the health level of the agent as well as her risk aversion. The 
health level is autoregressive meaning that the new value of the agent‟s health status 
depends on her health level in the previous period. This is included to avoid frequent 
jumps in the health level. We include a random value as well, however, which is once 
again Poisson-distributed
302
, so that the health level is allowed to vary from period to 
period. It is possible for an individual to see a sharp increase or decrease in her level of 
health, but the probability is higher for small variations since the expected value for 
the new health level is once again 95%. For reasons of simplicity, we did not include 
an age component in the variation of the health level. Besides, there is evidence 
suggesting that major changes in the life of senior citizens, such as the start into 
retirement, do not infer a significant change in the health level of the person 
concerned.
303
 
In our model, the relative health level also has repercussions on the risk aversion of the 
individual. If the health has decreased since the previous period, then the risk aversion 
of the Human will increase. If she is doing better than before, then she will also be 
more willing to bear risks.  
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We have to revisit the age increase at this point, because it can have certain 
repercussions on the life of the agent. If the agent reaches her pre-set age of retirement, 
then she will not be able to generate her work income anymore and will have to live 
the subsequent years off her saved resources or public support.  
Whenever an agent reaches her “Death Age” or if she is not capable of procuring for 
her living, she will die and be replaced by her offspring. We assume this method of 
reproducing since it allows us to hold the population size constant. This means that an 
extinction of a society is not possible, but we can observe the different dynamics 
unfolding. The largest problem for the simulation is that behavior would change 
radically if we admitted agents to mate and reproduce. We would have to specify their 
meeting strategies and their behavior in relationships. This would require us to include 
a variety of cultural and societal characteristics as well as behavioral aspects into the 
simulation which might make the results more insightful. The model would gain 
enormously in complexity, however, if the simulation of the reproduction process is 
supposed to be reasonable. This includes the definition of gender for the agents and 
distinct manners of conducting between female and male agents. Besides, we would 
have to include behavioral differences due to the marital status and many other 
aspects. Implementing such an alternative could be a rewarding project, even though 
there seem to be major shortfalls which may limit the reasonable feasibility of such an 
approach. 
Therefore, we have decided to design the model such that an agent who will reach her 
death age or who is incapable of providing her subsistence minimum will die and is 
reborn as an infant. The child is considered a relative of the preceding agent since she 
will have similar characteristics and will inherit half of the legal estate of her ancestor. 
There is a critical implication in this decision to model reproduction in the society in 
such a way. The infant will grow up by herself and will have to provide for herself 
from the first day. She will have access to the credit market and will not be treated 
more cautiously than other customers. This setup is more feasible, simple and 
transparent. Furthermore, it respects that the time spent to learn and become educated 
is linked to low or inexistent revenue and that it has to be financed in some way.  
It was argued
304
 that such a method would reward the individuals who abuse the 
system and accrue more and more debt until they would be reborn and reset to a debt 
of zero, because all offspring can inherit wealth but not debt. While there is an easy 
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rebuttal in the modeling framework which we will present in this section, there is also 
a more reality focused explanation. Almost all western countries offer the possibility 
for individuals to file for personal bankruptcy and can then restart into life as if there 
had not been this excessive debt. It is even explicitly the interest of the law to give 
individuals the possibility of starting anew and to “relieve the honest debtor from the 
weight of oppressive indebtedness”305. Restoring an individual to a debt of 0 in the 
case of having accumulated a too high burden is therefore not far from actual 
implementations. 
Nevertheless, there is a much easier response to this critique if we remember how such 
a model works. The agents have a set of behavioral rules and environmental stimuli 
which generate their actual behavior and interaction. Since the sum they will leave for 
their offspring is not relevant for decisions during the course of an agent‟s life nor will 
the individual request unlimited credit for the sake of not working, those 
simplifications may blur the amounts in some aggregate variables but they will not 
bias the behavior. Since it is the behavioral interaction which is pivotal in this model, 
this critique is a priori no reason to refuse the model.  
As mentioned earlier, the offspring‟s characterization depends on the parent‟s traits. 
This means that the new born agent inherits the values of her ancestor but it is possible 
that these values vary slightly. In the case of her age, it is reset to zero. Concerning the 
educational level of the child, it is possible to either have a child who will obtain a 
higher level, a lower level or the same as the parent agent. We have implemented a 
different likelihood of having the child more or less educated depending on the 
educational level of the parent. Any newborn agent will have an educational level 
which is raised by one, lowered by one or the same as the parent. Nevertheless, the 
level will have to remain between 1 and 3. Consequently, it is not possible for an agent 
of educational level 1 that her offspring has an educational level of 3. The strong 
barrier to jump a level is certainly not realistic, but it allows keeping a certain 
persistence in education levels in the simulation. 
Independently of the question if they are reincarnated, all individuals also react to 
influences from the people in their surroundings. Nevertheless, not every person who 
is close in space to another agent is similarly influential. So, there are differences in 
how close people are and how much contact they will have. We have therefore defined 
a network called friends which includes all those agents who are within the field of 
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vision of the agent at a certain point in time and who have not moved away further 
than a certain distance.
306
  
An individual is influenced by the people in her environment with respect to her risk 
aversion, her time preference as well as her happiness. In all three dimensions, she will 
assimilate with the people in her network. This means that her characteristics will 
approach those of her neighbors. If an agent has a very high risk aversion and all the 
people around her are less risk averse, then she will also lose part of her shyness 
towards uncertain situations. The reason for that is that social interaction will lead to 
discussions, talks, exchanges on various grounds and in various forms and humans are 
influenced by the opinions and positions of their neighbors. “When individuals make 
choices, they are often influenced by the behavior and opinions of people in their 
immediate environment.”307 The great advantage in agent-based modeling is that we 
can integrate the influences for each individual agent into the simulation and therefore 
gain a much more individualistic picture of the emergent phenomena. This means that 
the simulation will analyze the specific environment for every agent and calculate the 
influences she is exposed to as well as the effects on her time preference, her risk 
aversion as well as her happiness. 
Nevertheless, we have to respect that not every neighbor will have the same influence 
on the agent but that there are differences. Therefore, the simulation differentiates 
between simple friends who happen to live in the neighborhood of an agent and so 
called „cool friends‟ with whom she has closer ties. 
The friends who are said to be „cool friends‟ are those who share certain traits with the 
agent in question. Similarity creates closer ties
308
 and can lead to a stronger influence 
of those agents on each other
309
, which will then have repercussions on the lives of the 
individuals. Consequently, an agent will choose those agents in his „cool friends‟-
network who are similar and with whom she shares certain characteristics. This will 
create clusters and groups of people who are similarly successful. “This law, which 
applies universally to dynamic networks, accounts for the fact that nodes will 
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preferentially attach to other nodes or hubs that they relate to in terms of fitness.”310 
Therefore, we have modeled the subset of the friends-network as the network of cool 
friends who relate to their peers by certain characteristics. 
Since it is common in agent-based modeling to simulate characteristic traits as values 
inherent to the agent and then compare those values to other agent‟s sets in order to 
determine the cultural similarity
311
, we have chosen exactly this approach and defined 
a friend to be a cool friend if she has three out of five traits which are appreciated by 
the agent looking for friends. The five characteristics an agent looks for in a cool 
friend are a comparable age group, similar educational level, a comparable degree of 
happiness, a higher amount of implemented innovations, and a comparable wealth. In 
all categories we demand that the cool friend has to be somewhat similar following the 
argumentation above, which means that the value of the corresponding characteristic 
of a cool friend may not be considerably lower or higher than that of the agent in 
question. Only with respect to the innovative criterion do we look for the more 
successful individuals. This is due to the following reason. 
From intuition, we could derive two different assumptions concerning the influence of 
successful innovators in our surroundings. On the one hand, we could model the 
behavior of agents as looking only at best-practice innovative strategies and therefore 
only look for the most innovative agent in her environment. This asymmetric behavior 
will lead to a directionality that every agent is searching for the most innovative agent 
she can find and will try to profit from her experiences. 
Yet, there is evidence that spillovers are not only asymmetric, but that economic actors 
can benefit from all those participants in the market who are ahead of them.
312
 They 
will not only copy the best practice agent, but will be able to gain inputs from many 
more actors they perceive as interesting. “As people see more and more successful 
entrepreneurs in their area or in the media, this may enhance their perception of their 
own capabilities without enhancing actual capabilities“313. In an evolutionary 
economics context, these results match very well with the search for a „successful 
practice‟ instead of a possible „best practice‟ as well as satisficing behavior aiming at 
finding a way to achieve one‟s own ends with a reasonable degree of efficiency. It is 
this market observation that enables agents to find innovations and profit from the 
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spillovers of other actors, and that can spur innovation in a certain environment. In the 
simulation, we take this fact into consideration when an individual divides her friends-
network into „cool friends‟ and others. An individual who has successfully 
implemented more innovations than the agent herself makes her more likely to be 
considered a „cool friend‟. 
It is important to note, that the friends-network does not have a directionality 
component implemented. This means that if agent B is part of the friends-network of 
agent A then the opposite is also true. Therefore, the influence on the two is reciprocal. 
It is important to note however, that the classification of a „cool friend‟ is directional 
meaning that if agent A thinks of agent B as a cool friend, agent B does not necessarily 
consider agent A a cool friend. This reflects the idea that role models can have an 
influence on an individual‟s behavior while her behavior has no repercussion on the 
role model. The effect cool friends have on the agent are twice as strong as those 
„regular‟ friends have. Furthermore, the agent will try to move close towards the cool 
friends. This will create the clustering dynamics within the network.
314
  
Additionally, an agent might consider moving if she sees no opportunity to find an 
investor for her invention in her surroundings. Since she has no perfect vision across 
the entire „world‟ she can only find an investor in her neighborhood. If she realizes 
that most of her inventions are unfinanced, she will look further for a promising fund 
and move closer towards it. A fund is considered to be interesting if it has more capital 
and a higher rent from innovations than the fund she is invested in so far. In case she 
has not invested any money at a fund then any fund with positive capital which 
receives a rent from innovations is considered to be attractive. 
Finally, if we are in the governmental model then an agent will value her happiness 
with the current social insurance scheme. She can take three different positions saying 
either that the guaranteed subsistence minimum is too low, that it is too high, or that it 
should remain like that. In order to take that decision, the individual assesses the 
contribution she had to pay or the amount she received in the previous period and her 
risk aversion. The more money she had to pay into the system, the more she is inclined 
to consider the subsistence minimum procured for by the state too high. Consequently, 
the more she received from the state as payment, the less she is ready to vote for a 
reduction in subsistence.  
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Furthermore, the risk aversion is important. The more risk averse an individual is, the 
stronger she feels about securing a minimum lifestyle. This means that an agent with a 
high risk aversion will rather vote to increase than to decrease social insurance 
spending by setting a high subsistence minimum. Agents who are less risk averse will 
rather vote for a decrease. How the elections work is explained in section 7.3.3.9 since 
this is a rule implemented for the Public Sector. 
Those were the five rules, which every agent is following in her interaction in the 
simulation. We will now present the rules for the other agents before we turn to the 
results of the model runs. 
7.3.3.8 Contribution to Social Insurance 
The Public Sector has two rules which govern the functioning of the welfare state. All 
other functions which a government usually has to fulfill are assumed to be identical in 
both simulation setups and have therefore not been modeled. This implies that the 
Public Sector agent only interferes in the simulation in the governmental model.  
The first rule is where the percentage for the contribution is set. The government 
follows the directive that the receipts should in the long run cover the expenses, but 
that the social contribution should not be used to finance other governmental tasks. 
Consequently, we formulate the following rule: 
Calculate 
Contribution 
Public Sector (1) Compare the payments to the receipts 
from contributions 
(2) if all payments are covered then record 
good year 
a. if receipts are more than twice the 
payments then record excessive year 
(3) else if payments are larger than receipts 
then record bad year 
(4) if there were four bad periods in a row 
then raise percentage of contribution 
(5) if there were four excessive periods or ten 
good or excessive periods in a row then 
lower percentage of contribution 
Table 7-13: Public Sector rule "Calculate Contribution" 
The behavior of the Public Sector is very straight forward because it tries to balance its 
accounts by looking at the receipts it collects from those members of the society who 
had a revenue above the subsistence minimum and at the amount she had to spend on 
those individuals who were not able to secure their own standard of living.  
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The government will then keep track of the record concerning the receipts and 
expenses. Each period can then be qualified as either a bad year in case the expenses 
were higher than the receipts, as a good year if the state achieved a surplus or as an 
excessive year if the receipts are more than twice as large as the sum paid out to the 
receivers of social contribution.  
The only value the government can change without asking the people is the percentage 
of their revenue which those individuals who live above the subsistence minimum 
have to contribute to the social insurance program. So, if the government needs more 
money to fulfill its obligation to secure the poorest members of the society, then it will 
raise the percentage. This is very straight forward and is comparable to the real world 
situation where a raise in the contribution to social insurances is not uncommon.
315
 In 
our simulation, the government will also consider the balance of the inheritance tax 
account where it receives money when a wealthy agent dies and where it has to pay 
the debts if an agent dies indebted and the successor has not accepted the inheritance. 
Consequently, the Public Sector will compare the expenses for social insurance to the 
receipts of it increased by the balance of the inheritance account. 
In the case where the government takes in more money than it has to spend it is less 
predictable if the consequence is a decrease in the percentage to be contributed. The 
government could also decide that it will increase the services offered to those who 
receive the social insurance benefits. Politically, it may be beneficial to be able to 
implement such „good deeds‟. In this simulation, however, we have set the fixed rule 
that the Public Sector has to use excess money to reduce the contribution rate and that 
the level of security offered to the citizens is defined only through elections. 
Furthermore, the government will not react in panic and increase or lower the rates as 
soon as there is a good or a bad year for the public budget. On the contrary, it will only 
react if there were four bad years in a row or if there were four excessive years in a 
row. Additionally, it will also lower the rate if the previous ten years were all good or 
excessive. In those cases, the government will consider the rate inadequate and will 
lower or increase it accordingly by two percentage points per correction. 
  
                                                 
315
 see for example [Welt09] 
Individual Risk and Innovative Behavior - Modeling the relationship 
  149 
7.3.3.9 Vote on subsistence minimum 
The second rule which is relevant for the Public Sector is that it has to hold elections 
where the citizens may decide on the magnitude of the social insurance. It is 
impossible for them to fully abolish the system of social security, but they can decide 
on a reduction or an increase of the subsistence minimum which is the underlying 
factor influencing the amount of care offered by the state as well as the amount an 
agent has to pay to keep up the welfare state. 
The election rule is as follows: 
Set Subsistence 
Minimum 
Public 
Sector 
(1) if we are in an election period then find 
the median voter 
a. if median voter wants more social 
insurance then increase subsistence 
minimum by 10% 
b. if median voter wants less social 
insurance then lower subsistence 
minimum by 10% 
Table 7-14: Public Sector rule "Set Subsistence Minimum" 
The rule is very straight forward and integrates the median voter which we introduced 
in section 5.4. Since the election is one-dimensional and there are only three different 
states possible with one being exactly in between the two others, the median voter 
setup is especially suited for this constellation. The Public Sector will therefore record 
the votes of every individual and then follow the majority which means that the 
median voter is the one who decides. 
If the vote is such that the median voter is in favor of an increase in the subsistence 
minimum then it is raised by ten percent. If he votes for a decrease, it is reduced by ten 
percent. In a real election, there would probably be more parties with different levels 
which an individual can choose and the election would run on more criteria. Note that 
in our simulation it is not even important who is governing the society since the 
government only has to follow the rules aforementioned. Consequently, it is sufficient 
to include the public vote and make sure that the governmental budget is balanced. 
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7.3.3.10 The banks and investment funds 
When modeling the interactions with the financial sector, we try to limit the 
complexity to a reasonable degree. Even though we could define the financial 
behavior of the economic actors to be perfectly rational – this could be possible since 
we as programmers can control all chances and risks – it is not sensible to use such a 
hypothesis. “No credible theory of investment can be built on the assumption of 
perfect foresight and arbitrage over time.”316  
In this simulation, we define a very simple behavior for the banks and the investment 
funds. It is certainly possible to design this financial sector in a much more detailed 
way, but the model would grow much more complex without adding to the 
understanding. We only differentiate between banks and investment funds and have a 
very clear line of separation between their fields of activity. The banks can lend 
money for consumption wants and take low-risk and low-rent savings from their 
customers. The funds, however, take the money from their investors and finance 
inventions with the hope of realizing successful innovations. This division reflects the 
strong differentiation between the funding of an uncertain innovation project which is 
able to generate future profits and the foreseeable grant of credit for certain projects or 
to fulfill consumption wants and needs.
317
 
The important thing for banks in this model is that they are not allowed to fail. Any 
bank will get back its credits at the beginning of a period since each agent will pay 
back its debt in her “Generate Revenue”-rule. So, the only case when money is 
actually missing is when an individual is no longer able to receive a credit to pay for 
her subsistence minimum and will die of starvation. But since she will have paid her 
debt in the beginning of her last period, it can be thought of as the state absorbing her 
debt in case of her passing. This means that an individual can at any time take her 
money out of the bank without risking it not being there. On the other hand, the banks 
do not “know” that they cannot fail in the sense that their behavior is not influenced by 
this fact. They will still only lend out money up to the amount they have collected. 
The investment funds face a very different situation. They do not lend out the money, 
but they invest it, so the initial amount is gone as sunk costs in an innovation project, 
which may or may not be successful and give the investor a certain return in the years 
to come. This means that an individual who would like to withdraw her invested 
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 [Solo56], p. 93 
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 Schumpeter makes this very clear by arguing that there is a fundamental difference between those 
credits which are part of the regular activities in the business cycle and those which are only handed out 
on the idea of an invention which could work out as an innovation. cf. [Schu34b], pp. 146f 
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money cannot necessarily just take this from an amount which is directly available. 
Her original amount has been invested and is – hopefully from her point of view – 
giving a sufficient return to the investment fund. The difficulty is then how to model 
the input-output relationship between the fund and the individual. 
In the following sections, we will present the rules which govern the behavior of the 
banks and the funds in the simulation. 
7.3.3.11 Bank’s rules 
Since the bank is not facing the risk of defaulting, it follows two fairly simple rules 
designed to guarantee that the credit market is balanced and that the interest rate 
corresponds to the amounts requested. 
Award credit Bank (1) Consider the credit request from Human 
agent 
(2) Award credit to the individual if money 
available 
Calculate interest rate Bank (1) if money requested > money saved then 
increase rate 
(2) else lower rate by 1% but not below 0% 
Table 7-15: Bank rules 
Whenever a Human requests a credit, the bank will verify if it possesses sufficient 
financial resources and if so, will award the credit to the individual. The process is 
modeled in such a simple way, because the bank does not have to do any security 
checks on the creditor for it can be sure to be paid back at the beginning of the 
subsequent period.  
This simplification limits considerably the space of action for banks and it certainly 
diverts largely from reality here. But it depends on the role attributed to the financial 
sector to argue if it should be more elaborate in this simulation. We follow the logic 
that “[i]ts task is not – as it just happened – a short-term decoupling from the real 
economy spurred by speculation, but quite the opposite, the medium- and long-term 
oriented sustainable financial accompaniment and encouragement of innovative and 
successful companies and sectors”318. Then it is perfectly fine to implement the 
financial sector with its supportive role. The banking sector takes the low risk and low 
return activities while the investment sector is able and required to finance innovative 
activities.
319
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 [Hanu10], p. 94 
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 cf. [Schu34b], pp. 107f 
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The second rule governing the behavior of banks is the calculation of the interest rate. 
Again, we follow a very easy and dynamic approach which takes the interest rate from 
the previous period into consideration and increases or decreases it according to the 
credit demands and the debit volume. This is the simplest form of giving the bank the 
ability to influence its conditions. The agents who will save money at the bank will 
receive this percentage of credit and the agents who borrowed money from this bank 
will have to pay a rate one point above this percentage. So, if Humans can save at a 
rate of 3% at the bank then credits are awarded at a rate of 4%.  
There are some network and competition effects included in this rule, since a lower 
rate is more likely to raise the demand for credit and since a bank in a region with 
many competitors is likely to have a low credit demand, but we have decided not to 
complicate the matter further by including additional influences. Consequently, there 
is also no reaction to expectations in the bank‟s behavior. Since the banks are only 
active in the low risk market, the integration of expectations could be beneficial for 
them especially if they analyze the market around them and its dynamics. Yet, this 
would increase complexity in the banking sector even though it is not central to the 
analysis. Therefore, we stuck closely to the goal of keeping the banks as simple as 
possibly justifiable. 
7.3.3.12 Fund’s rules 
The funds complement the financial sector by offering individuals the possibility to 
invest in high risk-high return activities, namely the innovative endeavors. This is the 
creative function of the financial sector which is crucial in the process of 
implementing innovations. “The banker [...] stands between those, who wish to realize 
new combinations, and the owners of the means of production.”320 
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 [Schu34b], p. 110: “Der Bankier [...] steht zwischen jenen, die neue Kombinationen durchsetzen 
wollen, und den Besitzern von Produktionsmitteln.” 
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Invest Money 
 
Fund 
 
(1) Considering all unfinanced inventions, find the 
most attractive one 
(2) finance the innovation 
(3) repeat as long as there are funds available 
Calculate interest 
rate 
Fund (1) keep half of the rent from innovations to increase 
capital stock 
(2) set interest rate as return from left over rent from 
innovations to money invested at fund 
Relocate Fund (1) analyze new interest rate offer to see if it has been a 
good year 
(2) if it has been the fifth consecutive year without 
return then look out as far as vision permits 
(3) considering all Humans, move closer to wealthy 
Humans 
Is Successful Fund (1) analyze capital stock to see if it is negative showing 
a potentially dangerous drain of resources 
(2) if it has been the fifteenth consecutive year with a 
negative capital stock then close fund 
Table 7-16: Fund rules 
In this model, we have chosen the following approach: An individual who invests 
money at a fund will do so by adding the money to the account called “Client‟s 
savings” as well as “Cumulated Client‟s Savings”. The latter is only there to calculate 
how much money investors have given to this fund and this amount will be used to 
calculate the interest rate which the fund will offer in the subsequent period. 
The amount in “Client‟s savings” is added to the capital stock of the fund. When faced 
with a new investment decision, the fund will screen all inventions which need an 
investor and will finance as many as possible with his capital stock. This means that it 
will invest as much money from its capital base as possible. Only when invested, can 
money give a return. The order in which the fund will invest the money is that it 
prefers those inventions where the rent to cost ratio is highest (rule “Invest Money”). 
As we have argued earlier, it is impossible for the investor to accurately estimate the 
expected rent of an innovation. But since there is still the risk of the innovation failing, 
the investor cannot be sure of his choice. In the real world, he would probably take 
many more factors into consideration, and could still not overcome all uncertainty 
linked to the investment. Therefore we feel that the limitation of using the expected 
rent to cost ratio as the criterion for ordering the different investment opportunities is 
not overly simplistic. 
From the investment setup, we can infer on the other hand, that if a customer would 
like to withdraw her money, the capital stock may not have sufficient funds to repay 
her. If the fund has sufficient money in its capital stock, the investor is refunded her 
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initial amount and the investment is finished for both parties. In the case that the bank 
does not possess sufficient money, the agent will be able to withdraw her money as 
long as the capital market has not realized the peculiarities of the fund. Maybe the 
fund does receive substantial rent from its innovations and is therefore able to restore 
its capital stock in the subsequent periods. So, there is no need for the capital market to 
doubt the fund because of a single under-financed period. 
There are, however, two mechanisms within the financial sector which will monitor 
the funds. The first (rule “Relocate”) will make the fund consider changing 
environment if it was unsuccessful in investing money over the last five years. A fund 
will always consider her investment unsuccessful if it was unable to offer its 
customers any interest on their investments. In such a case, it will screen its 
environment as far as it can see and try to move closer towards affluent individuals. 
This is implemented in regional terms but can also be understood as a reaction to 
certain investment fields which are more appreciated by the customers. For example, 
an investment funds specialized on emerging markets yet unable to acquire any funds 
or investment projects, might consider changing its strategy and focus on the biotech 
sector in order to find both investing opportunities as well as investors. 
If even the relocation fails to bring any success, then there is the more consequential 
rule “Is Successful”, which strictly monitors the solvency of an investment fund. This 
means that a fund will be liquidated if it has a negative capital stock for fifteen 
subsequent periods. At this time, the fund will be closed and all invested agents lose 
their savings. All possible future rents of the innovations this fund had financed will 
be used to satisfy the creditors who financed the last years of capital needs of the 
fund.
321
 
Those strong abstractions and simplifications in the design of the financial market can 
be accepted for two reasons. On the one hand, we will stick to the ideal of keeping the 
model simple and not adding too much complexity. The transparency and 
understandability of the model would suffer considerably if the financial market had 
been designed in a more detailed form. On the other hand, the innovative activity is 
only accompanied by the financial markets who give some entrepreneurs the ability to 
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 This is modeled in a way such that neither the creditors for the fund nor the cash flows from the 
innovations are accounted for anymore. In the case of the failing of the fund, the creditors will most 
likely not receive the full amount. Since it is not important for the simulation, to what degree they are 
repaid, since this has no influence on their behavior, we have left out an explicit model of this event. All 
that is modeled is that a failing fund looses all its innovations and that its remaining customers lose their 
savings. 
Individual Risk and Innovative Behavior - Modeling the relationship 
  155 
realize their innovative ideas. While the role of a supportive banker who is willing to 
finance new ideas is important, the reasons and considerations behind his decision and 
the circumstances and issues he will have to consider are not central to this work. It 
would require an entire new model to include a “real” financial market into such a 
simulation. For our work, it will be sufficient to have a financial sector which is 
balanced and which can finance both consumption credits and investment projects.  
7.3.3.13 Inventions 
The inventions are the most abstract agent in the model since it is always possible to 
imagine humans, banks, funds or the government to be actors and to react to their 
environment. Inventions are modeled as agents in order to implement them as 
independent objects visible to investors and with specific characteristics. 
There is only activity which is autonomously executed by the invention: 
Depreciate Invention (1) reduce weight by five percentage points 
Table 7-17: Invention rule "Depreciate" 
The idea is that the value of the invention will decrease over time. Since we reduce the 
weight of the invention every period by five percentage points, it will have a weight of 
zero after twenty periods
322
. The rent the innovation returns in every period is 
weighted by this factor, so that it decreases over time. This may not be realistic in all 
cases and there may be situations, where the value of an invention should rather 
increase. Nevertheless, since we have no specification what the invention is all about, 
we have chosen the general rule of depreciating the invention. Once an invention is 
successfully turned into an innovation, it will still depreciate. There is no reason why 
the implemented invention should not face competitors, decreasing interest from the 
users or other factors which will erode the profit for the entrepreneur.
 323
 
All the inventions found during the course of the simulation are independent of each 
other. While this may seem trivial, it implies quite a lot on the content of the 
invention. A marginal invention may render a previous innovation worthless because it 
can better serve a certain end. Or one invention might add value to a different 
invention because with the help of the former the latter can achieve a considerably 
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 This value has been chosen since it is the duration of a patent when granted from the German Patent 
and Trade Mark Office [DPMA09] or from the US Patent and Trademark Office [USPTO08] 
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 This is comparable to Schumpeter‟s elaboration that the profit the entrepreneur can reap from his 
innovations is only temporary and that it will vanish once the new combination is integrated into the 
regular flow of the economy. Cf. [Schu34b], pp. 218f 
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larger rent
324
. We could randomly add the functionality that an invention‟s rent could 
increase or decrease in the course of the simulation, but this would not serve any 
purpose. Since the rent expectations are not part of the behavioral determinants for the 
inventor and since the investor cannot compare different scenarios and therefore only 
takes the one reasonable value into account
325
, there is no considerable explanatory 
power lost by creating independent inventions. 
7.3.4 Justification for simplifications 
In this section we will present some major simplifications which stretch over larger 
parts of the simulation and explain why we have chosen to implement them in this 
sense. 
7.3.4.1 The Quest for a utility function 
An important question within this work was if a utility function should be included in 
the agent‟s decision heuristics. Undoubtedly, whenever a human has a choice between 
two or more alternatives, she will opt for the one that she values highest. By using a 
utility function, we could have the individual take decisions and evaluate her degree of 
overall utility, which could be described as happiness or satisfaction. In order to 
establish such a measure for her well-being, we need a certain basis to evaluate the 
different utility gains or losses connected to every decision. This valuation scheme can 
not necessarily be reduced to a monetary amount which implies that even if the 
individual knows exactly all parameters of a choice and the outcomes of each 
alternative, we cannot simply add the utility of a first decision – say should I save 100 
€ or consume it? – to the utility of a second decision – say should I invest money into 
an innovative project or not? – since there is no unique scale by which to compare the 
changes in utility. Even though there are approaches where a weighting function is 
applied to all utility levels reachable and then those levels are added
326
, it is 
theoretically controversial to simply add utility levels as if they were measured on an 
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 This is for example true for some services offered for mobile devices which have largely benefitted 
from the broadband capabilities of new smartphones. 
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 As argued above, we can always consider the investor to take all information and expectations to 
which he has access into account when he compares the rent-to-cost ratio of the different available 
inventions. Since he cannot know that the rent he presumes is necessarily the correct one, it is not 
important which reasons lead to his estimation.  
326
 cf. for example [BlSZ09], p. 870. The weighting function serves in the first place to account for 
differences in the level of satisfaction taken from different products. That means that a loss of one unit 
of product A will have a different effect on utility than a gain of one unit of this product. Similarly, a 
gain of two units of this product will not have double the effect of a gain of one unit. Nevertheless, 
using a suited weighting function, adding different utility variations could be a valid calculation. This is 
discussed with respect to different attributes in the choice of overall packages. 
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ordinal scale.
327
 The problem is that any weighting function would have to be based on 
the same underlying idea of utility for a single individual in order to make different 
levels of utility comparable. If a weighting function took reference to the amount of 
utility an individual would gain or lose with each choice and if this utility could 
somehow be measured on an ordinal scale, then a utility function could be an 
interesting addition to the simulation in order to model the happiness and satisfaction 
of the agents. Since this approach is not very practical and it is impossible to 
reasonably define for an individual the amount of utility of a certain additional unit of 
product A versus an additional unit of product B, this approach is no longer pursued.  
There is however a way in which utility of different outcomes is supposed to be 
comparable and additively combinable. The von Neumann-Morgenstern utility is 
based on the idea of a lottery where the individual has a choice between different 
options and where we would like to find out how much more she likes the chosen 
alternative over one of the rejected ones. Then we could imagine offering the person a 
lottery where she will either receive the rejected option for sure or she will have to 
gamble over the chosen option with the probability of p of receiving it. The value of p 
at the time when she is indifferent between the lottery for the desired option or the sure 
gain of the rejected option then hints at the amount to which the one option is 
preferred over the other.
328
  
The problem with this solution however lies in the static approach of the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. It is difficult or even impossible to compare 
the outcomes of the same decision matrix in two distinct time periods because other 
factors will be relevant for the individual. For this reason, we will not pursue this 
approach any further. Another argument for avoiding such a utility function stems 
from the discussion that preferences should be allowed to change over the lifetime.
329
 
There has been a lot of debate over whether preferences of individuals can change. If 
we suppose that they do, then any utility function used would have to incorporate 
those changes during the course of the simulation. This means that there is not only a 
definition of individual utility bases, an individual weighting function but also an 
individual function of change of utility over time.  
In our case, however, the problem is even more complex. We not only cannot add the 
utility of different choices taken sequentially in order to define an overall utility level, 
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the individual already fails at fully evaluating each option. The savings decision for 
the risk provision funds is a good example. The individual can only learn from her 
experience how often she suffered from income reducing risk realization, but she can 
in no way know the exact outcomes of her future income. Here, she is faced with true 
uncertainty as it was introduced earlier. We could now add a utility function that tries 
to model the level of satisfaction she takes from every decision, but this would not add 
any positive explanatory power. There are two reasons why there is no additional 
value in introducing a utility function in this situation in the simulation where the 
agent would calculate her expected utility level depending on the options she can 
choose.  
The first reason is that “[a]bundant evidence exists, however, that (subjective) 
expected utility is not valid as a descriptive theory of decision under (uncertainty) 
risk.”330 Any measure of expected utility will fall short of a situation where the 
environmental variables change and where the actually eventually realized utilities 
may deviate substantially from the expected values. For this reason, individuals take 
decisions often following simplified approaches and rules of thumbs.
331
 They are 
satisfied with a successful and working option and do not strive for the optimal 
solution since there may very well be unknown factors which limit her from ever 
reaching such a state.  
The second reason why the simulation does not include a utility function and 
calculation procedure is now a very practical one. If we cannot add up the “utils” an 
individual gains from every decision, then there is no interest in calculating an 
accumulated utility for each individual. This means that we are only interested in a 
utility function in every single decision problem which an agent is facing. In this 
situation, however, she will see different aspects of each option and will be aware of 
her own preferences for each attribute. Based on this information, she will make her 
decision which will presumably lead to the highest utility. The absolute level of utility 
is of no interest, since it cannot be combined with other utility gains and the relative 
level will be determined from exactly the pieces of information used for the decision-
making. So, adding a utility function into the decision process will only serve as a 
detour without any analytical benefit.  
For those reasons, all decision problems included in the model are designed such that 
the individual takes all relevant and available information into account and chooses 
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accordingly based on the set of rules presented in this chapter. An uninformed 
observer of the model runs could then analytically derive possible utility functions that 
may lie behind the actions of the agents. This would precisely be the task of analytical 
economists who try to conceptualize the human behavior and search for regularities. In 
this sense, in our simulation, the utility function is internal to the agent without it 
being revealed other than implicitly in the decision rules. 
7.3.4.2 The savings account and the account for risk provision 
In the governmental model, there is only one savings account per agent. Whenever an 
individual chooses not to consume all the money and to save part of it, it is placed into 
this account. The agent also decides on the investment strategy for this money and can 
choose between the risky and the less risky investment. The risky investment includes 
financing innovations where there is no certain payout. In the more secure option, the 
individual places her money at banks who lend money to agents who will use the 
money for consumption credits. In a situation where the government does not pay for 
the entire subsistence minimum, individuals could also take out loans from those 
banks to secure their existence. 
The agent chooses the investment strategy depending on her risk aversion and the risk 
aversion varies with the environmental influences. In any case, it is not possible for an 
individual to split her savings between the low-risk and the high-risk options. 
Introducing split strategies would add unnecessary complexity to the model, since it is 
not the goal of the simulation to explain the financial market, but we need a 
functioning financial market to model the innovative activity.  
In the individual model, however, the agent has two different accounts. One is used for 
the risk provision where she will put the money she wants to save to protect herself 
against external risks. The money she is saving for all other purposes is placed into the 
savings account. Since the former is used to protect her against other risks, she will 
invest this money in a more risk adverse form. The other savings account, on the other 
hand, will be invested in a more risky way. 
The agent is free to choose if she prefers to invest both her accounts at funds, both at 
banks or the risk provision at a bank and the savings at a fund. The only option which 
is unavailable to her is that she would invest her risk provision at funds and deposit her 
savings at a bank, since the risk provision is meant to always be invested in the less 
risky alternative. The agent will choose her preferred portfolio strategy depending on 
the interest spread which she can observe between funds and banks and depending on 
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her risk aversion. The higher the risk aversion the higher has to be the interest spread 
between funds and banks to incite her to move her money into the risky alternative. 
Once again, she can only observe the interest offers of financial institutions in her 
environment, and therefore, we may find comparable agents follow different 
investment strategies, because they do not know of certain options and offers. 
7.4 Possible expansions 
It is always possible to enlarge a model and there are some additions we already 
mentioned in the discussion above. In this section, we will point to some more 
structural issues which could be integrated in future models or which should be kept in 
mind when trying to relate the model to specific problems. 
We have modeled offspring to replace the parent agent once the latter dies. This is 
certainly an assumption which could be relaxed. It is possible to define some behavior 
which leads to offspring. A major challenge in the implementation will be to decide on 
the integration of gender in the simulation. This will introduce a score of new 
behavioral patterns both for the parent agents as well as the children and their potential 
siblings but as long as they are included in a comprehensible way, it can be realized.  
Another aspect which might change some of the simulations‟ results is that we have 
not modeled any loyalty or hesitation for the agents to their banks. This means that 
once an agent finds a bank or a fund offering a higher interest rate, then she will 
change her entire savings or risk provision account to this bank or fund. In the real 
world, such a change would certainly not be as fast and we would expect to see some 
loyalty to the “house bank”. 
As an overall argument, it is always possible to find additional characteristic traits 
which could be implemented in order to become more realistic or to be able to model 
certain situations and events. An idea which points in this direction is that maybe the 
difference in innovativeness observed in the real world is linked to other factors such 
as for example the religiousness of the members of a society which might incite people 
to strive even more. Adding those factors would complicate the model to a degree 
which we felt inadequate.  
Furthermore, the effort an individual puts into the increase in her income by inventing 
and innovating is not deductible for her contribution payment. Consequently, an agent 
would have a higher incentive to invest the effort of trying to implement her invention 
since the financial risk would be reduced. This would most likely have an influence on 
her willingness to bear the risk of the innovation. Therefore, it can now be thought of 
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being included in the risk propensity procedure in the simulation. Future research 
might try to split this issue and reduce the financial risk by allowing an individual to 
deduct her investments.
332
 
Diffusion is not taken into account in the model. This could be added fairly easily 
since the model already includes spatial factors. It would only require to define and to 
program the underlying assumptions which have to be added. It is not included for 
reasons of simplicity. This includes hypotheses on the demand effects for innovation. 
If a customer does not accept the transaction cost he incurs when checking if a new 
product is better suited, then the innovation will not be successful. In our simulation 
we have abstracted from this point by attributing the success or failure of an 
innovation to a random process without any recursion to different mindsets in the 
underlying population.
333
 Adding diffusion should also include a focus on the demand 
side and its implications on innovation. 
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 In the model presented in section 5.2 such deductibility is clearly postulated. Cf. [Sinn96], p. 276 
333
 see for example [Wegn09], p. 81 
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8 The model’s results 
When talking about the outcome which emerges from the simulation, we will first 
explain the verification effort we have undertaken. Afterwards, we will present the 
results and link it to the previous discussions. 
8.1 Verification 
As we have discussed in section 6.1.3.5, it is important to make sure that the model 
does what it is supposed to do. Therefore, we can use the possibilities which the 
software Repast is offering in debugging and checking for consistency, and we can 
implement a monitoring routine which allows us to understand the behavior of the 
individual agents. 
First of all, we have made sure that the simulation will lead to the same results on 
subsequent runs with identical starting conditions. When a simulation uses random 
numbers then these have to be created by the computer. Since the computer cannot 
randomly decide on choosing certain values, there are elaborate algorithms which will 
create values in an apparently random order. There is an extensive statistical literature 
on creating useable and reliable sets of random numbers.
334
 Each random number 
generator relies on a certain starting value – called random seed – from which it will 
derive the next “random” number. By choosing this starting value it is possible to 
recreate the same list of random values. In order for the simulation to be reproducible, 
it has to return the same results if we use the same random numbers. This condition is 
met for the vast majority of the results reported in the next section.
335
  
The next step to verify the proper running of the model consisted in our case in the 
incremental implementation of different functionalities. Since the behavior of the 
Human agents is the most complex of the different agents used in the simulation, we 
have chosen to create it in a step-by-step structure. This means that we first 
programmed the revenue generation process and checked for its consistency by 
monitoring each step which a limited number of agents will take. Then we added the 
possibility to choose the risk provision behavior and we checked again the behavior. 
The third step was to add the “consumption and saving”-method allowing the agent to 
use her money.  
                                                 
334
 see for example the websites of the National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST08] or by 
[Hell10] at the pLab of the University of Salzburg 
335
 Single runs out of each set of 100 runs will vary slightly at changing intervals when they are 
recreated. Since the final conclusions did not change with those values, we chose to keep them in the 
analysis in order to keep the set of random seeds constant over all runs from 1,000,001 to 1,000,100. 
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We implemented the innovation rule twice – first independent of the rest of the 
simulation in an own environment and then within the final model in the way we 
explained above. The reason for this strategy is that this rule is introduced in an 
already complex environment where many interactions exist and where it is hardly 
feasible to check each step of every agent once we allow for a larger number of agents. 
Besides, since innovation is at the heart of the research questions we put special care 
into making sure that the routine would work flawless and in the intended manner. 
This can be more easily tested in a situation where we can run both isolated tests on 
only this rule and integrated checks in the complete model.  
Moreover, we have programmed a very tight set of information which the Human 
agents, the Fund agents and the Public Sector agent can communicate during the 
simulation. This helps track the behavior of each individual agent and therefore single 
out emergent developments against programming errors. Sample protocols of such 
information each agent will furnish during one period are presented in appendix C. 
Furthermore, we have tested the simulation using very few agents which enables us to 
follow the interactions between them and to check almost each calculation which is 
done during the simulation.  
Finally, we have checked the proper execution of the model on different computers 
and using different operating systems
336
. It is important to make sure that the same 
results can be reproduced independently of a specific computer. After extensive testing 
and debugging, we turned to the evaluation process. 
8.2 Results 
Before discussing the results which we can derive from the different simulation runs, 
we will present the general setup and the method we used to run the model. 
Every simulation is run for 60 periods. Since every period is understood to represent 
one year, we consider the development in our simulated population during the course 
of 60 years. While it is very easily possible to increase this amount considerably, we 
feel that trying to model the development of a society over a too long period is 
difficult because of the changing environment.
337
 Furthermore, we have run the 
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 We used two different computers which used Windows XP and Windows Vista. We ran Repast 
Simphony in the version 1.2 on both. 
337
 In order to extend the time horizon in a sensible way would require us to better specify how some 
environmental variables such as population size may change during the time span considered. 
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simulation 100 times with each individual configuration meaning that the only 
difference in the starting values was the different random seed.
338
 
Each simulation starts with the initialization of the Human agents, the Bank agents, the 
Fund agents and the Public Sector agent. They are randomly placed in a “world” with 
a size of 50x50. The space is defined to be continuous, however, which means that an 
agent can stand at any location within this space and not only at integer numbered 
fields. This means that agents do not have to move on a specific field comparable to a 
chess board but that they can occupy any position in between. A typical presentation 
of an initial situation can be found below:  
 
Figure 8-1: Exemplary situation after one time step - finance 
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 [Axel97] used ten runs per configuration setting. Therefore, we feel that using ten times as many will 
be suited to consider the results fairly robust to the choice of random seeds. Furthermore, we chose the 
random seeds between 1,000,001 and 1,000,100. 
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In the picture, each blue dot corresponds to a Human agent. The red cross symbols 
represent Funds and the purple crosses correspond to the Banks. An arrow from a 
Human to a Bank or a Fund signifies that the Human holds an account there. The 
different sizes of the Humans correspond to their revenue. The larger a blue circle, the 
greater the agent‟s revenue.  
The corresponding view in the friends‟ network in this case looks as follows: 
 
Figure 8-2: Exemplary situation after one time step – friends-network 
Here, the blue dots are once again the Human agents, but this time the size of the dot 
corresponds to the risk aversion which ranges between 0 and 10. The black lines 
between the agents represent the neighborhood relation between two agents. This 
means that all Humans which are within a certain distance are in the agent‟s friends‟ 
network. The red line shows that two agents consider each other „cool friends‟ and 
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share an even more pronounced interaction pattern. In any case, two things can be 
easily shown when looking at the initial configuration: on the one hand, we can have 
two situations with identical agents which will lead to different outcomes only because 
they are placed at different locations in the environment and therefore interact 
differently. Furthermore, the interaction patterns are not complete in the sense that an 
agent is comparably well connected to every other agent. This means that even though 
the network spreads almost across the entire „country‟, there is a difference in 
interaction between agents which are close and those which are at opposing borders. 
Nevertheless, we see that allowing local interaction for the agent can lead to a 
situation where almost the whole population is connected. 
  
Figure 8-3: Exemplary situation at the end of the simulation – friends-network 
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In this situation at the first time step, every agent will receive its initial endowment as 
explained in section 7.3.2 and then the agents will be allowed to interact according to 
the rules specified in section 7.3.3. Accordingly, we find ourselves in a situation after 
60 periods, where the spatial distribution will have changed. The situation in the 
friends‟ network may now look as shown in Figure 8-3. 
We can see that integration and clustering can take place, since for example the group 
in the north-east has been integrated and since we find densely populated areas in the 
south-west as well as in the center of our field. On the other hand, it is also possible 
that groups get separated and disintegrate from others such as for example the group in 
the north-west, which had been connected to the majority but lost this connection.  
During the run, we can track individual characteristics of the agents or aggregate 
variables of interest. For example, we can look at the development of the amount of 
inventions and innovations which are generated by all agents at every time step as an 
example of an aggregate variable or we can monitor the risk aversion of the individual 
agents: 
 
Figure 8-4: Invention and innovation development in an exemplary run 
The distribution of risk aversion in this case looks as follows. We can see the change 
and alteration in every individual‟s value for risk aversion. It is also visible that some 
agents become more risk averse or more risk seeking as time goes by. 
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Figure 8-5: Risk aversion of the simulated agents during the course of an exemplary run 
Since each run relies on several random influences which only depend on the random 
seed chosen in the beginning, we cannot just analyze a single run because it may rely 
on some extraordinary influences. 
The great advantage of the simulation environment is that we can run the model a 
large number of times and see which structures emerge. The main variables where we 
checked for an influence on the outcome are the following: 
Variable 
Used values 
 
Standard 
 Merit goods 0 1 
 
Subsistence minimum 2 8 12 
Invention threshold 40 60 80 
Average risk provision 10% 20% 
 
Table 8-1: Influential variables 
Table 8-1 shows that the standard run will use the default values which we explained 
in section 7.3.1. We have used the idea that governmental influence will not only be 
exerted in monetary terms, but that there are services which have an effect on the 
inventiveness of the individuals not linked to public expenditures. In order to test if 
this influence of merit goods has a decisive effect on the ability of a society to be 
inventive and innovative, we also let the simulation run with this value set to zero. 
The subsistence minimum is supposed to be 8 in the standard setup and we will 
increase it to 12 and reduce it to 2 in order to see if the amount of welfare offered by 
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the state makes a difference to the innovative behavior of the agents. Furthermore, 
using two as the subsistence minimum helps verifying if the simulation is able to 
reproduce the results which had been found in the study by [Bird01] discussed in 
section 5.2. 
Moreover, in the standard run we set the invention threshold to 60, which refers to the 
likelihood of finding an invention for each agent. In subsequent runs, we will increase 
it to 80 and lower it to 40 to see how the results are affected by such a variation.  
Lastly, we have varied the average risk provision which is also the starting value for 
the social insurance contribution set by the government. This helps us determine if the 
amount which people will use to provide for their risks has an influential effect on the 
innovativeness. 
Each of these setups has been run both for the individual model and for the 
governmental model. It generated the seven runs, which are listed in Table 8-2. 
 
Run 1 Run 2 Run 3 Run 4 Run 5 Run 6 Run 7 
Merit goods 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Subsistence minimum 
8 8 2 12 8 8 8 
Invention threshold 
60 60 60 60 40 80 60 
Average risk provision 
20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 10% 
Table 8-2: The seven simulation setups 
We have compared the results through difference-in-means analysis. In order to be 
able to use this method, we need independent samples as well as normally distributed 
outcomes. The samples are independent since no specific execution of the simulation 
has an influence on any other execution and since we can exclusively and 
unambiguously attribute each simulation run to its group. Moreover, even though we 
do not know the distribution of the data in our case, we can use this test because 
following the central limit theorem we have a sufficiently large sample.
339
 
Furthermore, it is possible to use the test even though we do not know if the “true” 
variation of both groups is identical since this condition does not have to hold when 
using the same sample size for each group as in our case.
340
 
The difference-in-means analysis allows us to check the hypothesis that there is no 
difference in the means of two groups of values. The idea is that if we can reject this 
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 cf. for example [Came09] where he explains that we need a minimum of 30 observations in order to 
use the Central Limit Theorem 
340
 cf. for example [BaBa02], pp. 192 
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hypothesis then we can suppose that there is a difference between the two groups. This 
allows us, for example, to test if the individual model has a different effect on the 
innovativeness of the society than the governmental model. A sample output of the 
difference-in-means analysis for the amount of innovations is shown in Table 8-3.
341
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean 
    inno-individual inno-governmental 
Mean 272.48 325.17 
Variance 23935.90869 18856.38495 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.303317286 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat -3.046916276 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.001482019 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.002964039 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545  
Table 8-3: Difference in Means Analysis: amount of innovations 
In Table 8-3, we can see that the mean amount of innovations in the individual model 
was 272.48 and in the governmental model 325.17. This means that out of the 100 
runs, the average amount of innovations which were created when social insurance 
was not offered was 52.37 lower than in the situation where the state provided for the 
subsistence minimum. The second line shows the variance which has been observed 
over the 100 runs in each model setup and the third line confirms the amount of runs 
which we have conducted in order to generate our data sets. 
We do not use the Pearson Correlation coefficient in our analysis, because each run is 
known to be independent of every other run. The line “Hypothesized Mean 
Difference” refers to the hypothesis which we would like to reject. We have chosen 
this hypothesized mean difference to be zero in each test in order to try if we can reject 
the following hypothesis: “The difference between the means of the governmental 
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 A complete list of the analyses of the here presented cases can be found in Appendix D. 
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model against the individual model is zero”. Once we can reject this hypothesis, we 
can be fairly certain that there is an influence exerted by social insurance. 
The next lines show the degrees of freedom (“df”) as well as the amount for the t-
statistics. The higher the absolute value of the “t Stat”, the more significant is the 
difference between the two models.  
From the “t Stat” value, the p-value (“P(T<=t)”) of the analysis is calculated. The 
lower the p-value, the smaller is the chance that it will be false to reject our basic 
hypothesis. Therefore, a p-value of 0.2964039% signifies that we are well above the 
99%-significance level when we reason that there is a difference between the two 
models. 
In the subsequent analysis, we will use the two-tail tests in order to analyze the 
differences between the governmental and the individual model. This helps us finding 
the influences where social insurance does have an effect on factors related to the 
innovativeness in the society. 
From the 100 simulation runs in the first setup (Run1), we find that the individual 
model produces on average 272 innovations and 658 inventions and, consequently, has 
an average ratio of innovations from inventions of 40%. In the governmental model, 
we find on average 325 innovations and 715 inventions, which corresponds to a ratio 
of innovation from invention of 45%. Furthermore, we also checked for the mean 
income of the agents as well as the standard deviation of the income during the 
simulation. Corresponding to the discussion in section 5.2, we can then analyze the 
position of the society in the µ-σ-space. We find that, on average, the mean income in 
the individual model amounts to 31 with an average standard deviation of the income 
per period of 48.
342
 In the governmental model, the average mean income is 38 with an 
average standard deviation of 32. The difference-in-means analysis shows that there is 
a statistically significant difference even at the 99%-level between the individual and 
the governmental model pointing to more inventions, more innovations, a higher mean 
income and a lower standard deviation of income in the case of social insurance. We 
have represented those results in Table 8-4. The first column shows the criterion for 
which we checked the means, the second shows the difference between the means 
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 The mean income presented here is calculated by taking the mean income in the simulation at every 
time-step (so the mean income of the 50 agents in the simulation) and then taking the arithmetic average 
of the 60 values over the entire simulation. The standard deviation is similarly calculated in every 
period and then we take the mean of the standard deviations which we find in the simulation. Finally, 
we take those two values per run and average them over the 100 simulation runs we conducted leading 
to an average mean income per period as well as an average standard deviation per period. 
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when subtracting the mean value of the individual model from the governmental 
model
343
, and the third column shows the corresponding p-value in the t-statistics. 
Consequently, we can say that at the 99%-level of significance the governmental 
model leads to more inventions, more innovations, a higher mean income in the 
population and a lower standard deviation of income in the society.  
Criterion Δ Means p-value344 
Inventions 57.08 0.000 
Innovations 52.69 0.003 
Ratio of innos from inventions 0.05 0.038 
Mean income of agents 6.36 0.000 
Mean standard deviation of income -16.26 0.000 
Mean risk aversion -0.08 0.256 
Table 8-4: Results from Run 1: Difference in Means Analysis between Individual and 
Governmental Model 
Furthermore, we checked for a difference in the mean risk aversion. The p-value of 
0.256 suggests that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the two means are the same at 
a sensible level. This means that even though the mean risk aversion after 100 
simulation runs was slightly higher in the individual model with a value of 6.11 
against 6.03 in the governmental model, we cannot say that there is a statistically 
significant difference in the risk aversion in the two models. Consequently, the 
difference in the innovative behavior has to stem from other factors such as, for 
example, the stability introduced through the public sector‟s social insurance. 
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 To avoid misunderstandings, the value of 57.08 for the difference in the means of inventions shows 
that there were on average over the 100 runs 57 inventions more in the governmental model than in the 
individual model after 60 periods. 
344
 The p-values in the table are from the two-tailed test of the paired two sample for mean t-test.  
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We have used the six variations in initial setups to check for the robustness of the 
results. From the difference-in-means analysis for the second setup (“Run 2”), we get 
the following results: 
Criterion Δ Means p-value 
Inventions 34.88 0.000 
Innovations 11.79 0.563 
Ratio of innos from inventions 0.01 0.746 
Mean income of agents 4.97 0.000 
Mean standard deviation of income -17.74 0.000 
Mean risk aversion 0.02 0.842 
Table 8-5: Results from Run 2: Difference in Means Analysis between Individual and 
Governmental Model 
Run 2 is marked by the fact that we chose to ignore any non-monetary influence of the 
public sector on the inventiveness of the agents. This means that the value for the 
variable “Merit Goods” was zero. On the individual agents‟ level, this variable 
influenced exclusively her inventiveness. Consequently, we find that now the 
governmental model only leads to, on average, 35 inventions more than the individual 
model. We find, however, that this still suggests that there is a statistically significant 
difference between the inventiveness in the governmental against the individual 
model. Nevertheless, even though we cannot perceive a changed picture concerning 
the inventions, there is a marked difference when looking at innovations. With a p-
value of 0.56 we can no longer say that there is a higher innovativeness in the 
governmental model. Consequently, it seems that the higher amount of inventions in 
the first run of the governmental model has also enabled more of the individuals to 
become innovative. As we can see from the now almost identical ratios of innovations 
from inventions, the advantage in the governmental model in the first run probably 
stemmed from the self-enforcing effects of innovations on the environment. So, even 
though we cannot decide anymore if one of the models leads to more innovations in 
this case, we can still look at the mean income and its variance. We find that the 
difference between the two models is significant and that the governmental model still 
has a higher mean income and a lower standard deviation. This means that even 
though it cannot produce more innovations, social insurance still can have an income 
increasing effect on the economy as a whole. Once again, the difference in the risk 
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aversion is not significant.
345
 So, we find that even when we restrict the government to 
providing social insurance only in a monetary form to those in need, there is a 
beneficial influence on the society what concerns the distribution of income. 
Furthermore, there is no evidence for a negative effect on the future orientation in such 
a way that the insurance offering might block innovation. 
The next influence for which we checked the model was the subsistence minimum. 
We had fixed it to 8 corresponding to a value of 8,000 €. Following Bird‟s argument in 
section 5.2, it is not necessarily important how much social protection a government 
offers, but only that it does offer some. Therefore we have checked the model with a 
subsistence minimum of 2 (Run 3) and with a larger value of 12 (Run 4). The results 
can be found in Table 8-6. 
Criterion 
Run 3 Run 4 
Δ Means p-value Δ Means p-value 
Inventions 74.56 0.000 72.07 0.000 
Innovations 47.78 0.011 35.04 0.049 
Ratio of innos from inventions 0.02 0.369 0.01 0.591 
Mean income of agents 0.89 0.332 14.29 0.000 
Mean standard deviation of income -3.36 0.005 -33.33 0.000 
Table 8-6: Results from Run 3 and 4: Difference in Means Analysis between Individual and 
Governmental Model 
Looking at the p-values, we find that we can no longer say that the ratio of innovations 
from inventions is different between the two models. Both for a larger as well as a 
smaller subsistence minimum, the difference is not marked enough to allow us to be 
sure of a difference between the models. This implies that the one which can generate 
more inventions will also produce more innovations. While the difference in the mean 
amount of inventions in the standard model (Run 1) was 57, it is now above 70 in both 
situations. In both Run 3 and Run 4 we find a slight decrease in the number of 
inventions in the individual models and an increase in the number of inventions in the 
governmental model. This suggests that the more pronounced values for the 
subsistence minimum work in favor of the stabilizing system with the governmental 
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 The difference in the mean risk aversion turns out not to be significant at the 90% level or above in 
any of the seven cases. Therefore we will leave it out of the tables for the subsequent runs, but the 
results can still be found in Appendix D. 
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insurance scheme. Similarly, we find that we can reject the hypothesis that the two 
models are equivalently innovative at the 95% level. Especially in the case of Run 3, 
we can reproduce the result which Bird mentioned in his paper that even a small 
insurance scheme may lead to a welfare increasing effect by stimulating innovations. 
Nevertheless, even though we find the significantly larger innovativeness, we do not 
have a statistically significant difference in the income distribution. The income 
variation is statistically significantly lower, but we cannot say that the mean income is 
higher in the governmental model. This is not very surprising since this time the public 
sector only raises people to a very low income level and therefore, the amount of 
people who are better off in the governmental than in the individual system is reduced. 
So, at a low level of social insurance, the main effect of the public sector seems to be 
the creation of a stable environment which allows the people to develop their creative 
abilities.  
Still, the graph in Figure 8-6 showing the average percentage of contribution to the 
social services as well as the corresponding average subsistence minimum per period 
after 100 simulation runs shows clearly that in the governmental model, the people 
will use the possibility to vote for an increase in the services of the welfare state. 
 
Figure 8-6: Development of social insurance in the governmental model in Run 3 
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Therefore, even though in the individual model each agent is free to choose her 
preferred strategy of dealing with the risk she faces in her life, the combined strategy 
in the governmental model appears to be more successful when it comes to generating 
innovations. 
In Run 4, however, we find that there are not only more innovations and more 
inventions, but the society in the governmental model also has a higher average 
income with a lower standard deviation. Consequently, we find a situation where the 
governmental model is again robustly superior to the individual model. In order to be 
able to compare the three situations, we looked at some of the developments. Figure 
8-7 shows the development of the percentage rate for the social contribution and the 
average subsistence minimum in our standard setup Run 1 as well as in Run 4. 
Compared to Run 3 both values in both setups are always larger. But when we plot 
Run 1 against Run 4 we find that even though the latter starts with a higher subsistence 
minimum and consequently first sees the contribution rate climb even higher, in the 
end it is Run 1 which shows the largest subsistence minimum and the highest 
contribution rate. This means that the members of the society voted either for a 
decrease or an increase in public services. 
 
Figure 8-7: Comparison of Run1 to Run4 in the Governmental Model 
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In order to see if any of the three governmental models is superior to the others, we 
also conducted difference in means analysis from Run1 against Run3 and against 
Run4. The results are shown in Table 8-7. 
Criterion 
Run1 vs Run3 Run1 vs Run4 
Δ Means p-value Δ Means p-value 
Inventions -13.29 0.056 -8.62 0.152 
Innovations -0.59 0.967 8.27 0.497 
Ratio of innos from inventions 0.01 0.750 0.02 0.289 
Mean income of agents 2.67 0.000 -1.39 0.010 
Mean standard deviation of income -1.53 0.095 0.16 0.835 
Mean subsistence minimum 4.35 0.000 -0.62 0.000 
Mean contribution to social insurance 0.04 0.000 -0.02 0.000 
Table 8-7: Difference in Means Analysis of Run1 against Run3 and Run4 in the Governmental 
Model 
We find that for most variables we cannot reject the hypothesis that their means are 
the same even at the 95% level of confidence. While it is not surprising that the 
differences in both the subsistence minimum and the rate of contribution to the social 
insurance are significant, we also find that mean income of the agents is significantly 
higher, the higher the subsistence minimum is at the time the simulation is started. 
This implies that the strategy which emerged for the population in Run 4 proved to be 
the most successful. They started with a high social standard and reduced it over time, 
which apparently lead to the most successful situation in terms of economic welfare. 
In any case, even though it is true that any level of social insurance is better than the 
individual model, we find that different levels do have an effect on the welfare of the 
society. Further research in this direction might help find a better design for the 
optimal amount of social insurance. 
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Furthermore, we tested our model for robustness in the invention threshold parameter. 
The lower the value, the easier it is for an individual to find an invention. This 
parameter has, however, no influence on the innovativeness or any other aspect in the 
agents‟ life. In the default setting it is chosen to be at 60 and we lower it to 40 (Run5) 
and raise it to 80 (Run6). The results of the two runs can be found in Table 8-8. 
Criterion 
Run 5 Run 6 
Δ Means p-value Δ Means p-value 
Inventions 45.58 0.000 70.49 0.000 
Innovations 36.45 0.064 40.58 0.000 
Ratio of innos from inventions 0.01 0.408 0.10 0.002 
Mean income of agents -1.39 0.286 11.78 0.000 
Mean standard deviation of income -11.00 0.000 -20.20 0.000 
Table 8-8: Results from Run 5 and 6: Difference in Means Analysis between Individual and 
Governmental Model 
Just looking at the means will already suggest that in both runs the governmental 
model is once again more future oriented and welfare enhancing. There are, however, 
marked differences between the two cases. In run 6, the situation is as clear cut as it 
presents itself. From the p-value we can see that all values are different between the 
models well above the 99% level of significance. This means that once it is very 
difficult to find an invention, the governmental model offers a huge advantage over the 
individual model by generating on average 41 innovations more and securing a higher 
and less widespread income for the citizens. 
The case is less clear when looking at Run 5 where invention has been facilitated 
compared to our standard setup. We find that the governmental model still is able to 
generate more inventions than the individual model, but we can only reject the 
hypothesis of equality for innovations at a 90%-level
346
. This means that there is much 
evidence that the innovativeness is still higher in the governmental model when 
inventions are easy to be found, but it is less clearly pronounced.  
Furthermore, this simulation setup does not lead to a higher average income in the 
governmental model. We find that in our sample the opposite is true where the mean 
income in the individual model is higher, but we cannot even say that there is a 
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difference in the means at a confidence level of 75%. Still, we do find that the 
governmental model has once again contributed to a smoothing in the distribution 
meaning that the standard deviation is significantly lower than in the individual model.  
Consequently, we find that the more difficult it is to be innovative, the stronger is the 
advantage of the governmental model and the better it is to have the social insurance 
scheme. Nevertheless, the mean income is more than twice as large in Run 5 as in Run 
6, which means that for social welfare it is best, if inventions and innovations are 
easily found. The easier it is to be creative and inventive, the less we need a public 
sector securing the citizens against their life risks because they can provide for their 
own. The more difficult it will be to find an invention, the more important the role of 
the government. 
Lastly we checked for a situation where the role of risk provision is less important for 
the population and so we reduced average risk provision in the individual model to 
10% and lowered the starting value for the contribution to the social services to 10%. 
The situation in the governmental model improves slightly with higher rates of 
inventions, innovations and a higher mean income. In the individual model, however, 
we see a different picture. While the number of inventions is relatively stable, the 
number of innovation decreased slightly pointing at the difficulties to finance an 
innovation. We find a sharp drop, however, in the mean income of the population 
which falls to 25 compared to 31 in Run 1. Consequently, we find the comparison as 
follows: 
Criterion Δ Means p-value 
Inventions 57.83 0.000 
Innovations 56.16 0.000 
Ratio of innos from inventions 0.05 0.019 
Mean income of agents 14.55 0.001 
Mean standard deviation of income -21.97 0.000 
Table 8-9: Results from Run 7: Difference in Means Analysis between Individual and 
Governmental Model  
In this situation we find statistically significantly more inventions and more 
innovations in the governmental model – each time even well beyond the 99%-level. 
Similarly, the mean income of the agents as well as the standard deviation are 
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statistically significantly different in both models and as in the runs before we find a 
higher and less widespread income in the governmental model. 
From those analyses, we can see that this simple agent-based model is able to 
reproduce the insights from the studies by Sinn and Bird. Furthermore, the results are 
fairly robust to changes in the parameter setup. Only in Run2, where we supposed that 
there is no effect from merit goods derived from the social insurance services provided 
by the government, is the society not capable of producing a statistically significantly 
higher amount of innovation compared to the individual model. In all other cases, the 
governmental model turned out to foster innovation in the society and led to a higher 
average income of the agents. Consequently, it suggests that social insurance can 
indeed spur innovation in a society. 
Further research can and should investigate into expanding the model and testing for 
other influences. We will point to some limitations of the simulation in the subsequent 
section. 
8.3 Limitations of the results 
At this point we can ask if the model and its implementation have fulfilled the 
expectations and met the desired goals. Before we dismiss it for having too strong 
assumptions or too weak results, we may look at what a model is able to achieve and 
what it cannot realize: “As in so many areas of economic research, we are forced to 
estimate „false models‟ that do not provide a complete or correct picture of reality. As 
a consequence, no single study can be regarded as a definitive test of a theory in the 
way that studies are in the experimental sciences. Instead, inferences must be made by 
weighing the results of different studies and by under-standing the basic data and the 
relevant institutions.”347 
One aspect which makes agent-based simulations difficult to interpret is the 
considerable amount of specific definitions of variables and dependencies. For a 
precise model which is supposed to be calculated, it is not sufficient to define that the 
derivative of a certain variable on a characteristic is positive. We need specific values 
and we need to clearly define the mathematical equations underlying those 
relationships. Such a definition is always unique, but it may not be uniquely definable. 
Consequently, each model can only give insight on the emergent structure in the 
precise system.  
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Still, it is not useless if it cannot mirror exactly a set of data found in the real world. It 
is necessary to require the interior consistency as well as to argue over the assumptions 
and hypotheses taken during the modeling. Furthermore, it is certainly valuable to 
explore more models on a similar question with different setups and compare the 
emerging structure of those in order to find similarities in the dynamics which allow 
inferring certain causalities from the assumptions. 
In the analysis presented here, we have almost exclusively focused on the final states 
of the simulation after the 60 periods, since the main goal was to gain insight on the 
ability of social insurance to spur innovation. Nevertheless, further analysis could look 
more closely at the development of the characteristics of the society during the 
simulation in order to find key influences which drive creativity, innovation or income 
generation.  
We also did not discuss the absolute values found in the simulation, such as amount of 
innovations or the average income of the individuals. Since the model could never 
exactly reproduce reality, the values it generates will not be comparable to anything 
outside the simulation. This means that it is not important if the amount of innovation 
corresponds to the mean amount of granted patents in a certain country. As long as the 
model is built on sound assumptions and it is interiorly consistent, then we can 
compare the results of different runs and draw conclusions from the variation.  
Additionally, the individual model which we discussed here is certainly not 
comparable to any real world implementation of any country. At least for reasons of 
fairness and justice, there is some system in any country which prevents that people 
have to starve to death. This means that our individual system, which does not offer 
any support to those who are unable to provide for themselves, cannot be found in any 
country. Nevertheless, in almost any system we will find some members who argue 
that the protection of the poorest and weakest is still too generous. In such a situation 
it may be useful to have a model as the one we presented here showing that a certain 
degree of social protection is desirable. Furthermore, the model also allows us to 
compare different setups of social insurance with each other so that we can see if some 
design of the public sector is more beneficial than others.  
Moreover, agents can decide if they are willing or not to be innovative. In this aspect 
we see the moral hazard which a system of social insurance can introduce. Agents 
with a low risk aversion might rather shy away from innovating in the governmental 
system, because they lack the incentive. Nevertheless, we did not include such a 
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behavior in the search for work or the working behavior. It can be argued that some 
people will adapt their living in order to lead their life off of public support. Such 
individuals may have a strong effect on others in their environment or their larger 
network. Some of them may also choose to offer their work in the black market, 
therefore forgoing contributing to the system as well as receiving support. The 
behavioral consequences on the environment could be strong depending on the 
interaction between the agents. Including such a behavior is certainly a central idea for 
a future extension of this simulation. 
Even though the current state of complexity of the model may blur the results and it is 
not always easy to find the underlying mechanisms leading to certain emergent 
structures, our model can provide additional insight on the implications which a social 
security scheme and a welfare state can have on an economy. Although referring to 
recessions in the current economic crisis, we find Nobel Prize laureates calling for 
more diverse approaches: “economists need to abandon the neat but wrong solution of 
assuming that everyone is rational and markets work perfectly. The vision that 
emerges as the profession rethinks its foundations may not be all that clear; it certainly 
won‟t be neat; but we can hope that it will have the virtue of being at least partly 
right.”348 Agent-based models offer a viewpoint and a methodological approach, 
which allows us to tackle research questions from a different, more comprehensive 
perspective which may shed light on formerly unexplored facets of an issue. 
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9 Conclusion 
The question we started off with was if social insurance was able to spur innovation 
and therefore secure the future-orientation for a region or if it limited the incentives to 
innovate for the members of the society and would lead to a tradeoff between income 
maximization and social cohesion.  
As we have seen in section 5.3, a definite solution to this question is hardly possible. 
Consequently, we cannot derive from our study that social insurance can stimulate 
innovative behavior and therefore create the dynamic environment necessary for 
economic development and the future optimism in a society. Nevertheless, our model 
has added a new perspective and is able to add to the arguments pointing in the 
direction that social insurance is indeed able to foster innovation.  
In a more general view, this study started from the theoretical base of CNSE which 
means that it is situated in an evolutionary context focusing on the dynamics of a 
system, and that it takes the interactions which exist in and between the three pillars – 
real sector, financial sector and public sector – into account. It builds on the idea that it 
is important to include all three sectors into the analysis when trying to understand the 
cause-effect relationships in an economy. All economic actors are part of larger 
systems both on a meso- as well as on a macro-level and they will influence others just 
as they are influenced by other agents and by the environment.  
Furthermore, we concentrate on the innovativeness of a society as the key criterion of 
its future orientation. While there may be other political measures possible which 
improve the current state of an economy, it is crucial for a society to ensure the well-
being in the future. Without innovation it is difficult – if not impossible -  to maintain 
the current standard of living because of unexpected and unforeseeable events such as 
shortages in supply, changes in preferences or even natural influences like for example 
the climate change or on a short term scale an ash-throwing volcano. In all those cases, 
a society needs innovation and entrepreneurs who assume the risk of failing and try to 
implement novelty. Only through an ongoing creative destruction is it possible to 
sustain a certain lifestyle. Consequently, from a welfare perspective, maximizing 
today‟s welfare should not be the primary goal of a political measure but rather 
maximizing the potential for future welfare, so that the economy is well prepared for 
the uncertainties and the changing and varying influences of the future.  
Social insurance is such a political measure which is introduced in an economy in 
order to provide for those who are unable to look out for themselves. It serves as a 
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safety net for the entire population securing that everybody will be supported to a 
certain level deemed to be the subsistence minimum. Grown through history, most 
western countries offer their citizens a more or less densely knit social system 
designed to help them overcome periods of distress or to balance bad fate by social 
support. This social system is often justified against a free-market logic by arguing 
that there is a moral value of fairness and equality, as well as the political goal of 
social peace. On the other hand, it is often attacked for being too generous and for 
limiting the incentive for people to get active. Therefore, we have taken the two ideas 
– the more integrated CNSE-approach and the dilemma of social insurance – and 
modeled them in an agent-based simulation designed to provide insights on the cause-
effect relationship between social insurance and the innovativeness of the society. 
The model which we have presented here can certainly only be a step in the direction 
to better understand the different inter-sector and intra-sector relations and how 
changes in the parameters – such as the introduction of social insurance – affect the 
system‟s state. Nevertheless, it offers direct insight at the influences of some aspects. 
We have found that the governmental model offering social insurance shows in no 
case a trend to fewer innovations than the individual model. In the standard setup, we 
even find that the ratio of how many of the inventions will be implemented into 
innovations is significantly higher once social insurance is offered. We have checked 
the robustness of those results to several parameter changes and found in most cases 
that social insurance will improve the future-orientation of an economy by increasing 
the amount of innovations and that there is no case at all, when it will have negative 
effects on the future orientation. This effect is even stronger, once it becomes difficult 
for an individual to find an invention or once we reduce the average risk provision 
making individuals bolder towards their own life strategy. The overall picture shows 
that social insurance is not only a means of securing social peace and cohesion in a 
country, but that it can also add to the future orientation. 
While policy and political decisions always work on a different basis than economics, 
it is important for economists to offer ideas and their welfare implications in order to 
enable politicians to find the best solution. Innovation is not only about the cool 
gadgets which made us the star in the schoolyard. For an economy and a society, they 
are much rather the best insurance and guarantee for a prosperous future. From our 
model, we infer that social insurance is a good means of reaching just this goal. We 
argue that social insurance can indeed spur innovation. 
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Appendix A: Source Code of the Model 
1) File model.score 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>  
- <score:SContext xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-
instance" xmlns:score="http://scoreabm.org/score" label="InnoEasy" 
ID="innoEasy" pluralLabel="InnoEasies"> 
  <attributes label="initial Number Of Humans" ID="initialNumberOfHumans" 
pluralLabel="initial Number Of Humanss" sType="INTEGER" 
defaultValue="50" />  
  <attributes label="initial Number Of Banks" ID="initialNumberOfBanks" 
pluralLabel="initial Number Of Bankss" sType="INTEGER" 
defaultValue="10" />  
  <attributes label="initial Number Of Funds" ID="initialNumberOfFunds" 
pluralLabel="initial Number Of Fundss" sType="INTEGER" 
defaultValue="10" />  
  <attributes label="individual Model" ID="individualModel" 
pluralLabel="individual Models" defaultValue="true" />  
  <attributes label="subsistence Minimum" ID="subsistenceMinimum" 
pluralLabel="subsistence Minimums" sType="FLOAT" defaultValue="8.0" />  
  <attributes label="influence Merit Goods" ID="influenceMeritGoods" 
pluralLabel="influence Merit Goodss" sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="1" 
/>  
  <attributes label="invention Threshold" ID="inventionThreshold" 
pluralLabel="invention Thresholds" sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="60" 
/>  
  <attributes label="minWorkAge" ID="minWorkAge" 
pluralLabel="minWorkAges" sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="16" />  
  <attributes label="max Initial Age" ID="maxInitialAge" pluralLabel="max 
Initial Ages" sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="50" />  
  <attributes label="avgRetirementAge" ID="avgRetirementAge" 
pluralLabel="avgRetirementAges" sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="67" />  
  <attributes label="minDeathAge" ID="minDeathAge" 
pluralLabel="minDeathAges" sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="60" />  
  <attributes label="maxDeathAge" ID="maxDeathAge" 
pluralLabel="maxDeathAges" sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="100" />  
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  <attributes label="maxEducation" ID="maxEducation" 
pluralLabel="maxEducations" sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="3" />  
  <attributes label="yearForEdu" ID="yearForEdu" pluralLabel="yearForEdus" 
description="how many years it takes to get to the next higher level of 
education" sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="3" />  
  <attributes label="avgUnempment" ID="avgUnempment" 
pluralLabel="avgUnempments" sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="8" />  
  <attributes label="healthProbability" ID="healthProbability" 
pluralLabel="healthProbabilities" sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="95" />  
  <attributes label="avgRiskProvision" ID="avgRiskProvision" 
pluralLabel="avgRiskProvisions" description="" sType="FLOAT" 
defaultValue="0.2" />  
  <attributes label="avgConsumptionRatio" ID="avgConsumptionRatio" 
pluralLabel="avgConsumptionRatios" sType="FLOAT" defaultValue="0.9" 
/>  
  <attributes label="highEduIncFactor" ID="highEduIncFactor" 
pluralLabel="highEduIncFactors" description="Factor how high education 
influences the average income" sType="FLOAT" defaultValue="1.62" />  
  <attributes label="midEduIncFactor" ID="midEduIncFactor" 
pluralLabel="midEduIncFactors" description="Factor how middle 
education influences the average income" sType="FLOAT" 
defaultValue="1.07" />  
  <attributes label="lowEduIncFactor" ID="lowEduIncFactor" 
pluralLabel="lowEduIncFactors" description="Factor how low education 
influences the average income" sType="FLOAT" defaultValue="0.91" />  
  <attributes label="num Periods" ID="numPeriods" pluralLabel="num 
Periodss" sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="60" />  
  <attributes label="boolDebug" ID="boolDebug" pluralLabel="boolDebugs" 
defaultValue="false" />  
  <implementation package="innoeasy" className="" basePath="../InnoEasy" 
mode="AUTO" />  
- <agents label="ModelInitializer" ID="modelInitializer" 
pluralLabel="ModelInitializers"> 
  <implementation className="ModelInitializer" />  
  </agents> 
- <agents label="Human" ID="human" pluralLabel="Humans"> 
  <implementation className="Human" />  
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  </agents> 
- <agents label="Bank" ID="bank" pluralLabel="Banks"> 
  <implementation className="Bank" />  
  </agents> 
- <agents label="Fund" ID="fund" pluralLabel="Funds"> 
  <implementation className="Fund" />  
  </agents> 
- <agents label="PublicSector" ID="publicSector" 
pluralLabel="PublicSectors"> 
  <implementation className="PublicSector" basePath="" />  
  </agents> 
- <agents label="Invention" ID="invention" pluralLabel="Inventions"> 
  <implementation className="Invention" />  
  </agents> 
- <projections xsi:type="score:SContinuousSpace" label="Space" ID="space" 
pluralLabel="Spaces" dimensionality="2"> 
  <attributes xsi:type="score:SAttributeArray" label="Dimensions" 
ID="dimensions" pluralLabel="Dimensionss" description="The size of each 
dimension." sType="INTEGER" size="2" />  
  <attributes label="Width" ID="width" pluralLabel="Widths" description="The 
horizontal extent of the space." sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="50" />  
  <attributes label="Height" ID="height" pluralLabel="Heights" description="The 
vertical extent of the space." sType="INTEGER" defaultValue="50" />  
  </projections> 
  <projections xsi:type="score:SNetwork" label="Inventor" ID="inventor" 
pluralLabel="Inventors" />  
  <projections xsi:type="score:SNetwork" label="Innovator" ID="innovator" 
pluralLabel="Innovators" directed="true" />  
  <projections xsi:type="score:SNetwork" label="Financier" ID="financier" 
pluralLabel="Financiers" directed="true" />  
  <projections xsi:type="score:SNetwork" label="Banking" ID="banking" 
pluralLabel="Bankings" directed="true" />  
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  <projections xsi:type="score:SNetwork" label="Investing" ID="investing" 
pluralLabel="Investings" directed="true" />  
  <projections xsi:type="score:SNetwork" label="ProvisionNet" 
ID="provisionNet" pluralLabel="ProvisionNets" directed="true" />  
  <projections xsi:type="score:SNetwork" label="SavingNet" ID="savingNet" 
pluralLabel="SavingNets" directed="true" />  
  <projections xsi:type="score:SNetwork" label="Friends" ID="friends" 
pluralLabel="Friendss" />  
  <projections xsi:type="score:SNetwork" label="Community" ID="community" 
pluralLabel="Communities" directed="true" />  
  </score:SContext> 
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2) File ModelInitializer.groovy 
 
/** 
 *  
 * This file was automatically generated by the Repast Simphony 
Agent Editor. 
 * Please see http://repast.sourceforge.net/ for details. 
 *  
 */ 
 
/** 
 * 
 * Set the package name. 
 * 
 */ 
package innoeasy 
 
/** 
 * 
 * Import the needed packages. 
 * 
 */ 
import java.io.* 
import java.math.* 
import java.util.* 
import javax.measure.unit.* 
import org.jscience.mathematics.number.* 
import org.jscience.mathematics.vector.* 
import org.jscience.physics.amount.* 
import repast.simphony.adaptation.neural.* 
import repast.simphony.adaptation.regression.* 
import repast.simphony.context.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.environment.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.schedule.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.watcher.* 
import repast.simphony.groovy.math.* 
import repast.simphony.integration.* 
import repast.simphony.matlab.link.* 
import repast.simphony.query.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.projection.* 
import repast.simphony.parameter.* 
import repast.simphony.random.* 
import repast.simphony.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.space.projection.* 
import repast.simphony.ui.probe.* 
import repast.simphony.util.* 
import simphony.util.messages.* 
import static java.lang.Math.* 
import static repast.simphony.essentials.RepastEssentials.* 
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/** 
 * 
 * This is an agent. 
 * 
 */ 
public class ModelInitializer  { 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is used to automatically generate agent 
identifiers. 
     * @field serialVersionUID 
     * 
     */ 
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is used to automatically generate agent 
identifiers. 
     * @field agentIDCounter 
     * 
     */ 
    protected static long agentIDCounter = 1 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is the agent's identifier. 
     * @field agentID 
     * 
     */ 
    protected String agentID = "ModelInitializer " + 
(agentIDCounter++) 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the user model builder 
     * @method initializeModel 
     * 
     */ 
    @ScheduledMethod( 
        start = 0d, 
        shuffle = true 
    ) 
    public static def initializeModel() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        RandomHelper.createNormal(0, 1) 
        RandomHelper.createPoisson(5) 
        // This is a task. 
        PublicSector state = new PublicSector() 
        AddAgentToContext("InnoEasy", state) 
        state.initialize() 
 
        // This is a loop. 
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        for (i in 1..GetParameter("initialNumberOfHumans")) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Human human = new Human() 
            AddAgentToContext("InnoEasy", human) 
            human.initializeHuman() 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (i in 1..GetParameter("initialNumberOfBanks")) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Bank bank = new Bank() 
            bank.dblInterest = RandomHelper.nextDoubleFromTo(0.0, 
0.07) 
            AddAgentToContext("InnoEasy", bank) 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (i in 1..GetParameter("initialNumberOfFunds")) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Fund fund = new Fund() 
            fund.dblInterest = RandomHelper.nextDoubleFromTo(0.0, 
0.07) 
            AddAgentToContext("InnoEasy", fund) 
 
        } 
 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This method provides a human-readable name for the agent. 
     * @method toString 
     * 
     */ 
    @ProbeID() 
    public String toString() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // Set the default agent identifier. 
        returnValue = this.agentID 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
 
}  
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3) File Human.groovy 
 
/** 
 *  
 * This file was automatically generated by the Repast Simphony 
Agent Editor. 
 * Please see http://repast.sourceforge.net/ for details. 
 *  
 */ 
 
/** 
 * 
 * Set the package name. 
 * 
 */ 
package innoeasy 
 
/** 
 * 
 * Import the needed packages. 
 * 
 */ 
import java.io.* 
import java.math.* 
import java.util.* 
import javax.measure.unit.* 
import org.jscience.mathematics.number.* 
import org.jscience.mathematics.vector.* 
import org.jscience.physics.amount.* 
import repast.simphony.adaptation.neural.* 
import repast.simphony.adaptation.regression.* 
import repast.simphony.context.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.environment.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.schedule.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.watcher.* 
import repast.simphony.groovy.math.* 
import repast.simphony.integration.* 
import repast.simphony.matlab.link.* 
import repast.simphony.query.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.projection.* 
import repast.simphony.parameter.* 
import repast.simphony.random.* 
import repast.simphony.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.space.projection.* 
import repast.simphony.ui.probe.* 
import repast.simphony.util.* 
import simphony.util.messages.* 
import static java.lang.Math.* 
import static repast.simphony.essentials.RepastEssentials.* 
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/** 
 * 
 * This is an agent. 
 * 
 */ 
public class Human  { 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intAge 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Age", usageName = "intAge") 
    public int getIntAge() { 
        return intAge 
    } 
    public void setIntAge(int newValue) { 
        intAge = newValue 
    } 
    public int intAge = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intExperience 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Experience", usageName = 
"intExperience") 
    public int getIntExperience() { 
        return intExperience 
    } 
    public void setIntExperience(int newValue) { 
        intExperience = newValue 
    } 
    public int intExperience = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intEducation 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Education", usageName = 
"intEducation") 
    public int getIntEducation() { 
        return intEducation 
    } 
    public void setIntEducation(int newValue) { 
        intEducation = newValue 
    } 
    public int intEducation = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intRiskAversion 
     * 
     */ 
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    @Parameter (displayName = "Risk Aversion", usageName = 
"intRiskAversion") 
    public int getIntRiskAversion() { 
        return intRiskAversion 
    } 
    public void setIntRiskAversion(int newValue) { 
        intRiskAversion = newValue 
    } 
    public int intRiskAversion = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblRiskProvision 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Risk Prov", usageName = 
"dblRiskProvision") 
    public double getDblRiskProvision() { 
        return dblRiskProvision 
    } 
    public void setDblRiskProvision(double newValue) { 
        dblRiskProvision = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblRiskProvision = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblSavings 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Savings", usageName = "dblSavings") 
    public double getDblSavings() { 
        return dblSavings 
    } 
    public void setDblSavings(double newValue) { 
        dblSavings = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblSavings = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnRetired 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Retired?", usageName = "blnRetired") 
    public boolean getBlnRetired() { 
        return blnRetired 
    } 
    public void setBlnRetired(boolean newValue) { 
        blnRetired = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnRetired = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the Health field. 
     * @field dblHealth 
     * 
     */ 
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    @Parameter (displayName = "Health", usageName = "dblHealth") 
    public double getDblHealth() { 
        return dblHealth 
    } 
    public void setDblHealth(double newValue) { 
        dblHealth = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblHealth = 1 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * Shows if the person has a job or not. 1:= employed; 0 := 
unemployed 
     * @field blnEmployed 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Employed?", usageName = 
"blnEmployed") 
    public boolean getBlnEmployed() { 
        return blnEmployed 
    } 
    public void setBlnEmployed(boolean newValue) { 
        blnEmployed = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnEmployed = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblHappiness 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Happiness", usageName = 
"dblHappiness") 
    public double getDblHappiness() { 
        return dblHappiness 
    } 
    public void setDblHappiness(double newValue) { 
        dblHappiness = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblHappiness = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intRetiringAge 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Retiring Age", usageName = 
"intRetiringAge") 
    public int getIntRetiringAge() { 
        return intRetiringAge 
    } 
    public void setIntRetiringAge(int newValue) { 
        intRetiringAge = newValue 
    } 
    public int intRetiringAge = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intDeathAge 
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     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Death Age", usageName = 
"intDeathAge") 
    public int getIntDeathAge() { 
        return intDeathAge 
    } 
    public void setIntDeathAge(int newValue) { 
        intDeathAge = newValue 
    } 
    public int intDeathAge = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblWorkIncome 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Work Income", usageName = 
"dblWorkIncome") 
    public double getDblWorkIncome() { 
        return dblWorkIncome 
    } 
    public void setDblWorkIncome(double newValue) { 
        dblWorkIncome = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblWorkIncome = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblRevenue 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Revenue", usageName = "dblRevenue") 
    public double getDblRevenue() { 
        return dblRevenue 
    } 
    public void setDblRevenue(double newValue) { 
        dblRevenue = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblRevenue = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblBankingI 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "i% Banking", usageName = 
"dblBankingI") 
    public double getDblBankingI() { 
        return dblBankingI 
    } 
    public void setDblBankingI(double newValue) { 
        dblBankingI = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblBankingI = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
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     * @field dblInvestingI 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "i% Investing", usageName = 
"dblInvestingI") 
    public double getDblInvestingI() { 
        return dblInvestingI 
    } 
    public void setDblInvestingI(double newValue) { 
        dblInvestingI = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblInvestingI = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblMoneyLeftAvailable 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Money Left", usageName = 
"dblMoneyLeftAvailable") 
    public double getDblMoneyLeftAvailable() { 
        return dblMoneyLeftAvailable 
    } 
    public void setDblMoneyLeftAvailable(double newValue) { 
        dblMoneyLeftAvailable = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblMoneyLeftAvailable = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the Happy w/ I% field. 
     * @field blnHappyWInterests 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Happy w/ I%", usageName = 
"blnHappyWInterests") 
    public boolean getBlnHappyWInterests() { 
        return blnHappyWInterests 
    } 
    public void setBlnHappyWInterests(boolean newValue) { 
        blnHappyWInterests = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnHappyWInterests = true 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intTimePreference 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Time Pref", usageName = 
"intTimePreference") 
    public int getIntTimePreference() { 
        return intTimePreference 
    } 
    public void setIntTimePreference(int newValue) { 
        intTimePreference = newValue 
    } 
    public int intTimePreference = 0 
 
    /** 
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     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblConsumption 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Consumption", usageName = 
"dblConsumption") 
    public double getDblConsumption() { 
        return dblConsumption 
    } 
    public void setDblConsumption(double newValue) { 
        dblConsumption = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblConsumption = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblConsumptionRatio 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "... Ratio", usageName = 
"dblConsumptionRatio") 
    public double getDblConsumptionRatio() { 
        return dblConsumptionRatio 
    } 
    public void setDblConsumptionRatio(double newValue) { 
        dblConsumptionRatio = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblConsumptionRatio = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblAvgInterestRate 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Avg i% Rate", usageName = 
"dblAvgInterestRate") 
    public double getDblAvgInterestRate() { 
        return dblAvgInterestRate 
    } 
    public void setDblAvgInterestRate(double newValue) { 
        dblAvgInterestRate = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblAvgInterestRate = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblDebt 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Debt", usageName = "dblDebt") 
    public double getDblDebt() { 
        return dblDebt 
    } 
    public void setDblDebt(double newValue) { 
        dblDebt = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblDebt = 0 
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    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnInsolvent 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Insolvent?", usageName = 
"blnInsolvent") 
    public boolean getBlnInsolvent() { 
        return blnInsolvent 
    } 
    public void setBlnInsolvent(boolean newValue) { 
        blnInsolvent = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnInsolvent = false 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnDebugAgent 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Debugger", usageName = 
"blnDebugAgent") 
    public boolean getBlnDebugAgent() { 
        return blnDebugAgent 
    } 
    public void setBlnDebugAgent(boolean newValue) { 
        blnDebugAgent = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnDebugAgent = false 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblMyCoords 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Coords", usageName = "dblMyCoords") 
    public double[] getDblMyCoords() { 
        return dblMyCoords 
    } 
    public void setDblMyCoords(double[] newValue) { 
        dblMyCoords = newValue 
    } 
    public double[] dblMyCoords = new double[2] 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intInvented 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "# Inventions", usageName = 
"intInvented") 
    public int getIntInvented() { 
        return intInvented 
    } 
    public void setIntInvented(int newValue) { 
        intInvented = newValue 
    } 
    public int intInvented = 0 
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    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intTinkerer 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Tinkerer", usageName = 
"intTinkerer") 
    public int getIntTinkerer() { 
        return intTinkerer 
    } 
    public void setIntTinkerer(int newValue) { 
        intTinkerer = newValue 
    } 
    public int intTinkerer = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intInnovated 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "# Innovations", usageName = 
"intInnovated") 
    public int getIntInnovated() { 
        return intInnovated 
    } 
    public void setIntInnovated(int newValue) { 
        intInnovated = newValue 
    } 
    public int intInnovated = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblInnoRent 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Inno rent", usageName = 
"dblInnoRent") 
    public double getDblInnoRent() { 
        return dblInnoRent 
    } 
    public void setDblInnoRent(double newValue) { 
        dblInnoRent = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblInnoRent = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intFailedInnos 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "failed innos", usageName = 
"intFailedInnos") 
    public int getIntFailedInnos() { 
        return intFailedInnos 
    } 
    public void setIntFailedInnos(int newValue) { 
        intFailedInnos = newValue 
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    } 
    public int intFailedInnos = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intExpensiveInvention 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "costly invent", usageName = 
"intExpensiveInvention") 
    public int getIntExpensiveInvention() { 
        return intExpensiveInvention 
    } 
    public void setIntExpensiveInvention(int newValue) { 
        intExpensiveInvention = newValue 
    } 
    public int intExpensiveInvention = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intScaredInvention 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "scared", usageName = 
"intScaredInvention") 
    public int getIntScaredInvention() { 
        return intScaredInvention 
    } 
    public void setIntScaredInvention(int newValue) { 
        intScaredInvention = newValue 
    } 
    public int intScaredInvention = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intNewInno 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "new Inno", usageName = "intNewInno") 
    public int getIntNewInno() { 
        return intNewInno 
    } 
    public void setIntNewInno(int newValue) { 
        intNewInno = newValue 
    } 
    public int intNewInno = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intNewInvention 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "new Invent", usageName = 
"intNewInvention") 
    public int getIntNewInvention() { 
        return intNewInvention 
    } 
    public void setIntNewInvention(int newValue) { 
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        intNewInvention = newValue 
    } 
    public int intNewInvention = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intNewExpensive 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "new costly", usageName = 
"intNewExpensive") 
    public int getIntNewExpensive() { 
        return intNewExpensive 
    } 
    public void setIntNewExpensive(int newValue) { 
        intNewExpensive = newValue 
    } 
    public int intNewExpensive = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intNewScared 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "new scared", usageName = 
"intNewScared") 
    public int getIntNewScared() { 
        return intNewScared 
    } 
    public void setIntNewScared(int newValue) { 
        intNewScared = newValue 
    } 
    public int intNewScared = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intNewFailed 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "new Failed", usageName = 
"intNewFailed") 
    public int getIntNewFailed() { 
        return intNewFailed 
    } 
    public void setIntNewFailed(int newValue) { 
        intNewFailed = newValue 
    } 
    public int intNewFailed = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblSocialContribution 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Social Contribution", usageName = 
"dblSocialContribution") 
    public double getDblSocialContribution() { 
        return dblSocialContribution 
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    } 
    public void setDblSocialContribution(double newValue) { 
        dblSocialContribution = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblSocialContribution = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnMoreWelfare 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "More Welfare", usageName = 
"blnMoreWelfare") 
    public boolean getBlnMoreWelfare() { 
        return blnMoreWelfare 
    } 
    public void setBlnMoreWelfare(boolean newValue) { 
        blnMoreWelfare = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnMoreWelfare = false 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnLessWelfare 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Less Welfare", usageName = 
"blnLessWelfare") 
    public boolean getBlnLessWelfare() { 
        return blnLessWelfare 
    } 
    public void setBlnLessWelfare(boolean newValue) { 
        blnLessWelfare = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnLessWelfare = false 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnSavingsAtBank 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Savings at bank?", usageName = 
"blnSavingsAtBank") 
    public boolean getBlnSavingsAtBank() { 
        return blnSavingsAtBank 
    } 
    public void setBlnSavingsAtBank(boolean newValue) { 
        blnSavingsAtBank = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnSavingsAtBank = false 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnProvisionAtBank 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Provision at bank?", usageName = 
"blnProvisionAtBank") 
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    public boolean getBlnProvisionAtBank() { 
        return blnProvisionAtBank 
    } 
    public void setBlnProvisionAtBank(boolean newValue) { 
        blnProvisionAtBank = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnProvisionAtBank = true 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblSavingI 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "i% Saving", usageName = 
"dblSavingI") 
    public double getDblSavingI() { 
        return dblSavingI 
    } 
    public void setDblSavingI(double newValue) { 
        dblSavingI = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblSavingI = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblProvisionI 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "i% Provision", usageName = 
"dblProvisionI") 
    public double getDblProvisionI() { 
        return dblProvisionI 
    } 
    public void setDblProvisionI(double newValue) { 
        dblProvisionI = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblProvisionI = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intCoolFriends 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "# of friends", usageName = 
"intCoolFriends") 
    public int getIntCoolFriends() { 
        return intCoolFriends 
    } 
    public void setIntCoolFriends(int newValue) { 
        intCoolFriends = newValue 
    } 
    public int intCoolFriends = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblIncBeforeRedistribution 
     * 
     */ 
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    @Parameter (displayName = "inc before redistrib", usageName = 
"dblIncBeforeRedistribution") 
    public double getDblIncBeforeRedistribution() { 
        return dblIncBeforeRedistribution 
    } 
    public void setDblIncBeforeRedistribution(double newValue) { 
        dblIncBeforeRedistribution = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblIncBeforeRedistribution = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblIncAfterRedistribution 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "inc after redistrib", usageName = 
"dblIncAfterRedistribution") 
    public double getDblIncAfterRedistribution() { 
        return dblIncAfterRedistribution 
    } 
    public void setDblIncAfterRedistribution(double newValue) { 
        dblIncAfterRedistribution = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblIncAfterRedistribution = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * Here are the inventions of this agent and her predecessors 
     * @field intFamilyInventions 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Family Inv", usageName = 
"intFamilyInventions") 
    public int getIntFamilyInventions() { 
        return intFamilyInventions 
    } 
    public void setIntFamilyInventions(int newValue) { 
        intFamilyInventions = newValue 
    } 
    public int intFamilyInventions = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * Here are the innovations of the individual and her 
predecessors 
     * @field intFamilyInnovations 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Family Innos", usageName = 
"intFamilyInnovations") 
    public int getIntFamilyInnovations() { 
        return intFamilyInnovations 
    } 
    public void setIntFamilyInnovations(int newValue) { 
        intFamilyInnovations = newValue 
    } 
    public int intFamilyInnovations = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
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     * @field intInnosAround 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Innos Around", usageName = 
"intInnosAround") 
    public int getIntInnosAround() { 
        return intInnosAround 
    } 
    public void setIntInnosAround(int newValue) { 
        intInnosAround = newValue 
    } 
    public int intInnosAround = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is used to automatically generate agent 
identifiers. 
     * @field serialVersionUID 
     * 
     */ 
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is used to automatically generate agent 
identifiers. 
     * @field agentIDCounter 
     * 
     */ 
    protected static long agentIDCounter = 1 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is the agent's identifier. 
     * @field agentID 
     * 
     */ 
    protected String agentID = "Human " + (agentIDCounter++) 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method liveOneYear 
     * 
     */ 
    @ScheduledMethod( 
        start = 1d, 
        interval = 1d, 
        shuffle = true 
    ) 
    public def liveOneYear() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("We'll start 
a new year, I'm updating my variables")} 
        updateVariables() 
 Source Code of the Model - File Human.groovy 
A-24 
 
        // This is a task. 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I'll see 
what revenue I can generate")} 
        generateRevenue() 
        // This is a task. 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I have to 
look for my risk")} 
        riskProvision() 
        // This is a task. 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("Now, I'll 
save or consume!")} 
        saveConsume() 
        // This is a task. 
        invent() 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method initializeHuman 
     * 
     */ 
    public def initializeHuman() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def maxInitialAge = GetParameter("maxInitialAge") 
        def maxEducation = GetParameter("maxEducation") 
        def minDeathAge = GetParameter("minDeathAge") 
        def maxDeathAge = GetParameter("maxDeathAge") 
        def avgRetirementAge = GetParameter("avgRetirementAge") 
        // This is a task. 
        def subsistenceMinimum = GetParameter("subsistenceMinimum") 
//it is no problem that we get the value here from the parameter 
group, since there has not been any need yet for the state to 
change it. From now on (i.e. when an agent is reborn) this value 
will be read from the state. 
        def lowEduIncFactor = GetParameter("lowEduIncFactor")  
        def midEduIncFactor = GetParameter("midEduIncFactor")  
        def highEduIncFactor = GetParameter("highEduIncFactor")  
        def minWorkAge = GetParameter("minWorkAge") 
        // This is a task. 
        def healthParameter = 100 - 
GetParameter("healthProbability") 
        // This is a task. 
        setIntRiskAversion(RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0, 10)) 
        setDblHappiness(RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0, 100)) 
        setIntTimePreference(RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0,10)) 
        def educationLevel = RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0,100) 
        if (educationLevel < 30) 
        { intEducation = 1} 
        else  
        { 
          if (educationLevel < 74) 
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          { intEducation = 2} 
          else 
          { intEducation = 3} 
        } 
        // This is a task. 
        setIntAge(RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0, maxInitialAge)) 
        if (intAge < minWorkAge) {dblSavings = 
RandomHelper.nextDoubleFromTo(0, ((minWorkAge - 
intAge)*subsistenceMinimum))} 
        setIntDeathAge(RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(minDeathAge, 
maxDeathAge)) 
        
setIntRetiringAge(RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(avgRetirementAge - 10, 
avgRetirementAge + 10)) 
        if (intRetiringAge > intDeathAge) {intRetiringAge = 
intDeathAge}  //this helps avoid an error in "update Variables" 
        // This is a task. 
        def eduIncFactor = 0.0 
        if (intEducation == 1) {eduIncFactor = lowEduIncFactor} 
        if (intEducation == 2) {eduIncFactor = midEduIncFactor} 
        if (intEducation == 3) {eduIncFactor = highEduIncFactor} 
        // This is a task. 
        RandomHelper.createNormal(0, 1) 
        def incomeVariable = 
(double)RandomHelper.getNormal().nextDouble() 
        setDblWorkIncome((int)(exp(3.35 + 0.47 * incomeVariable) * 
eduIncFactor + subsistenceMinimum)) 
        // This is a task. 
        RandomHelper.createPoisson(healthParameter) 
        setDblHealth(100 - RandomHelper.getPoisson().nextInt()) 
        // This is a task. 
        initializeNetwork() 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method generateRevenue 
     * 
     */ 
    public def generateRevenue() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def individualModel = GetParameter("individualModel") 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (AmIWorking()) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setDblRevenue(dblWorkIncome * dblHealth / 100) 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I'm 
working, I'll get an income of "+dblRevenue)} 
 
 Source Code of the Model - File Human.groovy 
A-26 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
        // This is a task. 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("And I get 
the rent from my innovations")} 
        dblRevenue += RentFromInnovations() 
        // This is a task. 
        InterestPayment(true)  //the true refers to the savings 
account 
        setDblSavingI(dblBankingI + dblInvestingI) 
        dblRevenue += dblBankingI + dblInvestingI 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Furthermore, I get interest: From my bank, 
it's "+dblBankingI+" and from my fund it's "+dblInvestingI)} 
        setDblBankingI(dblInvestingI = 0) 
        // This is a task. 
        if (individualModel) {InterestPayment(false)} //the false 
refers to the risk provision account if we have the individual 
model 
        setDblProvisionI(dblBankingI + dblInvestingI) 
        dblRevenue += dblBankingI + dblInvestingI 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Furthermore, I get interest: From my bank, 
it's "+dblBankingI+" and from my fund it's "+dblInvestingI)} 
        setDblBankingI(dblInvestingI = 0) 
        // This is a task. 
        if ((dblSavingI <= 0.0) || (dblProvisionI <=0.0)) 
{blnHappyWInterests = false} 
        dblRevenue -= RepayCredit() 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("Ok, and I 
just repaid my credit")} 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method AmIWorking 
     * 
     */ 
    public boolean AmIWorking() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def minWorkAge = GetParameter("minWorkAge") 
        def yearForEdu = GetParameter("yearForEdu") 
        // This is a task. 
        def intWorkAge = minWorkAge + (intEducation - 1)*yearForEdu 
        if ((blnRetired == false)  && (intAge >= intRetiringAge)) 
        { blnRetired = true} 
           
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
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        if ((intAge < minWorkAge) || blnRetired || !(IsEmployed())) 
{ 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setBlnEmployed(false) 
            returnValue = false 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("Either 
I'm too young ("+intAge+") or I'm retired ("+blnRetired+") or I'm 
just unemployed")} 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            returnValue = true 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I'm 
working!")} 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method updateVariables 
     * 
     */ 
    public def updateVariables() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def healthProbability = GetParameter("healthProbability") 
        def individualModel = GetParameter("individualModel") 
        // This is a task. 
        def oldHealth = dblHealth 
        dblHealth += RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0, 20) - 10 
        setDblHealth((oldHealth + dblHealth) / 2) 
        if (dblHealth > 100) {dblHealth = 100} 
        if (dblHealth < 0) {dblHealth = 0} 
        // This is a task. 
        if (dblHealth > oldHealth) {intRiskAversion --} 
        if (dblHealth < oldHealth) {intRiskAversion ++} 
        if (intRiskAversion > 10) {intRiskAversion  = 10} 
        if (intRiskAversion < 0) {intRiskAversion = 0} 
        // This is a task. 
        intAge++ 
        if (blnEmployed == true) {intExperience++} 
        setDblRevenue(dblBankingI = dblInvestingI = 0) 
        //if (RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0,100) < intAge) 
{intTimePreference--} 
        if (intTimePreference < 0) {intTimePreference = 0} 
        //if (RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(intRetiringAge-10, 
intDeathAge) < intAge) {intTimePreference++} 
        if (intTimePreference > 10) {intTimePreference = 10} 
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        //here we follow Fisher's theories of decreasing then 
increasing time preference 
        // This is a task. 
        //intInnovated += intNewInno 
        //intInvented += intNewInvention    -> this is taken care 
of in the inventive process 
        setIntNewInno(intNewInvention = 0) 
        setIntNewExpensive(intNewScared = intNewFailed = 0) 
        // This is a task. 
        if (intAge > intDeathAge) {beReborn()} 
        // This is a task. 
        environmentalInfluence() 
        if (RandomHelper.nextDoubleFromTo(0.0, 1.0) > 0.5) 
{blnHappyWInterests = true} else {blnHappyWInterests = false} 
        if ((dblBankingI + dblInvestingI <= 0) && (dblSavings + 
dblRiskProvision >= 0)) {blnHappyWInterests = false} 
        if (individualModel == false) {publicSectorInfluence()} 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method RentFromInnovations 
     * 
     */ 
    public double RentFromInnovations() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        // This is a task. 
        Network innovativeness = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Innovator") 
        Network financing = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Financier") 
        // This is a task. 
        def rent = 0 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (partInnovation in (new NetPathWithin(innovativeness, 
this, 1).query())) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            def particularRent 
            particularRent = partInnovation.dblRent * 
partInnovation.dblWeight / 2 
            rent += particularRent 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("The 
innovation brings me "+particularRent+".")} 
 
        } 
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        // This is a loop. 
        for (partFinanced in (new NetPathWithin(financing, this, 
1).query())) { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (partFinanced.blnSuccess == true) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                def particularRentFinanced 
                particularRentFinanced = partFinanced.dblRent * 
partFinanced.dblWeight / 2 
                rent += particularRentFinanced 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("The 
innovation which I financed brings me 
"+particularRentFinanced+".")} 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
            } 
 
        } 
 
        // This is a task. 
        setDblInnoRent(rent) 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("Ok, so in 
total I get "+rent+" EUR from my innovations.")} 
        returnValue = rent 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method InterestPayment 
     * 
     */ 
    public void InterestPayment(boolean blnOnSavings) { 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        Network banking = (Network)context.getProjection("Banking") 
        Network investing = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Investing") 
        Network savingNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("SavingNet") 
        Network provisionNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("ProvisionNet") 
        // This is a task. 
        def AmountForInterest = 0.0 
        def individualModel = GetParameter("individualModel") 
        def additionalPoint = 0.0 
        Iterator list = new NetworkSuccessor(savingNet, 
this).query().iterator() 
        def WhichNetwork = "" 
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        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (blnOnSavings) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            WhichNetwork = "InnoEasy/SavingNet" 
            if (dblSavings < 0) {additionalPoint = 0.01} 
            AmountForInterest = dblSavings 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            list = new NetworkSuccessor(provisionNet, 
this).query().iterator() 
            WhichNetwork = "InnoEasy/ProvisionNet" 
            AmountForInterest = dblRiskProvision 
            //here we don't have to set the additional percentage 
point in case risk provision is negative, because risk provision 
can never be negative. 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (list.hasNext()) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Object institution = list.next() 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (institution instanceof Bank) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                setDblBankingI(AmountForInterest * 
(institution.dblInterest + additionalPoint)) 
                //if (dblBankingI > AmountForInterest * 10) 
{dblBankingI = 0} 
                if (dblBankingI > 0) 
{institution.dblInterestPayments += dblBankingI} 
                if (dblBankingI < 0) 
{institution.dblInterestReceipts -= dblBankingI} 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
received or paid "+dblBankingI+" EUR interest from or to my bank 
corresponding to an invested amount of "+AmountForInterest+".")} 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                setDblInvestingI(AmountForInterest * 
institution.dblInterest) 
                //if (dblInvestingI > AmountForInterest * 10) 
{dblInvestingI = 0} 
                if (dblInvestingI <=0) {dblInvestingI = 0} // we 
can only invest money at funds but not borrow from them 
                if (dblInvestingI > 0) 
{institution.dblInterestPayments += dblInvestingI} 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
received "+dblInvestingI+" EUR interest from my fund.")} 
 
            } 
 
        } else  { 
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        } 
        // End the method. 
        return 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method RepayCredit 
     * 
     */ 
    public double RepayCredit() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        // This is a task. 
        Network savingNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("SavingNet") 
        // This is a task. 
        def individualModel = GetParameter("individualModel") 
        returnValue = 0.0 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (bank in (new NetworkAdjacent(savingNet, 
this).query())) { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if ((dblSavings < 0) && (bank instanceof Bank)) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                bank.dblClientsCredits = bank.dblClientsCredits + 
dblSavings 
                RepastEdge removedEdge = 
RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/Banking", this, bank) 
                RepastEdge removedEdge2 = 
RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/SavingNet", this, bank) 
                // This is a task. 
                returnValue = -dblSavings 
                if (!(individualModel)) {dblDebt = -dblSavings} 
                setDblSavings(0) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
payed back my credit and closed my banking account")} 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                returnValue = 0 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
had no credit and just keep my savings account.")} 
 
            } 
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        } 
 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method IsEmployed 
     * 
     */ 
    public boolean IsEmployed() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def avgUnempment = GetParameter("avgUnempment") 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (blnEmployed == true) { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0,100) > avgUnempment) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                setBlnEmployed(true) 
                returnValue = true 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I'm 
employed!")} 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                setBlnEmployed(false) 
                returnValue = false 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I'm 
unemployed")} 
 
            } 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0,100) > avgUnempment * 
2) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                setBlnEmployed(true) 
                returnValue = true 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I'm 
employed!")} 
 
            } else  { 
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                // This is a task. 
                setBlnEmployed(false) 
                returnValue = false 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I'm 
unemployed")} 
 
            } 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method riskProvision 
     * 
     */ 
    public def riskProvision() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def individualModel = GetParameter("individualModel") 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (individualModel == true) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("Let's 
go for individual risk provision")} 
            individualRiskProvision() 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("Let's 
go for social risk provision")} 
            socialRiskProvision() 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method individualRiskProvision 
     * 
     */ 
    public def individualRiskProvision() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
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        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        Network community = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Community") 
        Iterator list = new NetworkAdjacent(community, 
this).query().iterator() 
        PublicSector state = list.next() 
        def subsistenceMinimum = state.dblSubsistenceMinimum 
        // This is a task. 
        def avgRiskProvision = GetParameter("avgRiskProvision") 
        setDblMoneyLeftAvailable(dblRevenue) 
        setDblIncBeforeRedistribution(dblIncAfterRedistribution = 
dblRevenue) 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (dblRevenue >= subsistenceMinimum) { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (blnHappyWInterests) { 
 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                deleteAccount(blnProvisionAtBank, false) 
                //the true refers to banks and the false to the 
Risk Provision account 
                // This is a task. 
                searchNewFinInst(takeBankOrFund(false), false) 
                //the true refers to banks and the false to the 
Risk Provision account 
                //if (intRiskAversion <= 3) 
{searchNewFinInst(false, false)} 
                //the false refers to funds and the false to the 
Risk Provision account 
 
            } 
            // This is a task. 
            dblMoneyLeftAvailable -= subsistenceMinimum 
            // This is a task. 
            def Percentage = avgRiskProvision + (intRiskAversion - 
intTimePreference) / 10 * 0.2 
            if (Percentage < 0) {Percentage = 0} 
            // This is a task. 
            def AmountToSave = Percentage * dblMoneyLeftAvailable 
            saveAmount(blnProvisionAtBank, false, AmountToSave) 
            dblMoneyLeftAvailable -= AmountToSave 
            dblRiskProvision += AmountToSave 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I had 
enough money for the subsistence minimum and I put "+Percentage+" % 
as savings into my account, that's "+AmountToSave+" EUR. Now I have 
"+dblMoneyLeftAvailable+" EUR left over for saving and consuming." 
)} 
 
        } else  { 
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            // This is a task. 
            def AllMoneyAvailable = dblRevenue + dblSavings + 
dblRiskProvision 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I don't 
have enough revenue to cover my subsistence minimum. The funds I 
have are "+AllMoneyAvailable)} 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (AllMoneyAvailable > subsistenceMinimum) { 
 
 
                // This is an agent decision. 
                if (dblSavings > subsistenceMinimum - dblRevenue) { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    emptyAccount(blnSavingsAtBank, true) 
                    setDblSavings(dblSavings - subsistenceMinimum + 
dblRevenue) 
                    saveAmount(blnSavingsAtBank, true, dblSavings) 
                    setDblMoneyLeftAvailable(0) 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("I had enough savings and so I used those to 
cover my subsistence minimum.")} 
 
                } else  { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("My savings of "+dblSavings+" are not enough. 
So I take from my risk Provision of "+dblRiskProvision+" the 
remaining amount of "+(subsistenceMinimum - dblSavings - 
dblRevenue)+".")} 
                    // This is a task. 
                    emptyAccount(blnSavingsAtBank, true)  //savings 
account at funds 
                    emptyAccount(blnProvisionAtBank, false)  //risk 
provision account at banks 
                    setDblRiskProvision(dblRiskProvision - 
subsistenceMinimum + dblRevenue + dblSavings) 
                    saveAmount(blnProvisionAtBank, false, 
dblRiskProvision)  //if there is a remainder, we'll put it into the 
risk provision account. That means we first take the savings and 
then the needed extra from the risk provision 
                    setDblMoneyLeftAvailable(dblSavings = 0) 
 
                } 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                def AmountNeeded = subsistenceMinimum - dblRevenue 
- dblSavings - dblRiskProvision 
                emptyAccount(blnProvisionAtBank, false)  //get all 
the money she has 
                emptyAccount(blnSavingsAtBank, true)  //get all the 
money she has 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("Oh 
my gosh, I need "+AmountNeeded+" to cover my subsistence 
minimum.")} 
 
                // This is an agent decision. 
                if (getCredit(AmountNeeded)) { 
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                    // This is a task. 
                    setDblMoneyLeftAvailable(dblRiskProvision = 0) 
                    setDblSavings(-(AmountNeeded)) 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Ok, cool, I received a credit!")} 
 
                } else  { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    //death() 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Well, I guess, I'm starviiiiiinn.....")} 
                    beReborn() 
 
                } 
 
            } 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method socialRiskProvision 
     * 
     */ 
    public def socialRiskProvision(innoeasy.PublicSector 
watchedAgent) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        // This is a task. 
        Network community = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Community") 
        Iterator list = new NetworkAdjacent(community, 
this).query().iterator() 
        PublicSector state = list.next() 
        // This is a task. 
        def subsistenceMinimum = state.dblSubsistenceMinimum 
        def percentSocContribution = 
state.dblPercentSocContribution 
        setDblMoneyLeftAvailable(dblRevenue) 
        setDblIncBeforeRedistribution(dblRevenue + dblDebt) 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (dblRevenue + dblDebt >= subsistenceMinimum) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
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            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I have 
enough funds ("+dblMoneyLeftAvailable+") to cover my own 
subsistence minimum. So, I'll contribute to the social security 
fund.")} 
            setDblMoneyLeftAvailable(dblMoneyLeftAvailable - 
subsistenceMinimum) 
            def double contributionPayment 
            contributionPayment = (dblMoneyLeftAvailable + dblDebt) 
* percentSocContribution 
            // In the second step, we have to add dblDebt to the 
amount of money we have to pay taxes on because this money has been 
subtracted in the GenerateRevenue-method. But the money I use to 
repay my debt is certainly not tax exempt therefore we have to add 
it here. 
            state.dblCurrentSocialReceipts += contributionPayment 
            dblMoneyLeftAvailable -= contributionPayment 
            dblSocialContribution += contributionPayment 
            setDblIncAfterRedistribution(dblIncBeforeRedistribution 
- contributionPayment) 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // Here we have to subtract dblDebt from the 
subsistenceMinimum as well, since this money does not really lack 
in the revenue but is a consequence of extensive consumption in 
previous periods. Therefore, the social system should not be used 
to repay the debts of the individual. 
            def double socialReceipts 
            socialReceipts = subsistenceMinimum - 
dblMoneyLeftAvailable - dblDebt 
            state.dblCurrentSocialExpenses += socialReceipts 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I don't 
have enough funds "+dblMoneyLeftAvailable+" including the debt of 
"+dblDebt+" to cover my own subsistence minimum. I will need the 
government to help me.")} 
            dblSocialContribution -= socialReceipts 
            // This is a task. 
            setDblMoneyLeftAvailable(-dblDebt) 
            //I don't have any money available, but I still have my 
debt to cover. 
            setDblIncAfterRedistribution(dblIncBeforeRedistribution 
+ socialReceipts) 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method initializeNetwork 
     * 
     */ 
    public def initializeNetwork() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
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        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        Network savingNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("SavingNet") 
        Network provisionNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("ProvisionNet") 
        // This is a task. 
        Network community = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Community") 
        Network friends = (Network)context.getProjection("Friends") 
        Network banking = (Network)context.getProjection("Banking") 
        Network investing = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Investing") 
 
        // This is important when an individual is reborn. It 
should not know all the people his ancestor used to know 
        for (friend in (new NetPathWithin(friends, this, 
1).query())) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/Friends", this, friend) 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (state in (GetObjects("InnoEasy", 
"innoeasy.PublicSector"))) { 
 
 
            // Make a decision. 
            if (state instanceof PublicSector) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                CreateEdge("InnoEasy/Community", this, state, 1.0) 
                //IndexedIterable iter = GetObjects("root", 
"anl.example.MyAgent") 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
            } 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is important when an individual is reborn. It 
should not know all the people his ancestor used to know 
        for (bank in (new NetPathWithin(banking, this, 1).query())) 
{ 
 
            // This is a task. 
            RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/Banking", this, bank) 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is important when an individual is reborn. It 
should not know all the people his ancestor used to know 
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        for (fund in (new NetPathWithin(investing, this, 
1).query())) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/Investing", this, fund) 
 
        } 
 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method emptyAccount 
     * 
     */ 
    public def emptyAccount(boolean atBanks, boolean fromSavings) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        Network banking = (Network)context.getProjection("Banking") 
        Network investing = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Investing") 
        Network savingNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("SavingNet") 
        Network provisionNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("ProvisionNet") 
        // This is a task. 
        def AmountToWithdraw = 0.0 
        Iterator list = new NetworkSuccessor(savingNet, 
this).query().iterator() 
        def WhichNetwork = "" 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (fromSavings) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            AmountToWithdraw = dblSavings 
            WhichNetwork = "InnoEasy/SavingNet" 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            AmountToWithdraw = dblRiskProvision 
            list = new NetworkSuccessor(provisionNet, 
this).query().iterator() 
            WhichNetwork = "InnoEasy/ProvisionNet" 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (list.hasNext()) { 
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            // This is a task. 
            Object institution = list.next() 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (institution instanceof Bank) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                institution.dblClientsSavings -= AmountToWithdraw 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("Ok, 
I just emptied my bank account")} 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                institution.dblCapitalStock -= AmountToWithdraw 
                institution.dblCumClientsSavings -= 
AmountToWithdraw 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Well, I'm out of all my investments")} 
 
            } 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method searchNewFinInst 
     * 
     */ 
    public def searchNewFinInst(boolean atBanks, boolean 
fromSavings) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def AmountToSave = 0 
        def WhichNetwork = "" 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (fromSavings) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            AmountToSave = dblSavings 
            WhichNetwork = "InnoEasy/SavingNet" 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            AmountToSave = dblRiskProvision 
            WhichNetwork = "InnoEasy/ProvisionNet" 
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        } 
        // This is a task. 
        def maxInterest = 0 
        def bestInstitution = "" 
        def blnFound = false 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (institution in (new ContinuousWithin(space, this, 
15).query())) { 
 
 
            // Make a decision. 
            if (atBanks) { 
 
 
                // Make a decision. 
                if (institution instanceof Bank) { 
 
 
                    // This is an agent decision. 
                    if (institution.dblInterest >= maxInterest) { 
 
                        // This is a task. 
                        //bestInstitution = institution.name 
                        maxInterest = institution.dblInterest 
 
                    } else  { 
 
 
                    } 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
                // Make a decision. 
                if (institution instanceof Fund) { 
 
 
                    // This is an agent decision. 
                    if (institution.dblInterest >= maxInterest) { 
 
                        // This is a task. 
                        //bestInstitution = institution.name 
                        maxInterest = institution.dblInterest 
 
                    } else  { 
 
 
                    } 
 
                } else  { 
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                } 
 
            } 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (institution in (new ContinuousWithin(space, this, 
15).query())) { 
 
 
            // Make a decision. 
            if (atBanks) { 
 
 
                // Make a decision. 
                if (institution instanceof Bank) { 
 
 
                    // This is an agent decision. 
                    if ((institution.dblInterest == maxInterest) && 
(blnFound == false)) { 
 
                        // This is a task. 
                        RepastEdge newEdge = 
CreateEdge("InnoEasy/Banking", this, institution, 1.0) 
                        RepastEdge newEdge2 = 
CreateEdge(WhichNetwork, this, institution, AmountToSave) 
                        institution.dblClientsSavings += 
AmountToSave 
                        blnFound = true 
                        if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Ok, so I found a new bank and will save my 
money here")} 
 
                    } else  { 
 
 
                    } 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
                // Make a decision. 
                if (institution instanceof Fund) { 
 
 
                    // This is an agent decision. 
                    if ((institution.dblInterest == maxInterest) && 
(blnFound == false)) { 
 
                        // This is a task. 
                        RepastEdge newEdge = 
CreateEdge("InnoEasy/Investing", this, institution, 1.0) 
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                        RepastEdge newEdge2 = 
CreateEdge(WhichNetwork, this, institution, AmountToSave) 
                        institution.dblCumClientsSavings += 
AmountToSave 
                        institution.dblClientsSavings += 
AmountToSave 
                        blnFound = true 
                        // This is a task. 
                        if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Ok, so I found a new fund and will invest my 
money here")} 
 
                    } else  { 
 
 
                    } 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
 
            } 
 
        } 
 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method saveAmount 
     * 
     */ 
    public def saveAmount(boolean atBanks, boolean inSavings, 
double AmountToSave) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        Network banking = (Network)context.getProjection("Banking") 
        Network investing = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Investing") 
        Network savingNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("SavingNet") 
        Network provisionNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("ProvisionNet") 
        // This is a task. 
        Iterator list = new NetworkSuccessor(savingNet, 
this).query().iterator() 
        def WhichNetwork = "" 
        def NewTotal = 0.0 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
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        if (inSavings) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            NewTotal = dblSavings + AmountToSave 
            WhichNetwork="InnoEasy/SavingNet" 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            NewTotal = dblRiskProvision + AmountToSave 
            list = new NetworkSuccessor(provisionNet, 
this).query().iterator() 
            WhichNetwork="InnoEasy/ProvisionNet" 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (list.hasNext()) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Object institution = list.next() 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (institution instanceof Bank) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                institution.dblClientsSavings += AmountToSave 
                RepastEdge edge = SetEdgeWeight(WhichNetwork, this, 
institution, NewTotal) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
just saved "+AmountToSave+" in my bank account.")} 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                institution.dblClientsSavings += AmountToSave 
                institution.dblCumClientsSavings += AmountToSave 
                RepastEdge edge = SetEdgeWeight(WhichNetwork, this, 
institution, NewTotal) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
just invested "+AmountToSave+" in my fund.")} 
 
            } 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method deleteAccount 
     * 
     */ 
    public def deleteAccount(boolean atBanks, boolean fromSavings) 
{ 
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        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        Network banking = (Network)context.getProjection("Banking") 
        Network investing = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Investing") 
        Network savingNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("SavingNet") 
        Network provisionNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("ProvisionNet") 
        // This is a task. 
        emptyAccount(atBanks, fromSavings) 
        Iterator list = new NetworkSuccessor(savingNet, 
this).query().iterator() 
        def WhichNetwork = "" 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (fromSavings) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            WhichNetwork = "InnoEasy/SavingNet" 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            list = new NetworkSuccessor(provisionNet, 
this).query().iterator() 
            WhichNetwork = "InnoEasy/ProvisionNet" 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (list.hasNext()) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Object institution = list.next() 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (institution instanceof Bank) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                RepastEdge removedEdge = RemoveEdge(WhichNetwork, 
this, institution) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("Ok, 
I just deleted my savings or risk provision account")} 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                RepastEdge removedEdge4 = RemoveEdge(WhichNetwork, 
this, institution) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
just deleted my savings or my provision account")} 
 
            } 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
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            if (atBanks) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                list = new NetworkAdjacent(banking, 
this).query().iterator() 
 
                // This is an agent decision. 
                if (list.hasNext()) { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    Bank myBank = list.next() 
                    RepastEdge removedEdge2 = 
RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/Banking", this, myBank) 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("I just deleted my bank account")} 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                list = new NetworkAdjacent(investing, 
this).query().iterator() 
 
                // This is an agent decision. 
                if (list.hasNext()) { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    Fund myFund = list.next() 
                    RepastEdge removedEdge3 = 
RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/Investing", this, myFund) 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("I just deleted my investment account")} 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
 
            } 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method getCredit 
     * 
     */ 
    public boolean getCredit(double AmountAsked) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
 Source Code of the Model - File Human.groovy  
A-47 
 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        // This is a task. 
        Network banking = (Network)context.getProjection("Banking") 
        Network savingNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("SavingNet") 
        // This is a task. 
        boolean hasCredit = false 
        def counter = 0 
        //banks in (GetObjects("InnoEasy", "innoeasy.Bank")) 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (banks in ( FindAgentsInContext("InnoEasy", "SELECT * 
FROM innoeasy.Bank ORDER BY dblInterest ASC"))) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            counter++ 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("Let's 
ask the "+counter+"th bank for money. It's interest rate would be 
"+banks.dblInterest+" (%).")} 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (hasCredit == false) { 
 
 
                // This is an agent decision. 
                if (banks instanceof Bank) { 
 
 
                    // This is an agent decision. 
                    if (banks.creditRequest(AmountAsked)) { 
 
                        // This is a task. 
                        hasCredit = true 
                        deleteAccount(blnSavingsAtBank, true) 
                        RepastEdge newEdge = 
CreateEdge("InnoEasy/Banking", this, banks, 10.0) 
                        RepastEdge newEdge2 = 
CreateEdge("InnoEasy/SavingNet", this, banks, AmountAsked) 
                        if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Cool, I received my credit from the 
"+counter+". bank.")} 
 
                    } else  { 
 
 
                    } 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
 
            } else  { 
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            } 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (hasCredit) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setBlnSavingsAtBank(true) 
            returnValue = true 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            returnValue = false 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("Oh no, 
nobody wants to lend me some money")} 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method saveConsume 
     * 
     */ 
    public def saveConsume() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def avgConsumptionRatio = 
GetParameter("avgConsumptionRatio") 
        def individualModel = GetParameter("individualModel") 
        def boolDebug = GetParameter("boolDebug") 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (dblSavings - dblDebt > 0) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setDblConsumptionRatio(avgConsumptionRatio + 
(dblSavings - dblDebt) /dblRevenue / 10) 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setDblConsumptionRatio(avgConsumptionRatio + 
(dblSavings - dblDebt) /dblRevenue / 2) 
 
        } 
        // This is a task. 
        dblConsumptionRatio += ((intTimePreference - 5) *2 / 100) 
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        def fundsRate = getAvgInterestRate(false) //the "false" 
refers to funds instead of banks 
        def banksRate = getAvgInterestRate(true) + 0.01 //the 
"true" refers to banks instead of funds; 0.01 is added due to the 
cost of the credit 
        if (boolDebug == false) {dblConsumptionRatio -= 
(((fundsRate + banksRate) / 2 - 0.03)*5)}  //0.03 is subtracted to 
account for a real rate of interest of 1% and an inflation rate of 
2%.  
        if (boolDebug == true) {dblConsumptionRatio -= ((banksRate 
- 0.03)*5)}  //0.03 is subtracted to account for a real rate of 
interest of 1% and an inflation rate of 2%.  
        // This is a task. 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("To 
calculate my consumption ratio, I take the interest offers from 
funds "+fundsRate+" and from banks "+banksRate+" and the time 
preference "+intTimePreference+" (as "+((intTimePreference - 5) *2 
/ 100)+" into account.")} 
        // This is a task. 
        if (dblConsumptionRatio < 0) {dblConsumptionRatio = 0} 
        if (dblConsumptionRatio > 10) {dblConsumptionRatio = 
avgConsumptionRatio} 
        if ((dblConsumptionRatio > 1) && (blnInsolvent == true)) 
{dblConsumptionRatio = 1} 
        if (dblRevenue + dblSavings - dblDebt < 0) 
(dblConsumptionRatio = 0) 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("My savings 
are "+dblSavings+" and I still have "+dblMoneyLeftAvailable+". Hey, 
I'd like to consume "+(dblConsumptionRatio * 100)+"% of the amount 
of money I still have.")} 
        // This is a task. 
        setDblConsumption(dblMoneyLeftAvailable * 
dblConsumptionRatio) 
        dblMoneyLeftAvailable -= dblConsumption 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I just 
consumed "+dblConsumption+" and so left over money is 
"+dblMoneyLeftAvailable)} 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (dblMoneyLeftAvailable >= 0) { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (dblMoneyLeftAvailable > 0.0) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I'm 
saving the left over money")} 
                consumptionSaving(individualModel, 
dblMoneyLeftAvailable) 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
            } 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if ((dblSavings < -(dblMoneyLeftAvailable))) { 
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                // This is an agent decision. 
                if (getCredit(-(dblMoneyLeftAvailable) - 
dblSavings)) { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    setDblSavings(dblMoneyLeftAvailable + 
dblSavings) 
                    setDblDebt(0) 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("I received my credit")} 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                    // This is an agent decision. 
                    if (dblMoneyLeftAvailable + dblSavings + 
dblConsumption > 0) { 
 
                        // This is a task. 
                        setDblConsumption(dblMoneyLeftAvailable + 
dblConsumption + dblSavings) 
                        setDblSavings(0) 
                        setDblDebt(0) 
                        if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Unfortunately, I didn't get a credit. So, I 
reduced my consumption to "+dblConsumption+" and used up all my 
savings.")} 
 
                    } else  { 
 
                        // This is a task. 
                        setDblConsumption(0) 
                        setDblSavings(0) 
                        setDblDebt(0) 
                        setBlnInsolvent(true) 
                        if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Unfortunately, I didn't get a credit. So, in 
the social model, I'm not allowed to take out any more debts")} 
 
                    } 
 
                } 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
will have to take my savings to cover my consumption wants")} 
                withdrawAmount(blnSavingsAtBank, true, (-
(dblMoneyLeftAvailable)))  //the first argument is "atBanks", the 
second "inSavings", the third the amount 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
just withdrew the money out of my savings which I wanted to 
consume")} 
                // This is a task. 
                dblSavings += dblMoneyLeftAvailable 
                //we add 'moneyLeftAvailable' since it contains a 
negative value 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
take the additional money to consume from my savings accounts.")} 
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            } 
 
        } 
        // This is a task. 
        setDblMoneyLeftAvailable(0) 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method getAvgInterestRate 
     * 
     */ 
    public double getAvgInterestRate(boolean fromBanks) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def numInstitutions = 0 
        def cumulatedInterestRate = 0.0 
        def foundNewLocation = false 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (institution in (new ContinuousWithin(space, this, 
15).query())) { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (fromBanks) { 
 
 
                // Make a decision. 
                if (institution instanceof Bank) { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    numInstitutions ++ 
                    cumulatedInterestRate += 
institution.dblInterest 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Here's a bank with "+institution.dblInterest * 
100+"% interest...count for average")} 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
                // Make a decision. 
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                if (institution instanceof Fund) { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    numInstitutions ++ 
                    cumulatedInterestRate += 
institution.dblInterest 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Here's a fund with "+institution.dblInterest * 
100+"% interest...count for average.")} 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
 
            } 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if ((numInstitutions > 0) || (fromBanks == false)) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            if (numInstitutions == 0) {dblAvgInterestRate = 0.0}  
            else {dblAvgInterestRate = cumulatedInterestRate / 
numInstitutions} 
            //we do not want to found new funds, therefore we need 
to check for a value of 0 
            returnValue = dblAvgInterestRate 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            NdPoint point = space.getLocation(this) 
            double myY = point.getY() 
            double myX = point.getX() 
            // System.out.println("My coordinates are: 
"+space.getLocation(this)+" and that should be the same as: "+myX+" 
and "+myY+".") 
            // This is a task. 
            Bank newBank = new Bank() 
            context.add(newBank) 
            returnValue = 0 
 
            // This is a loop. 
            while (!foundNewLocation) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                double bankX=myX + 
RandomHelper.nextDoubleFromTo(0.0, 5.0) - 2.5 
                double bankY=myY + 
RandomHelper.nextDoubleFromTo(0.0, 5.0) - 2.5 
                if (bankX < 0) {bankX = 0} 
                if (bankY < 0) {bankY = 0} 
                def maxX = GetParameter("spacewidth") 
                // This is a task. 
                def maxY = GetParameter("spaceheight") 
                if (bankX > maxX-1) {bankX = maxX-1}  //this is not 
good programming style 
                if (bankY > maxY-1) {bankY = maxY-1}  //dimensions 
shoulb be read from ContinuousSpace 
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                foundNewLocation = MoveAgent("InnoEasy/Space", 
newBank, bankX, bankY) 
                returnValue = 0.03 
 
            } 
 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method consumptionSaving 
     * 
     */ 
    public def consumptionSaving(boolean individualModel, double 
AmountToSave) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (blnHappyWInterests) { 
 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            deleteAccount(blnSavingsAtBank, true) 
            //the atBanks refers to banks and the true to the 
Savings account 
            // This is a task. 
            searchNewFinInst(takeBankOrFund(true), true) 
            //the atBanks refers to banks and the true to the 
Savings account 
 
        } 
        // This is a task. 
        saveAmount(blnSavingsAtBank, true, AmountToSave) 
        dblSavings += AmountToSave 
        setDblMoneyLeftAvailable(0) 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I have been 
saving money which I didn't consume")} 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method withdrawAmount 
     * 
     */ 
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    public def withdrawAmount(boolean atBanks, boolean inSavings, 
double AmountToWithdraw) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        Network banking = (Network)context.getProjection("Banking") 
        Network investing = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Investing") 
        Network savingNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("SavingNet") 
        Network provisionNet = 
(Network)context.getProjection("ProvisionNet") 
        // This is a task. 
        Iterator list = new NetworkSuccessor(savingNet, 
this).query().iterator() 
        def NewTotal = 0.0 
        def WhichNetwork = "" 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (inSavings) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            NewTotal = dblSavings - AmountToWithdraw 
            WhichNetwork="InnoEasy/SavingNet" 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            NewTotal = dblRiskProvision - AmountToWithdraw 
            list = new NetworkSuccessor(provisionNet, 
this).query().iterator() 
            WhichNetwork="InnoEasy/ProvisionNet" 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (list.hasNext()) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Object institution = list.next() 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (institution instanceof Bank) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                institution.dblClientsSavings -= AmountToWithdraw 
                RepastEdge edge = SetEdgeWeight(WhichNetwork, this, 
institution, NewTotal) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
just withdrew "+AmountToWithdraw+" from my bank account.")} 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                institution.dblCapitalStock -= AmountToWithdraw 
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                institution.dblCumClientsSavings -= 
AmountToWithdraw 
                RepastEdge edge = SetEdgeWeight(WhichNetwork, this, 
institution, NewTotal) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
just took out "+AmountToWithdraw+" from my investment fund")} 
 
            } 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This contains the invention step, the financing step as well 
as the risking step 
     * @method invent 
     * 
     */ 
    public def invent() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (findInvention()) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Invention invention = new Invention() 
            invention.initialize() 
            AddAgentToContext("InnoEasy", invention) 
            CreateEdge("InnoEasy/Inventor", this, invention, 1.0) 
            // This is a task. 
            intInvented++ 
            intNewInvention ++ 
            dblHappiness += 1 
            intFamilyInventions ++ 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (financeInvention(invention)) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                CreateEdge("InnoEasy/Financier", this, invention, 
1.0) 
                invention.blnFinanced = true 
 
                // This is an agent decision. 
                if (riskInnovation(invention)) { 
 
 
                    // This is an agent decision. 
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                    if (RandomHelper.nextDoubleFromTo(0.0, 2.0) -  
1 + intInnovated / intInvented > 0.5) { 
 
                        // This is a task. 
                        intInnovated++ 
                        withdrawAmount(blnSavingsAtBank, true, 
invention.dblCost) 
                        intNewInno++ 
                        intRiskAversion -= 1 
                        if (intRiskAversion < 0) {intRiskAversion = 
0} 
                        intFamilyInnovations++ 
                        // This is a task. 
                        dblHappiness ++ 
                        if (dblHappiness > 100) {dblHappiness = 
100} 
                        CreateEdge("InnoEasy/Innovator", this, 
invention, 1.0) 
                        invention.blnSuccess = true 
                        if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Cool, the invention was a success...I did it 
all by myself!.")} 
                        dblSavings -= invention.dblCost 
 
                    } else  { 
 
                        // This is a task. 
                        intFailedInnos++ 
                        invention.blnFailed = true 
                        intRiskAversion += 1 
                        if (intRiskAversion > 10) {intRiskAversion 
= 10} 
                        intNewFailed ++ 
                        // This is a task. 
                        if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Oh gosh...I tried to do it as a one-man-show, 
but the innovation failed. ;-(")} 
                        dblHappiness -= 
RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0,2) 
                        if (dblHappiness < 0) {dblHappiness = 0} 
                        withdrawAmount(blnSavingsAtBank, true, 
invention.dblCost) 
                        dblSavings -= invention.dblCost 
 
                    } 
 
                } else  { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    intScaredInvention++ 
                    intNewScared++ 
                    dblHappiness -= RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0,1) 
                    if (dblHappiness < 0) {dblHappiness = 0} 
 
                } 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                intExpensiveInvention ++ 
                intNewExpensive++ 
                invention.blnFinanced = false 
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                dblHappiness -= RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0,1) 
                if (dblHappiness < 0) {dblHappiness = 0} 
 
            } 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            dblHappiness -= RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0,2) 
            dblHappiness += 1 
            if (dblHappiness > 100) {dblHappiness = 100} 
            if (dblHappiness < 0) {dblHappiness = 0} 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method beReborn 
     * 
     */ 
    public def beReborn() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def maxInitialAge = GetParameter("maxInitialAge") 
        def maxEducation = GetParameter("maxEducation") 
        def minDeathAge = GetParameter("minDeathAge") 
        def maxDeathAge = GetParameter("maxDeathAge") 
        def avgRetirementAge = GetParameter("avgRetirementAge") 
        // This is a task. 
        //def subsistenceMinimum = 
GetParameter("subsistenceMinimum") 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("Good Lord, 
a miracle! I'm reborn.")} 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        Network community = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Community") 
        Iterator list = new NetworkAdjacent(community, 
this).query().iterator() 
        PublicSector state = list.next() 
        def subsistenceMinimum = state.dblSubsistenceMinimum 
        // This is a task. 
        setIntRiskAversion(intRiskAversion + 
RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0, 2) - 1) 
        if (intRiskAversion > 10) {intRiskAversion = 10} 
        if (intRiskAversion < 0) {intRiskAversion = 0} 
        setDblHappiness(dblHappiness + 
RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0, 20)) 
        if (dblHappiness > 100) {dblHappiness = 100} 
        setIntEducation(intEducation + 
RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0, 2) - 1) 
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        if (intEducation > maxEducation) {intEducation = 
maxEducation} 
        if (intEducation < 1) {intEducation = 1} 
        setIntTimePreference(intTimePreference + 
RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0,2) - 1) 
        setIntExperience(0) 
        // This is a task. 
        setIntAge(0) 
        intDeathAge += RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0,20) - 10 
        if (intDeathAge > 100) {intDeathAge = 100} 
        if (intDeathAge < 60) {intDeathAge = 60} 
        intRetiringAge += RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0, 10) - 5 
        if (intRetiringAge > avgRetirementAge + 15) {intRetiringAge 
= avgRetirementAge + 15} 
        if (intRetiringAge < avgRetirementAge - 15) {intRetiringAge 
= avgRetirementAge - 15} 
        intTinkerer += RandomHelper.nextIntFromTo(0, 2) - 1 
        if (intTinkerer > 1) {intTinkerer = 1} 
        if (intTinkerer < 0) {intTinkerer = 0} 
        if (intRetiringAge > intDeathAge) {intRetiringAge = 
intDeathAge}  //this helps avoid an error in "update Variables" 
        // This is a task. 
        def adjustmentFactor = RandomHelper.nextDoubleFromTo(0.0, 
1.0) + 0.5 
        setDblWorkIncome(dblWorkIncome * adjustmentFactor) 
        if (dblWorkIncome < subsistenceMinimum) {dblWorkIncome = 
subsistenceMinimum} 
        // This is a task. 
        setIntExpensiveInvention(intScaredInvention = 
intFailedInnos = 0) 
        setIntInvented(intInnovated = 0) 
        setBlnRetired(false) 
        // This is a task. 
        inheritSavings() 
        // This is a task. 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        Network inventiveness = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Inventor") 
        Network innovativeness = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Innovator") 
        Network financier = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Financier") 
        // This is a task. 
        def counterInvent = 0 
        def counterInno = 0 
        def counterFinancedInno = 0 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (partInvention in (new NetPathWithin(inventiveness, 
this, 1).query())) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            partInvention.blnDeadInventor = true 
            counterInvent ++ 
            RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/Inventor", this, partInvention) 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("That's 
too bad. I'm losing the "+counterInvent+"th invention of my 
forefather.")} 
 
        } 
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        // This is a loop. 
        for (partInno in (new NetPathWithin(innovativeness, this, 
1).query())) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            counterInno ++ 
            RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/Innovator", this, partInno) 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("That's 
too bad. I'm losing the "+counterInno+"th innovation of my 
forefather.")} 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (partInno in (new NetPathWithin(financier, this, 
1).query())) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            counterFinancedInno ++ 
            RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/Financier", this, partInno) 
 
        } 
 
        // This is a task. 
        initializeNetwork() 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method findInvention 
     * 
     */ 
    public boolean findInvention() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def individualModel = GetParameter("individualModel") 
        def influenceMeritGoods = 0 
        if (!(individualModel)) {influenceMeritGoods = 
GetParameter("influenceMeritGoods")} 
        // the idea is that the public system also offers better 
general conditions (i.e. job market effects or infrastructural 
effects). Therefore, there is a better environment for innovation 
in the public system 
        // This is a task. 
        def inventionPropensity = influenceMeritGoods 
        inventionPropensity += (intEducation + intTinkerer)*10 + 
intExperience 
        inventionPropensity += intInvented 
        inventionPropensity += dblHappiness / 20 
        inventionPropensity += intCoolFriends 
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        // This is a task. 
        def riskInfluence = 1.0 
        riskInfluence = 0.4 * intRiskAversion - (intRiskAversion * 
intRiskAversion / 25) + 1 
        //this way, the risk aversion has the highest effect on 
invention propensity when it is in a medium sector. The more extrem 
an agent feels about risk, the less likely she will invent 
        inventionPropensity = inventionPropensity * riskInfluence 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("My risk 
aversion is "+intRiskAversion+" and accordingly, the risk Influence 
is "+riskInfluence+".")} 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (RandomHelper.nextDoubleFromTo(0, inventionPropensity) > 
GetParameter("inventionThreshold")) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            returnValue = true 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
invented something. My invention propensity was 
"+inventionPropensity+".")} 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            returnValue = false 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
didn't invent anything. My invention propensity was 
"+inventionPropensity+".")} 
            //System.out.println("I didn't invent anything. My 
invention propensity was "+inventionPropensity+".") 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method financeInvention 
     * 
     */ 
    public boolean financeInvention(Invention invention) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def financePropensity=0 
        financePropensity = dblSavings - invention.dblCost 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (financePropensity > 0) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            returnValue = true 
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            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
financed the invention. My finance propensity was 
"+financePropensity+".")} 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            returnValue = false 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
couldn't finance the invention. My finance propensity was 
"+financePropensity+".")} 
            //System.out.println("I couldn't finance the invention. 
My finance propensity was "+financePropensity+".") 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method riskInnovation 
     * 
     */ 
    public boolean riskInnovation(Invention invention) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def riskPropensity = 0.0 
        riskPropensity = (10 - 
RandomHelper.nextDoubleFromTo(intRiskAversion-2, 
intRiskAversion+2)) 
        riskPropensity += intInnovated 
        riskPropensity += (intInnosAround / 2) 
        // This is a task. 
        def individualModel = GetParameter("individualModel") 
        def intIndividualModel = 0 
        def influenceIndividualModel = 0 
        if (individualModel) {intIndividualModel = 1}  //this 
allows us to add or subtract the influence of the individual model 
on the innovation propensity of the agent 
        // This is a task. If the risk aversion is high, then the 
public model rather makes the agent risk the innovation. If she's 
rather risk seeking then she will more likely risk it in the 
individual model 
        if (intRiskAversion > 5) {influenceIndividualModel = 1 - 
intIndividualModel} 
        if (intRiskAversion < 5) {influenceIndividualModel = 
intIndividualModel} 
        riskPropensity += influenceIndividualModel 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (riskPropensity > 5) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
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            returnValue = true 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I dared 
implementing the invention. My risk propensity was 
"+riskPropensity+".")} 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            returnValue = false 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
didn't risk implementing the invention. My risk propensity was 
"+riskPropensity+".")} 
            //System.out.println("I didn't risk implementing the 
invention. My risk propensity was "+riskPropensity+".") 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method inheritSavings 
     * 
     */ 
    public def inheritSavings() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        Network community = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Community") 
        Iterator list = new NetworkAdjacent(community, 
this).query().iterator() 
        PublicSector state = list.next() 
        // This is a task. 
        deleteAccount(blnSavingsAtBank, true)  //here we delete the 
savings account 
        deleteAccount(blnProvisionAtBank, false) //here we delete 
the risk provision account 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (dblSavings + dblRiskProvision > 0) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setDblSavings((dblSavings + dblRiskProvision) / 2) 
            state.dblInheritance += dblSavings 
            setDblRiskProvision(0) 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            state.dblInheritance = state.dblInheritance + 
dblSavings + dblRiskProvision 
            setDblSavings(0) 
 Source Code of the Model - File Human.groovy  
A-63 
 
            setDblRiskProvision(0) 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method isFriendCool 
     * 
     */ 
    public boolean isFriendCool(Human friend) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def counter = 0 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if ((friend.intAge - intAge >= -5) && (friend.intAge - 
intAge <= 5)) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            counter ++ 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (friend.intEducation == intEducation) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            counter ++ 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if ((friend.dblHappiness - dblHappiness >= -5) && 
(friend.dblHappiness - dblHappiness <= 5)) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            counter ++ 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (friend.intInnovated - intInnovated >= 0) { 
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            // This is a task. 
            counter ++ 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if ((friend.dblSavings + friend.dblRiskProvision - 
dblSavings - dblRiskProvision >= -20) && (friend.dblSavings + 
friend.dblRiskProvision - dblSavings - dblRiskProvision <= 20)) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            counter ++ 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (counter > 3) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            RepastEdge edge = SetEdgeWeight("InnoEasy/Friends", 
this, friend, 2.5) 
            returnValue = true 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            RepastEdge edge = SetEdgeWeight("InnoEasy/Friends", 
this, friend, 1.0) 
            returnValue = false 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method isInterestingFund 
     * 
     */ 
    public boolean isInterestingFund(Fund institution) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def counter = 0 
        def ownCapitalStock = 0 
        def ownInnoRent = 0 
        // This is a task. 
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        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        // This is a task. 
        Network investing = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Investing") 
        Iterator list = new NetworkAdjacent(investing, 
this).query().iterator() 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (list.hasNext()) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Fund myFund = list.next() 
            ownCapitalStock = myFund.dblCapitalStock 
            ownInnoRent = myFund.dblInnoRent 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("My fund 
has a capital stock of "+ownCapitalStock+" and an inno rent of 
"+ownInnoRent+".")} 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (institution.dblCapitalStock > ownCapitalStock) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            counter ++ 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (institution.dblInnoRent > ownInnoRent) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            counter ++ 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (counter >=2) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            returnValue = true 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("There 
is a more interesting fund with a capital stock 
of"+institution.dblCapitalStock+" and an inno rent of 
"+institution.dblInnoRent+".")} 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            returnValue = false 
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            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("This 
fund is less interesting with a capital stock 
of"+institution.dblCapitalStock+" and an inno rent of 
"+institution.dblInnoRent+".")} 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method environmentalInfluence 
     * 
     */ 
    public def environmentalInfluence() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        Network friends = (Network)context.getProjection("Friends") 
        Network inventiveness = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Inventor") 
        setIntInnosAround(0) 
        // This is a task. 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("My friends 
do have an effect on me. But to start with, I have a risk aversion 
of "+intRiskAversion+", a time preference of "+intTimePreference+" 
and my happiness is "+dblHappiness+".")} 
        // This is a task. 
        def counter = 0 
        def tempRiskAversion = 0 
        def tempTimePreference = 0 
        def tempHappiness = 0 
        def tempAvgInterest = 0 
        // This is a task. 
        def tempXCoords = 0 
        def tempYCoords = 0 
        def counterCoords = 0 
        def counterFinancedInventions = 0 
        def counterUnfinancedInventions = 0 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (friend in (new AndQuery(new ContinuousWithin(space, 
this, 10), new NotQuery(context, new NetPathWithin(friends, this, 
1))).query())) { 
 
 
            // Make a decision. 
            if (friend instanceof Human) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                CreateEdge("InnoEasy/Friends", this, friend, 1.0) 
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                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
have a new friend.")} 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
            } 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (friend in (new AndQuery(new NotQuery(context, new 
ContinuousWithin(space, this, 25)), new NetPathWithin(friends, 
this, 1)).query())) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/Friends", this, friend) 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I lost 
touch with a friend.")} 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (friend in (new NetPathWithin(friends, this, 
1).query())) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            tempRiskAversion += friend.intRiskAversion  
            tempTimePreference += friend.intTimePreference 
            tempHappiness += friend.dblHappiness 
            counter++ 
            intInnosAround += friend.intNewInno 
            // This is a task. 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("This 
friend has a risk aversion of "+friend.intRiskAversion+", a time 
preference of "+friend.intTimePreference+" and interests of 
"+friend.dblBankingI+" and "+friend.dblInvestingI+".")} 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (isFriendCool(friend)) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                NdPoint point = space.getLocation(friend) 
                tempYCoords += point.getY() 
                tempXCoords += point.getX() 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("This friend is cool, I'll try to move 
closer.")} 
                counterCoords ++ 
                // This is a task. 
                tempRiskAversion += friend.intRiskAversion  
                tempTimePreference += friend.intTimePreference 
                tempHappiness += friend.dblHappiness 
                counter++ 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("This friend is cool, so her influence counts 
double.")} 
 
            } else  { 
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            } 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (invention in (new NetPathWithin(inventiveness, this, 
1).query())) { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (invention.dblWeight > 0.25) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                if (invention.blnFinanced == false) 
{counterUnfinancedInventions ++} 
                if (invention.blnFinanced == true) 
{counterFinancedInventions ++} 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("Checked financing. Result: 
"+invention.blnFinanced+".")} 
                //The agent does not care, if he financed the 
invention himself. We suppose that she just wants to see her 
inventions financed and once she grows unhappy w/ the possibilities 
she considers moving closer to the next fund 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
            } 
 
        } 
 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if ((counterUnfinancedInventions + 1) / 
(counterFinancedInventions + 1) >= 1.5) { 
 
 
            // This is a loop. 
            for (institution in (new ContinuousWithin(space, this, 
30).query())) { 
 
 
                // Make a decision. 
                if ((institution instanceof Fund) && 
(isInterestingFund(institution))) { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    NdPoint point = space.getLocation(institution) 
                    tempYCoords += point.getY() 
                    tempXCoords += point.getX() 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("I found a fund and will move closer.")} 
                    counterCoords ++ 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
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            } 
 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (counter > 0) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            tempRiskAversion = tempRiskAversion / counter 
            setIntRiskAversion((int)Math.round((intRiskAversion * 3 
+ tempRiskAversion) / 4)) 
            if (intRiskAversion > 10) {intRiskAversion = 10} 
            if (intRiskAversion < 0) {intRiskAversion = 0} 
            // This is a task. 
            tempTimePreference = tempTimePreference / counter 
            setIntTimePreference((int)Math.round((intTimePreference 
* 3 + tempTimePreference) / 4)) 
            if (intTimePreference > 10) {intTimePreference = 10} 
            if (intTimePreference < 0) {intTimePreference = 0} 
            // This is a task. 
            tempHappiness = tempHappiness / counter 
            setDblHappiness((int)Math.round((dblHappiness * 3 + 
tempHappiness) / 4)) 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("My 
friends did have an effect on me. Now I have a risk aversion of 
"+intRiskAversion+", a time preference of "+intTimePreference+" and 
my happiness is "+dblHappiness+".")} 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (counterCoords > 0) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                NdPoint point = space.getLocation(this) 
                def myY = point.getY() 
                def myX = point.getX() 
                // System.out.println("My coordinates are: 
"+space.getLocation(this)+" and that should be the same as: "+myX+" 
and "+myY+".") 
                // This is a task. 
                double newX=(myX * 9 + tempXCoords / counterCoords) 
/ 10 
                double newY=(myY * 9 + tempYCoords / counterCoords) 
/ 10 
                MoveAgent("InnoEasy/Space", this, newX, newY) 
                // This is a task. 
                setIntCoolFriends(counterCoords) 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
            } 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I have 
no ("+counter+") friends and so they don't have any effect on 
me.")} 
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        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method publicSectorInfluence 
     * 
     */ 
    public def publicSectorInfluence() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def counter = 0 
        def ownCapitalStock = 0 
        def ownInnoRent = 0 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        Network community = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Community") 
        Iterator list = new NetworkAdjacent(community, 
this).query().iterator() 
        PublicSector state = list.next() 
        def subsistenceMinimum = state.dblSubsistenceMinimum 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (dblSocialContribution > intRiskAversion / 
subsistenceMinimum * 8) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setBlnLessWelfare(true) 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("My 
social contribution was "+dblSocialContribution+" and my risk 
aversion of  "+intRiskAversion+" as well as the subsistence minimum 
of "+subsistenceMinimum+" make me think that the latter is too 
high.")} 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setBlnLessWelfare(false) 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("My 
social contribution was "+dblSocialContribution+" and my risk 
aversion of  "+intRiskAversion+" as well as the subsistence minimum 
of "+subsistenceMinimum+" make me think that the latter is not too 
high.")} 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (dblSocialContribution < intRiskAversion / 
subsistenceMinimum * 2) { 
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            // This is a task. 
            setBlnMoreWelfare(true) 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("My 
social contribution was "+dblSocialContribution+" and my risk 
aversion of  "+intRiskAversion+" as well as the subsistence minimum 
of "+subsistenceMinimum+" make me think that the latter is too 
low.")} 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setBlnMoreWelfare(false) 
            if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("My 
social contribution was "+dblSocialContribution+" and my risk 
aversion of  "+intRiskAversion+" as well as the subsistence minimum 
of "+subsistenceMinimum+" make me think that the latter is not too 
low.")} 
 
        } 
        // This is a task. 
        setDblSocialContribution(0) 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method takeBankOrFund 
     * 
     */ 
    public boolean takeBankOrFund(boolean ForSavings) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def InterestGap = (getAvgInterestRate(false) - 
getAvgInterestRate(true)) * 100 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("The 
interest gap between funds and banks I can see is 
"+InterestGap+"%.")} 
        def SavingsCoefficient = (intRiskAversion-5) * 
intRiskAversion 
        def ProvisionCoefficient = (intRiskAversion-2) * 
intRiskAversion 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (ForSavings) { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (InterestGap > SavingsCoefficient) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                if (blnSavingsAtBank == true) 
{deleteAccount(blnSavingsAtBank, ForSavings)} 
                setBlnSavingsAtBank(false) 
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                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
will invest my savings at a fund because the interest gap 
("+InterestGap+") is greater than my risk aversion coefficient: 
"+SavingsCoefficient+".")} 
                returnValue = false 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                if (blnSavingsAtBank == false) 
{deleteAccount(blnSavingsAtBank, ForSavings)} 
                setBlnSavingsAtBank(true) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
will invest my savings at a bank because the interest gap 
("+InterestGap+") is smaller than my risk aversion coefficient: 
"+SavingsCoefficient+".")} 
                returnValue = true 
 
            } 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (InterestGap > ProvisionCoefficient) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                if (blnProvisionAtBank == true) 
{deleteAccount(blnProvisionAtBank, ForSavings)} 
                setBlnProvisionAtBank(false) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
will invest my risk provision at a fund because the interest gap 
("+InterestGap+") is greater than my risk aversion coefficient: 
"+ProvisionCoefficient+".")} 
                returnValue = false 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                if (blnProvisionAtBank == true) 
{deleteAccount(blnProvisionAtBank, ForSavings)} 
                setBlnProvisionAtBank(true) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("I 
will invest my risk provision at a bank because the interest gap 
("+InterestGap+") is smaller than my risk aversion coefficient: 
"+ProvisionCoefficient+".")} 
                returnValue = true 
 
            } 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This method provides a human-readable name for the agent. 
     * @method toString 
     * 
     */ 
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    @ProbeID() 
    public String toString() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // Set the default agent identifier. 
        returnValue = this.agentID 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
 
} 
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4) File PublicSector.groovy 
 
/** 
 *  
 * This file was automatically generated by the Repast Simphony 
Agent Editor. 
 * Please see http://repast.sourceforge.net/ for details. 
 *  
 */ 
 
/** 
 * 
 * Set the package name. 
 * 
 */ 
package innoeasy 
 
/** 
 * 
 * Import the needed packages. 
 * 
 */ 
import java.io.* 
import java.math.* 
import java.util.* 
import javax.measure.unit.* 
import org.jscience.mathematics.number.* 
import org.jscience.mathematics.vector.* 
import org.jscience.physics.amount.* 
import repast.simphony.adaptation.neural.* 
import repast.simphony.adaptation.regression.* 
import repast.simphony.context.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.environment.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.schedule.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.watcher.* 
import repast.simphony.groovy.math.* 
import repast.simphony.integration.* 
import repast.simphony.matlab.link.* 
import repast.simphony.query.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.projection.* 
import repast.simphony.parameter.* 
import repast.simphony.random.* 
import repast.simphony.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.space.projection.* 
import repast.simphony.ui.probe.* 
import repast.simphony.util.* 
import simphony.util.messages.* 
import static java.lang.Math.* 
import static repast.simphony.essentials.RepastEssentials.* 
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/** 
 * 
 * This is an agent. 
 * 
 */ 
public class PublicSector  { 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblPercentSocContribution 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "% Soc Contrib", usageName = 
"dblPercentSocContribution") 
    public double getDblPercentSocContribution() { 
        return dblPercentSocContribution 
    } 
    public void setDblPercentSocContribution(double newValue) { 
        dblPercentSocContribution = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblPercentSocContribution = 0.2 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblSocialReceipts 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Soc. Receipts", usageName = 
"dblSocialReceipts") 
    public double getDblSocialReceipts() { 
        return dblSocialReceipts 
    } 
    public void setDblSocialReceipts(double newValue) { 
        dblSocialReceipts = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblSocialReceipts = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblSocialExpenses 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Soc. Expenses", usageName = 
"dblSocialExpenses") 
    public double getDblSocialExpenses() { 
        return dblSocialExpenses 
    } 
    public void setDblSocialExpenses(double newValue) { 
        dblSocialExpenses = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblSocialExpenses = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblCurrentSocialReceipts 
     * 
     */ 
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    @Parameter (displayName = "Curr. Soc. Receipts", usageName = 
"dblCurrentSocialReceipts") 
    public double getDblCurrentSocialReceipts() { 
        return dblCurrentSocialReceipts 
    } 
    public void setDblCurrentSocialReceipts(double newValue) { 
        dblCurrentSocialReceipts = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblCurrentSocialReceipts = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblCurrentSocialExpenses 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Curr. Soc. Expenses", usageName = 
"dblCurrentSocialExpenses") 
    public double getDblCurrentSocialExpenses() { 
        return dblCurrentSocialExpenses 
    } 
    public void setDblCurrentSocialExpenses(double newValue) { 
        dblCurrentSocialExpenses = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblCurrentSocialExpenses = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intBadYear 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Bad Year", usageName = "intBadYear") 
    public int getIntBadYear() { 
        return intBadYear 
    } 
    public void setIntBadYear(int newValue) { 
        intBadYear = newValue 
    } 
    public int intBadYear = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intExcessiveYear 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Exc. Year", usageName = 
"intExcessiveYear") 
    public int getIntExcessiveYear() { 
        return intExcessiveYear 
    } 
    public void setIntExcessiveYear(int newValue) { 
        intExcessiveYear = newValue 
    } 
    public int intExcessiveYear = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intGoodYear 
     * 
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     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Good Year", usageName = 
"intGoodYear") 
    public int getIntGoodYear() { 
        return intGoodYear 
    } 
    public void setIntGoodYear(int newValue) { 
        intGoodYear = newValue 
    } 
    public int intGoodYear = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblInheritance 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Inheritance", usageName = 
"dblInheritance") 
    public double getDblInheritance() { 
        return dblInheritance 
    } 
    public void setDblInheritance(double newValue) { 
        dblInheritance = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblInheritance = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblSubsistenceMinimum 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Subsistence Minimum", usageName = 
"dblSubsistenceMinimum") 
    public double getDblSubsistenceMinimum() { 
        return dblSubsistenceMinimum 
    } 
    public void setDblSubsistenceMinimum(double newValue) { 
        dblSubsistenceMinimum = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblSubsistenceMinimum = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnDebugAgent 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Debugger", usageName = 
"blnDebugAgent") 
    public boolean getBlnDebugAgent() { 
        return blnDebugAgent 
    } 
    public void setBlnDebugAgent(boolean newValue) { 
        blnDebugAgent = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnDebugAgent = false 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
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     * @field intCountPeriods 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Count Periods", usageName = 
"intCountPeriods") 
    public int getIntCountPeriods() { 
        return intCountPeriods 
    } 
    public void setIntCountPeriods(int newValue) { 
        intCountPeriods = newValue 
    } 
    public int intCountPeriods = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is used to automatically generate agent 
identifiers. 
     * @field serialVersionUID 
     * 
     */ 
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is used to automatically generate agent 
identifiers. 
     * @field agentIDCounter 
     * 
     */ 
    protected static long agentIDCounter = 1 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is the agent's identifier. 
     * @field agentID 
     * 
     */ 
    protected String agentID = "PublicSector " + (agentIDCounter++) 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method initialize 
     * 
     */ 
    public def initialize() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        
setDblSubsistenceMinimum(GetParameter("subsistenceMinimum")) 
        if (blnDebugAgent == true) {System.out.println("State: I 
have found the subsistence mimimum to be : 
"+dblSubsistenceMinimum+".")} 
        
setDblPercentSocContribution(GetParameter("avgRiskProvision")) 
        // Return the results. 
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        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method calculateContribution 
     * 
     */ 
    @ScheduledMethod( 
        start = 1d, 
        interval = 1d, 
        shuffle = true 
    ) 
    public def calculateContribution() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def individualModel = GetParameter("individualModel") 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if ((individualModel) || ((dblCurrentSocialReceipts == 0) 
&& (dblCurrentSocialExpenses == 0))) { 
 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (dblCurrentSocialReceipts >= 
dblCurrentSocialExpenses) { 
 
 
                // This is an agent decision. 
                if (dblCurrentSocialReceipts > 2 * 
dblCurrentSocialExpenses) { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    intGoodYear ++ 
                    setIntBadYear(0) 
                    intExcessiveYear ++ 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("State: The receipts of 
"+dblCurrentSocialReceipts+" are much higher than the expenses of 
"+dblCurrentSocialExpenses+", so we record the 
"+intExcessiveYear+"th excessive year and the "+intGoodYear+"th 
good year in a row.")} 
 
                } else  { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    intGoodYear ++ 
                    setIntBadYear(0) 
                    setIntExcessiveYear(0) 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("State: The receipts of 
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"+dblCurrentSocialReceipts+" are higher than the expenses of 
"+dblCurrentSocialExpenses+", so we record the "+intGoodYear+"th 
good year in a row.")} 
 
                } 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                intBadYear ++ 
                setIntGoodYear(0) 
                setIntExcessiveYear(0) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("State: The receipts of 
"+dblCurrentSocialReceipts+" are smaller than the expenses of 
"+dblCurrentSocialExpenses+", so we record the "+intBadYear+"th bad 
year in a row.")} 
 
            } 
            // This is a task. 
            dblSocialReceipts += dblCurrentSocialReceipts 
            dblSocialExpenses += dblCurrentSocialExpenses 
            setDblCurrentSocialReceipts(dblCurrentSocialExpenses = 
0) 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if ((intBadYear >= 4) || (dblSocialReceipts + 
dblInheritance < dblSocialExpenses)) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                dblPercentSocContribution += 0.02 
                setIntBadYear(2) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("State: We had "+intBadYear+" bad years in a 
row (or the budget is negative), so we raise the social 
contribution to "+(100*dblPercentSocContribution)+"%. The 
corresponding subsistence minimum is "+dblSubsistenceMinimum+".")} 
                setIntGoodYear(0) 
                setIntExcessiveYear(0) 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
            } 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if ((intGoodYear >= 10) || (intExcessiveYear>= 4)) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                dblPercentSocContribution -= 0.02 
                setIntGoodYear(2) 
                if (intExcessiveYear >= 4) {intExcessiveYear = 2} 
                if (dblPercentSocContribution <= 0.0) 
{dblPercentSocContribution = 0.0} 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("State: We had "+intGoodYear+" good years in a 
row, so we lower the social contribution to 
"+(100*dblPercentSocContribution)+"%. The corresponding subsistence 
minimum is "+dblSubsistenceMinimum+".")} 
 
            } else  { 
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            } 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method setSubsistenceMinimum 
     * 
     */ 
    @ScheduledMethod( 
        start = 4d, 
        interval = 4d, 
        shuffle = true 
    ) 
    public def setSubsistenceMinimum() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        def individualModel = GetParameter("individualModel") 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (individualModel) { 
 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
            ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
            Network community = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Community") 
            // This is a task. 
            def counter = 0 
            def counterLess = 0 
            def counterMore = 0 
 
            // This is a loop. 
            for (citizen in ( FindAgentsInContext("InnoEasy", 
"SELECT * FROM innoeasy.Human"))) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                if ((citizen.blnMoreWelfare == true) && 
(citizen.blnLessWelfare == false)) {counterMore ++} 
                if ((citizen.blnLessWelfare == true) && 
(citizen.blnMoreWelfare == false)) {counterLess ++} 
                counter++ 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("State: This citizen wants more 
("+citizen.blnMoreWelfare+") or less ("+citizen.blnLessWelfare+") 
welfare.")} 
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            } 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (counterMore >= counter / 2) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                setDblSubsistenceMinimum(dblSubsistenceMinimum * 
1.1) 
                if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("State: Since we have "+counterMore+" people 
who don't like the risk, we increased the subsistence minimum to 
"+dblSubsistenceMinimum+".")} 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
                // This is an agent decision. 
                if (counterLess >= counter / 2) { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    setDblSubsistenceMinimum(dblSubsistenceMinimum 
* 0.9) 
                    if (blnDebugAgent == true) 
{System.out.println("State: Since we have "+counterLess+" people 
who like the risk, we lowered the subsistence minimum to 
"+dblSubsistenceMinimum+".")} 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
 
            } 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method endSimulation 
     * 
     */ 
    @ScheduledMethod( 
        start = 1d, 
        interval = 1d, 
        priority = -1.7976931348623157E308d, 
        shuffle = true 
    ) 
    public def endSimulation() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
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        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        Network community = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Community") 
        // We will end the simulation by default after "numPeriods" 
periods. 
        intCountPeriods ++ 
        def numPeriods = GetParameter("numPeriods") 
        if (intCountPeriods > numPeriods) 
{RunEnvironment.getInstance().endRun()} 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (intCountPeriods > numPeriods) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            RunEnvironment.getInstance().endRun() 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This method provides a human-readable name for the agent. 
     * @method toString 
     * 
     */ 
    @ProbeID() 
    public String toString() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // Set the default agent identifier. 
        returnValue = this.agentID 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
 
} 
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5) File Bank.groovy 
 
/** 
 *  
 * This file was automatically generated by the Repast Simphony 
Agent Editor. 
 * Please see http://repast.sourceforge.net/ for details. 
 *  
 */ 
 
/** 
 * 
 * Set the package name. 
 * 
 */ 
package innoeasy 
 
/** 
 * 
 * Import the needed packages. 
 * 
 */ 
import java.io.* 
import java.math.* 
import java.util.* 
import javax.measure.unit.* 
import org.jscience.mathematics.number.* 
import org.jscience.mathematics.vector.* 
import org.jscience.physics.amount.* 
import repast.simphony.adaptation.neural.* 
import repast.simphony.adaptation.regression.* 
import repast.simphony.context.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.environment.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.schedule.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.watcher.* 
import repast.simphony.groovy.math.* 
import repast.simphony.integration.* 
import repast.simphony.matlab.link.* 
import repast.simphony.query.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.projection.* 
import repast.simphony.parameter.* 
import repast.simphony.random.* 
import repast.simphony.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.space.projection.* 
import repast.simphony.ui.probe.* 
import repast.simphony.util.* 
import simphony.util.messages.* 
import static java.lang.Math.* 
import static repast.simphony.essentials.RepastEssentials.* 
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/** 
 * 
 * This is an agent. 
 * 
 */ 
public class Bank  { 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblInterest 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Interest rate", usageName = 
"dblInterest") 
    public double getDblInterest() { 
        return dblInterest 
    } 
    public void setDblInterest(double newValue) { 
        dblInterest = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblInterest = 0.03 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblInterestPayments 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "InterestPayments", usageName = 
"dblInterestPayments") 
    public double getDblInterestPayments() { 
        return dblInterestPayments 
    } 
    public void setDblInterestPayments(double newValue) { 
        dblInterestPayments = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblInterestPayments = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblInterestReceipts 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Interest Receipts", usageName = 
"dblInterestReceipts") 
    public double getDblInterestReceipts() { 
        return dblInterestReceipts 
    } 
    public void setDblInterestReceipts(double newValue) { 
        dblInterestReceipts = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblInterestReceipts = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblClientsCredits 
     * 
     */ 
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    @Parameter (displayName = "Client's Credits", usageName = 
"dblClientsCredits") 
    public double getDblClientsCredits() { 
        return dblClientsCredits 
    } 
    public void setDblClientsCredits(double newValue) { 
        dblClientsCredits = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblClientsCredits = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblClientsSavings 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Client's Savings", usageName = 
"dblClientsSavings") 
    public double getDblClientsSavings() { 
        return dblClientsSavings 
    } 
    public void setDblClientsSavings(double newValue) { 
        dblClientsSavings = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblClientsSavings = 0.0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblCreditRequests 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "CreditRequests", usageName = 
"dblCreditRequests") 
    public double getDblCreditRequests() { 
        return dblCreditRequests 
    } 
    public void setDblCreditRequests(double newValue) { 
        dblCreditRequests = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblCreditRequests = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intYearsWOCustomer 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Years w/o customer", usageName = 
"intYearsWOCustomer") 
    public int getIntYearsWOCustomer() { 
        return intYearsWOCustomer 
    } 
    public void setIntYearsWOCustomer(int newValue) { 
        intYearsWOCustomer = newValue 
    } 
    public int intYearsWOCustomer = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is used to automatically generate agent 
identifiers. 
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     * @field serialVersionUID 
     * 
     */ 
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is used to automatically generate agent 
identifiers. 
     * @field agentIDCounter 
     * 
     */ 
    protected static long agentIDCounter = 1 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is the agent's identifier. 
     * @field agentID 
     * 
     */ 
    protected String agentID = "Bank " + (agentIDCounter++) 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method creditRequest 
     * 
     */ 
    public boolean creditRequest(double AmtRequested) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (dblClientsSavings - dblClientsCredits > AmtRequested) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            dblClientsCredits += AmtRequested 
            returnValue = true 
            dblCreditRequests += AmtRequested 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            returnValue = false 
            dblCreditRequests += AmtRequested 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method adjustRate 
     * 
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     */ 
    @ScheduledMethod( 
        start = 1d, 
        interval = 1d, 
        shuffle = true 
    ) 
    public def adjustRate() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (dblCreditRequests > dblClientsSavings) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            dblInterest += 0.01 
            //System.out.println("I have "+dblClientsSavings+" in 
savings and they requested "+dblCreditRequests+" EUR. So, I need 
more savings and I will raise my interest rate to 
"+dblInterest+"%.") 
            setDblCreditRequests(0) 
            if (dblClientsSavings < 0.00001) {dblClientsSavings = 
0.0} 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            dblInterest -= 0.01 
            if (dblInterest < 0.001) {dblInterest = 0.00} 
            //System.out.println("I have "+dblClientsSavings+" in 
savings and they requested "+dblCreditRequests+" EUR. So, I need 
more credit requests and I will decrease my interest rate to 
"+dblInterest+"%.") 
            setDblCreditRequests(0) 
            if (dblClientsSavings < 0.00001) {dblClientsSavings = 
0.0} 
 
        } 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        //System.out.println("My coordinates are: 
"+space.getLocation(this)) 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * The bank checks if it is really used by the customers 
     * @method isNecessary 
     * 
     */ 
    public def isNecessary() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
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        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        Network banking = (Network)context.getProjection("Banking") 
        Iterator list = new NetworkAdjacent(banking, 
this).query().iterator() 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (list.hasNext()) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setIntYearsWOCustomer(0) 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            intYearsWOCustomer += 1 
 
        } 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (intYearsWOCustomer > 5) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Context c = RemoveAgentFromModel(this) 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This method provides a human-readable name for the agent. 
     * @method toString 
     * 
     */ 
    @ProbeID() 
    public String toString() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // Set the default agent identifier. 
        returnValue = this.agentID 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
}  
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6) File Fund.groovy 
 
/** 
 *  
 * This file was automatically generated by the Repast Simphony 
Agent Editor. 
 * Please see http://repast.sourceforge.net/ for details. 
 *  
 */ 
 
/** 
 * 
 * Set the package name. 
 * 
 */ 
package innoeasy 
 
/** 
 * 
 * Import the needed packages. 
 * 
 */ 
import java.io.* 
import java.math.* 
import java.util.* 
import javax.measure.unit.* 
import org.jscience.mathematics.number.* 
import org.jscience.mathematics.vector.* 
import org.jscience.physics.amount.* 
import repast.simphony.adaptation.neural.* 
import repast.simphony.adaptation.regression.* 
import repast.simphony.context.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.environment.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.schedule.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.watcher.* 
import repast.simphony.groovy.math.* 
import repast.simphony.integration.* 
import repast.simphony.matlab.link.* 
import repast.simphony.query.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.projection.* 
import repast.simphony.parameter.* 
import repast.simphony.random.* 
import repast.simphony.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.space.projection.* 
import repast.simphony.ui.probe.* 
import repast.simphony.util.* 
import simphony.util.messages.* 
import static java.lang.Math.* 
import static repast.simphony.essentials.RepastEssentials.* 
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/** 
 * 
 * This is an agent. 
 * 
 */ 
public class Fund  { 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblInterest 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Interest rate", usageName = 
"dblInterest") 
    public double getDblInterest() { 
        return dblInterest 
    } 
    public void setDblInterest(double newValue) { 
        dblInterest = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblInterest = 0.03 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblInterestPayments 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "InterestPayments", usageName = 
"dblInterestPayments") 
    public double getDblInterestPayments() { 
        return dblInterestPayments 
    } 
    public void setDblInterestPayments(double newValue) { 
        dblInterestPayments = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblInterestPayments = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblClientsSavings 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Client's Savings", usageName = 
"dblClientsSavings") 
    public double getDblClientsSavings() { 
        return dblClientsSavings 
    } 
    public void setDblClientsSavings(double newValue) { 
        dblClientsSavings = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblClientsSavings = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblCapitalStock 
     * 
     */ 
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    @Parameter (displayName = "Capital Stock", usageName = 
"dblCapitalStock") 
    public double getDblCapitalStock() { 
        return dblCapitalStock 
    } 
    public void setDblCapitalStock(double newValue) { 
        dblCapitalStock = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblCapitalStock = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblInvestedMoney 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Invested Money", usageName = 
"dblInvestedMoney") 
    public double getDblInvestedMoney() { 
        return dblInvestedMoney 
    } 
    public void setDblInvestedMoney(double newValue) { 
        dblInvestedMoney = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblInvestedMoney = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblInnoRent 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "InnoRent", usageName = 
"dblInnoRent") 
    public double getDblInnoRent() { 
        return dblInnoRent 
    } 
    public void setDblInnoRent(double newValue) { 
        dblInnoRent = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblInnoRent = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnDebugFund 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "DebugFund", usageName = 
"blnDebugFund") 
    public boolean getBlnDebugFund() { 
        return blnDebugFund 
    } 
    public void setBlnDebugFund(boolean newValue) { 
        blnDebugFund = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnDebugFund = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblCumClientsSavings 
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     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Cumulated Client's Savings", 
usageName = "dblCumClientsSavings") 
    public double getDblCumClientsSavings() { 
        return dblCumClientsSavings 
    } 
    public void setDblCumClientsSavings(double newValue) { 
        dblCumClientsSavings = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblCumClientsSavings = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intNegativeYears 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Negative Years", usageName = 
"intNegativeYears") 
    public int getIntNegativeYears() { 
        return intNegativeYears 
    } 
    public void setIntNegativeYears(int newValue) { 
        intNegativeYears = newValue 
    } 
    public int intNegativeYears = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field intNoInterestYears 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Low I% Years", usageName = 
"intNoInterestYears") 
    public int getIntNoInterestYears() { 
        return intNoInterestYears 
    } 
    public void setIntNoInterestYears(int newValue) { 
        intNoInterestYears = newValue 
    } 
    public int intNoInterestYears = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is used to automatically generate agent 
identifiers. 
     * @field serialVersionUID 
     * 
     */ 
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is used to automatically generate agent 
identifiers. 
     * @field agentIDCounter 
     * 
     */ 
    protected static long agentIDCounter = 1 
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    /** 
     * 
     * This value is the agent's identifier. 
     * @field agentID 
     * 
     */ 
    protected String agentID = "Fund " + (agentIDCounter++) 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method investMoney 
     * 
     */ 
    @ScheduledMethod( 
        start = 2d, 
        interval = 1d, 
        shuffle = true 
    ) 
    public def investMoney() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        // This is a task. 
        Network banking = (Network)context.getProjection("Banking") 
        // This is a task. 
        dblCapitalStock += dblClientsSavings 
        setDblClientsSavings(0) 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (invention in ( FindAgentsInContext("InnoEasy", "SELECT 
* FROM innoeasy.Invention ORDER BY (dblRent/dblCost) DESC"))) { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if ((invention.blnFinanced == false) && 
(invention.blnSuccess == false) && (invention.blnFailed == false)) 
{ 
 
 
                // This is an agent decision. 
                if (dblCapitalStock > invention.dblCost) { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    if (blnDebugFund == true) 
{System.out.println("Fund: I just want to make sure, we'll get the 
right ones. This invention's finance status is 
"+invention.blnFinanced+" and its rent/cost ratio is 
"+(invention.dblRent/invention.dblCost)+" with a cost of 
"+invention.dblCost+" and a rent of "+invention.dblRent+".")} 
                    financeInnovation(invention) 
 
                } else  { 
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                } 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
            } 
 
        } 
 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method RentFromInnovations 
     * 
     */ 
    @ScheduledMethod( 
        start = 2d, 
        interval = 1d, 
        shuffle = true 
    ) 
    public void RentFromInnovations() { 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        // This is a task. 
        Network innovativeness = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Innovator") 
        Network financing = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Financier") 
        // This is a task. 
        dblCapitalStock += dblInnoRent 
        dblCapitalStock -= dblInterestPayments 
        //this means that the capital stock is increased by not 
paid out profits from last year or decreased if the interest paid 
was too high. 
        if (blnDebugFund == true) {System.out.println("Fund: We 
just increased the capital stock by last year's inno rent of 
"+dblInnoRent+" and lowered it by the interest payments of 
"+dblInterestPayments+" to an amount of "+dblCapitalStock+".")} 
        setDblInnoRent(dblInterestPayments = 0) 
 
        // This is a loop. 
        for (partFinanced in (new NetPathWithin(financing, this, 
1).query())) { 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (partFinanced.blnSuccess == true) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
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                dblInnoRent += partFinanced.dblRent * 
partFinanced.dblWeight / 2 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
            } 
 
        } 
 
        // This is a task. 
        if (blnDebugFund == true) {System.out.println("Fund: Ok, so 
I get "+(dblInnoRent + dblInterestPayments)+" EUR from my 
innovations and the interest payments were 
"+dblInterestPayments+".")} 
        // End the method. 
        return 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method calculateInterestRate 
     * 
     */ 
    @ScheduledMethod( 
        start = 3d, 
        interval = 1d, 
        shuffle = true 
    ) 
    public def calculateInterestRate() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        if (dblCumClientsSavings > 0.0) {dblInterest = dblInnoRent 
/ dblCumClientsSavings / 2} // we'll divide by 2 to save some money 
for times when there is no sufficient rent from the innovations. 
This assumption can be easily removed. 
        if (dblInterest < 0.0) {dblInterest = 0.0} 
        if (dblInterest > 5.0) {dblInterest = 5.0} 
        dblCapitalStock += (dblInnoRent / 2)   //the other half is 
put into the capital stock to be able to refund investors who wish 
to withdraw their money 
        if ((dblCapitalStock > 0.0) && (dblCumClientsSavings <= 
0.0) && (dblInnoRent > 0.0)) {dblInterest += 0.1} 
        // This is a task. 
        if (blnDebugFund == true) {System.out.println("Fund: The 
new interest rate is "+dblInterest+" since we administered 
"+dblCumClientsSavings+" EUR from investors and received a rent of 
"+dblInnoRent+".")} 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
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     * 
     * The bank checks if it is really used by the customers 
     * @method isSuccessful 
     * 
     */ 
    @ScheduledMethod( 
        start = 3d, 
        interval = 1d, 
        shuffle = true 
    ) 
    public def isSuccessful() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (dblCapitalStock >= 0) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setIntNegativeYears(0) 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            intNegativeYears += 1 
 
        } 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        Network investing = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Investing") 
        Network financing = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Financier") 
        if (blnDebugFund == true) {System.out.println("Fund: We had 
"+intNegativeYears+" negative years.")} 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (intNegativeYears > 25) { 
 
 
            // This is a loop. 
            for (investor in (new NetworkPredecessor(investing, 
this).query())) { 
 
 
                // Make a decision. 
                if (investor instanceof Human) { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    investor.dblSavings = 0 
                    investor.intRiskAversion += 3 
                    if (investor.intRiskAversion > 10) 
{investor.intRiskAversion = 10} 
                    RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/Investing", investor, 
this) 
                    if (blnDebugFund == true) 
{System.out.println("Fund: We have to close another account.")} 
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                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
 
            } 
 
 
            // This is a loop. 
            for (partInvention in (new 
NetworkPredecessor(financing, this).query())) { 
 
 
                // This is an agent decision. 
                if (partInvention instanceof Invention) { 
 
                    // This is a task. 
                    RemoveEdge("InnoEasy/Financier", partInvention, 
this) 
                    if (blnDebugFund == true) 
{System.out.println("Fund: We have to delete another invention from 
portfolio.")} 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
 
            } 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Context c = RemoveAgentFromModel(this) 
            if (blnDebugFund == true) {System.out.println("Fund: 
The fund is out of money. It has just been liquidated.")} 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method financeInnovation 
     * 
     */ 
    public def financeInnovation(Invention invention) { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        Network inventing = 
(Network)context.getProjection("Inventor") 
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        Iterator list = new NetworkAdjacent(inventing, 
invention).query().iterator() 
        if (blnDebugFund == true) {System.out.println("Fund:  we'll 
finance the invention. Let's see if it works.")} 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (list.hasNext()) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Human inventor = list.next() 
            //only a living inventor can implent his invention into 
an innovation 
            // This is a task. 
            dblInvestedMoney += invention.dblCost 
            dblCapitalStock -= invention.dblCost 
            if (blnDebugFund == true) {System.out.println("Fund: We 
have just financed a new invention which costs 
"+invention.dblCost+" from the capital stock which has now left 
"+dblCapitalStock+". So, in total, we have now invested 
"+dblInvestedMoney+".")} 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (RandomHelper.nextDoubleFromTo(0.0, 3.0) -  1 + 
inventor.intInnovated / inventor.intInvented > 0.5) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                inventor.intInnovated++ 
                if (blnDebugFund == true) 
{System.out.println("Fund: Great, the invention turned out to be an 
innovation.")} 
                // inventor.intNewInno++  'This would only have an 
effect if the fund is executed after the corresponding agent, since 
the value is reset to 0 at the beginning of the agent rules. Since 
the value is only for statistics and it can be derived by 
subtracting two intInnovated-values, it is not problematic to leave 
it out here 
                inventor.intRiskAversion -= 1 
                if (inventor.intRiskAversion < 0) 
{inventor.intRiskAversion = 0} 
                inventor.intFamilyInnovations++ 
                // This is a task. 
                CreateEdge("InnoEasy/Financier", this, invention, 
1.0) 
                CreateEdge("InnoEasy/Innovator", inventor, 
invention, 1.0) 
                invention.blnSuccess = true 
                invention.blnFinanced = true 
 
            } else  { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                inventor.intFailedInnos++ 
                invention.blnFailed = true 
                if (blnDebugFund == true) 
{System.out.println("Fund: Unfortunately, the invention failed.")} 
                inventor.intRiskAversion += 1 
                if (inventor.intRiskAversion > 10) 
{inventor.intRiskAversion = 10} 
                //inventor.intNewFailed ++  'This would only have 
an effect if the fund is executed after the corresponding agent, 
since the value is reset to 0 at the beginning of the agent rules. 
Since the value is only for statistics and it can be derived by 
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subtracting two intFailedInnos-values, it is not problematic to 
leave it out here 
 
            } 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            invention.blnDeadInventor = true 
            if (blnDebugFund == true) {System.out.println("Fund:  
Oops, the inventor is no longer with us.")} 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * The bank checks if it is really used by the customers 
     * @method needToMove 
     * 
     */ 
    @ScheduledMethod( 
        start = 3d, 
        interval = 1d, 
        shuffle = true 
    ) 
    public def needToMove() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (dblInterest > 0.0) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setIntNoInterestYears(0) 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            intNoInterestYears += 1 
 
        } 
        // This is a task. 
        Context context = FindContext("InnoEasy") 
        ContinuousSpace space = 
(ContinuousSpace)context.getProjection("Space") 
        if (blnDebugFund == true) {System.out.println("Fund: We had 
"+intNoInterestYears+" no interest years.")} 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (intNoInterestYears > 5) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            def counter = 0 
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            def tempXCoords = 0 
            def tempYCoords = 0 
            setIntNoInterestYears(0) 
 
            // This is a loop. 
            for (richie in (new ContinuousWithin(space, this, 
10).query())) { 
 
 
                // Make a decision. 
                if (richie instanceof Human) { 
 
 
                    // Make a decision. 
                    if (richie.dblSavings + richie.dblRiskProvision 
> 20) { 
 
                        // This is a task. 
                        NdPoint point = space.getLocation(richie) 
                        tempYCoords += point.getY() 
                        tempXCoords += point.getX() 
                        if (blnDebugFund == true) 
{System.out.println("I found a rich human and will move closer.")} 
                        counter ++ 
 
                    } else  { 
 
 
                    } 
 
                } else  { 
 
 
                } 
 
            } 
 
 
            // This is an agent decision. 
            if (counter > 0) { 
 
                // This is a task. 
                NdPoint point = space.getLocation(this) 
                def myY = point.getY() 
                def myX = point.getX() 
                if (blnDebugFund == true) 
{System.out.println("Fund: I'm moving.")} 
                // This is a task. 
                double newX=(myX + tempXCoords / counter) / 2 
                double newY=(myY + tempYCoords / counter) / 2 
                // This is a task. 
                MoveAgent("InnoEasy/Space", this, newX, newY) 
 
            } else  { 
 
 
            } 
 
        } else  { 
 
 
        } 
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        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This method provides a human-readable name for the agent. 
     * @method toString 
     * 
     */ 
    @ProbeID() 
    public String toString() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // Set the default agent identifier. 
        returnValue = this.agentID 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
 
} 
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7) File Invention.groovy 
 
/** 
 *  
 * This file was automatically generated by the Repast Simphony 
Agent Editor. 
 * Please see http://repast.sourceforge.net/ for details. 
 *  
 */ 
 
/** 
 * 
 * Set the package name. 
 * 
 */ 
package innoeasy 
 
/** 
 * 
 * Import the needed packages. 
 * 
 */ 
import java.io.* 
import java.math.* 
import java.util.* 
import javax.measure.unit.* 
import org.jscience.mathematics.number.* 
import org.jscience.mathematics.vector.* 
import org.jscience.physics.amount.* 
import repast.simphony.adaptation.neural.* 
import repast.simphony.adaptation.regression.* 
import repast.simphony.context.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.context.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.environment.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.schedule.* 
import repast.simphony.engine.watcher.* 
import repast.simphony.groovy.math.* 
import repast.simphony.integration.* 
import repast.simphony.matlab.link.* 
import repast.simphony.query.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.query.space.projection.* 
import repast.simphony.parameter.* 
import repast.simphony.random.* 
import repast.simphony.space.continuous.* 
import repast.simphony.space.gis.* 
import repast.simphony.space.graph.* 
import repast.simphony.space.grid.* 
import repast.simphony.space.projection.* 
import repast.simphony.ui.probe.* 
import repast.simphony.util.* 
import simphony.util.messages.* 
import static java.lang.Math.* 
import static repast.simphony.essentials.RepastEssentials.* 
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/** 
 * 
 * This is an agent. 
 * 
 */ 
public class Invention  { 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblRent 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Rent", usageName = "dblRent") 
    public double getDblRent() { 
        return dblRent 
    } 
    public void setDblRent(double newValue) { 
        dblRent = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblRent = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field dblCost 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Cost", usageName = "dblCost") 
    public double getDblCost() { 
        return dblCost 
    } 
    public void setDblCost(double newValue) { 
        dblCost = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblCost = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * The weight of an innovation decreases over time 
     * @field dblWeight 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Weight", usageName = "dblWeight") 
    public double getDblWeight() { 
        return dblWeight 
    } 
    public void setDblWeight(double newValue) { 
        dblWeight = newValue 
    } 
    public double dblWeight = 1 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnFailed 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "failed?", usageName = "blnFailed") 
    public boolean getBlnFailed() { 
        return blnFailed 
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    } 
    public void setBlnFailed(boolean newValue) { 
        blnFailed = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnFailed = false 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnSuccess 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Success?", usageName = "blnSuccess") 
    public boolean getBlnSuccess() { 
        return blnSuccess 
    } 
    public void setBlnSuccess(boolean newValue) { 
        blnSuccess = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnSuccess = false 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnFinanced 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Financed?", usageName = 
"blnFinanced") 
    public boolean getBlnFinanced() { 
        return blnFinanced 
    } 
    public void setBlnFinanced(boolean newValue) { 
        blnFinanced = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnFinanced = false 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnRent10 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Rent > 10", usageName = "blnRent10") 
    public int getBlnRent10() { 
        return blnRent10 
    } 
    public void setBlnRent10(int newValue) { 
        blnRent10 = newValue 
    } 
    public int blnRent10 = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnRent20 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Rent > 20", usageName = "blnRent20") 
    public int getBlnRent20() { 
        return blnRent20 
    } 
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    public void setBlnRent20(int newValue) { 
        blnRent20 = newValue 
    } 
    public int blnRent20 = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnRent30 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Rent > 30", usageName = "blnRent30") 
    public int getBlnRent30() { 
        return blnRent30 
    } 
    public void setBlnRent30(int newValue) { 
        blnRent30 = newValue 
    } 
    public int blnRent30 = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnRent40 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Rent > 40", usageName = "blnRent40") 
    public int getBlnRent40() { 
        return blnRent40 
    } 
    public void setBlnRent40(int newValue) { 
        blnRent40 = newValue 
    } 
    public int blnRent40 = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnRent50 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Rent > 50", usageName = "blnRent50") 
    public int getBlnRent50() { 
        return blnRent50 
    } 
    public void setBlnRent50(int newValue) { 
        blnRent50 = newValue 
    } 
    public int blnRent50 = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is an agent property. 
     * @field blnDeadInventor 
     * 
     */ 
    @Parameter (displayName = "Dead inventor", usageName = 
"blnDeadInventor") 
    public boolean getBlnDeadInventor() { 
        return blnDeadInventor 
    } 
    public void setBlnDeadInventor(boolean newValue) { 
 Source Code of the Model - File Invention.groovy  
A-107 
 
        blnDeadInventor = newValue 
    } 
    public boolean blnDeadInventor = 0 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is used to automatically generate agent 
identifiers. 
     * @field serialVersionUID 
     * 
     */ 
    private static final long serialVersionUID = 1L 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is used to automatically generate agent 
identifiers. 
     * @field agentIDCounter 
     * 
     */ 
    protected static long agentIDCounter = 1 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This value is the agent's identifier. 
     * @field agentID 
     * 
     */ 
    protected String agentID = "Invention " + (agentIDCounter++) 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method initialize 
     * 
     */ 
    public def initialize() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // This is a task. 
        RandomHelper.createPoisson(25) 
        setDblRent(RandomHelper.getPoisson().nextInt()) 
        setDblCost(RandomHelper.nextDoubleFromTo(dblRent/2, 
dblRent*2)) 
        setDblWeight(1) 
        // This is a task. 
        if (dblRent>15) {blnRent10 = 1; blnRent20 = 0; blnRent30 = 
0; blnRent40 = 0; blnRent50 = 0;} 
        if (dblRent>20) {blnRent10 = 0; blnRent20 = 1; blnRent30 = 
0; blnRent40 = 0; blnRent50 = 0;} 
        if (dblRent>25) {blnRent10 = 0; blnRent20 = 0; blnRent30 = 
1; blnRent40 = 0; blnRent50 = 0;} 
        if (dblRent>30) {blnRent10 = 0; blnRent20 = 0; blnRent30 = 
0; blnRent40 = 1; blnRent50 = 0;} 
        if (dblRent>35) {blnRent10 = 0; blnRent20 = 0; blnRent30 = 
0; blnRent40 = 0; blnRent50 = 1;} 
        // Return the results. 
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        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This is the step behavior. 
     * @method depreciate 
     * 
     */ 
    @ScheduledMethod( 
        start = 0d, 
        interval = 1d, 
        shuffle = true 
    ) 
    public def depreciate() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (dblWeight > 0) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setDblWeight(dblWeight - 0.05) 
            if (dblWeight <= 0.0) {dblWeight = 0.0} 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            setDblWeight(0) 
            checkForRemoval() 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This behavior is called by the Humans 
     * @method isInnovation 
     * 
     */ 
    public boolean isInnovation() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (blnSuccess == true) { 
 
            // This is a task. 
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            returnValue = true 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            returnValue = false 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * An invention with a weight of 0 and a dead inventor can be 
removed from the simulation in order to reduce the necessary 
computational power 
     * @method checkForRemoval 
     * 
     */ 
    public def checkForRemoval() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
 
        // This is an agent decision. 
        if (blnDeadInventor) { 
 
 
        } else  { 
 
            // This is a task. 
            Context c = RemoveAgentFromModel(this) 
 
        } 
        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
    /** 
     * 
     * This method provides a human-readable name for the agent. 
     * @method toString 
     * 
     */ 
    @ProbeID() 
    public String toString() { 
 
        // Define the return value variable. 
        def returnValue 
 
        // Note the simulation time. 
        def time = GetTickCountInTimeUnits() 
 
        // Set the default agent identifier. 
        returnValue = this.agentID 
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        // Return the results. 
        return returnValue 
 
    } 
 
 
} 
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Appendix B: Rules for the agents 
Generate 
Revenue 
Human (1) if human is neither retired nor unemployed nor 
too young to work then receive work income 
depending on health level 
(2) receive rent from innovations1 
(3) add or subtract interest payments 
(4) pay back credit from earlier period2 
Social Risk 
Provision 
Human (1) if  Revenue > Subsistence Minimum then pay 
percentage of contribution required 
(2) if  Revenue < Subsistence Minimum then receive 
difference from social insurance 
Individual 
Risk Provision 
Human (1) if Revenue > Subsistence Minimum then  
a. if satisfied with returns then pay money into 
one’s own provision stock according to risk 
aversion and time preference. 
b. if dissatisfied with return then move entire 
provision stock to different bank and pay 
money into one’s own provision stock 
according to risk aversion and time 
preference. 
(2) if Revenue < Subsistence Minimum then  
a. take money from the risk provision stock 
and from other savings if necessary to add 
up to the Subsistence Minimum 
b. if Money left Available < Subsistence 
Minimum then try to get a credit from the 
financial market 
c. if no credit available then die of starvation 
(3) deduce subsistence minimum in all cases unless 
death 
Save or 
Consume 
Human (1) compute savings ratio by varying average 
consumption ratio with 
a. amount of savings relative to revenue (+) 
b. time preference (+) and  
c. offered interest rate (-) 
(2) compute amount consumed from amount 
available 
(3) if remaining amount > 0 then place remaining 
amount in savings account and find bank to invest 
money 
(4) else look for bank to lend the money 
  
                                                          
1
 This is accomplished by the innovation itself. The rule “Generate Revenue” will call the rule “Pay rent” in 
each invention connected to the individual. 
2
 The credit has to be paid back directly so that the savings accounts can be balanced. Otherwise we could 
have the problem, that a bank could go out of business because it lacks the funds to pay out the savings 
invested. If a credit cannot be repaid then the amount is deducted from all the savings. Since the savings have 
been put in the period before, this is always in balance or positive thanks to the interest difference that the 
bank receives. 
 Rules for the agents - File Invention.groovy 
A-112 
 
Innovate Human (1) Compute invention propensity according to her 
education, work experience, innovation 
experience, network stimuli, her happiness, 
merit goods,  her tinkerer propensity and her 
risk aversion 
(2) if an invention is made then compute financing 
propensity according to her wealth and the cost 
of the innovation 
a. if willing to finance then compute risk 
propensity according to risk aversion, risks 
privately borne and innovation experience 
i. if willing to risk then carry out 
innovation 
1. if successful then add 
innovation to portfolio 
UpdateVariables Human (1) Set new values for age, health, risk aversion, 
experience 
(2) if age is above DeathAge then be reborn 
(3) Update environmental influences 
a. friends network 
b. financing of inventions 
(4) if we are in the governmental model then set 
voting behavior 
Calculate 
Contribution 
Public 
Sector 
(1) Compare the payments to the receipts from 
contributions 
(2) if all payments are covered then record good 
year 
a. if receipts are more than twice the 
payments then record excessive year 
(3) else if payments are larger than receipts then 
record bad year 
(4) if there were four bad periods in a row then 
raise percentage of contribution 
(5) if there were four excessive periods or ten good 
or excessive periods in a row then lower 
percentage of contribution 
Set Subsistence 
Minimum 
Public 
Sector 
(1) if we are in an election period then find the 
median voter 
a. if median voter wants more social 
insurance then increase subsistence 
minimum by 10% 
b. if median voter wants less social insurance 
then lower subsistence minimum by 10% 
Award credit Bank (1) Consider the credit request from Human agent 
(2) Award credit to the individual if money 
available 
Calculate 
interest rate 
Bank (1) if money requested > money saved then increase 
rate 
(2) else lower rate by 1% but not below 0% 
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Invest Money 
 
Fund 
 
(1) Considering all unfinanced inventions, find the 
most attractive one 
(2) finance the innovation 
(3) repeat as long as there are funds available 
Calculate 
interest rate 
Fund (1) keep half of the rent from innovations to 
increase capital stock 
(2) set interest rate as return from left over rent 
from innovations to money invested at fund 
Relocate Fund (1) analyze new interest rate offer to see if it has 
been a good year 
(2) if it has been the fifth consecutive year without 
return then look out as far as vision permits 
(3) considering all Humans, move closer to 
wealthy Humans 
Is Successful Fund (1) analyze capital stock to see if it is negative 
showing a potentially dangerous drain of 
resources 
(2) if it has been the fifteenth consecutive year with 
a negative capital stock then close fund 
Depreciate Invention (1) reduce weight by five percentage points 
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Appendix C: Verification of the runs 
1) Public Sector Agent 
This is an exemplary message which the Public Sector agent may return during the course 
of one year. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (false) or less (true) welfare. 
State: This citizen wants more (true) or less (false) welfare. 
State: Since we have 28 people who like the risk, we lowered the 
subsistence minimum to 7.2. 
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State: The receipts of 608.2934771105091 are much higher than the 
expenses of 184.54069347894568, so we record the 3th excessive year 
and the 3th good year in a row. 
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2) Fund agent 
This is an exemplary message which a Fund agent may return during the course of one 
year. 
Fund: The new interest rate is 0.12131576934303498 since we 
administered 1633.3408350212649 EUR from investors and received a 
rent of 396.29999999999984. 
Fund: We just increased the capital stock by last year's inno rent 
of 396.29999999999984 and lowered it by the interest payments of 
198.1499999999997 to an amount of 2743.9004223935776. 
Fund: Ok, so I get 357.5999999999998 EUR from my innovations and 
the interest payments were 0.0. 
Fund: I just want to make sure, we'll get the right ones. This 
invention's finance status is false and its rent/cost ratio is 
1.0437548606235647 with a cost of 23.951984266750515 and a rent of 
25.0. 
Fund:  we'll finance the invention. Let's see if it works. 
Fund: We have just financed a new invention which costs 
23.951984266750515 from the capital stock which has now left 
4353.28927314809. So, in total, we have now invested 
3002.880054414971. 
Fund: Unfortunately, the invention failed. 
Fund: I just want to make sure, we'll get the right ones. This 
invention's finance status is false and its rent/cost ratio is 
0.9898436283139894 with a cost of 30.307817459106445 and a rent of 
30.0. 
Fund:  we'll finance the invention. Let's see if it works. 
Fund: We have just financed a new invention which costs 
30.307817459106445 from the capital stock which has now left 
4322.981455688983. So, in total, we have now invested 
3033.1878718740772. 
Fund: Unfortunately, the invention failed. 
Fund: I just want to make sure, we'll get the right ones. This 
invention's finance status is false and its rent/cost ratio is 
0.9871498118632411 with a cost of 26.338454090291634 and a rent of 
26.0. 
Fund:  we'll finance the invention. Let's see if it works. 
Fund: We have just financed a new invention which costs 
26.338454090291634 from the capital stock which has now left 
4296.643001598692. So, in total, we have now invested 
3059.526325964369. 
Fund: Great, the invention turned out to be an innovation. 
Fund: I just want to make sure, we'll get the right ones. This 
invention's finance status is false and its rent/cost ratio is 
0.9821820059959481 with a cost of 17.30840098496992 and a rent of 
17.0. 
Fund:  we'll finance the invention. Let's see if it works. 
Fund: We have just financed a new invention which costs 
17.30840098496992 from the capital stock which has now left 
4279.334600613722. So, in total, we have now invested 
3076.834726949339. 
Fund: Great, the invention turned out to be an innovation. 
Fund: I just want to make sure, we'll get the right ones. This 
invention's finance status is false and its rent/cost ratio is 
0.8151471730465409 with a cost of 30.669308349024504 and a rent of 
25.0. 
Fund:  we'll finance the invention. Let's see if it works. 
Fund: We have just financed a new invention which costs 
30.669308349024504 from the capital stock which has now left 
4248.665292264697. So, in total, we have now invested 
3107.5040352983633. 
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Fund: Unfortunately, the invention failed. 
Fund: I just want to make sure, we'll get the right ones. This 
invention's finance status is false and its rent/cost ratio is 
0.5823391310553426 with a cost of 49.79916075267829 and a rent of 
29.0. 
Fund:  we'll finance the invention. Let's see if it works. 
Fund: We have just financed a new invention which costs 
49.79916075267829 from the capital stock which has now left 
4198.866131512019. So, in total, we have now invested 
3157.3031960510416. 
Fund: Unfortunately, the invention failed. 
Fund: I just want to make sure, we'll get the right ones. This 
invention's finance status is false and its rent/cost ratio is 
0.5677447924108948 with a cost of 45.79522409988567 and a rent of 
26.0. 
Fund:  we'll finance the invention. Let's see if it works. 
Fund: We have just financed a new invention which costs 
45.79522409988567 from the capital stock which has now left 
4153.070907412133. So, in total, we have now invested 
3203.0984201509273. 
Fund: Great, the invention turned out to be an innovation. 
Fund: I just want to make sure, we'll get the right ones. This 
invention's finance status is false and its rent/cost ratio is 
0.5314233738962361 with a cost of 60.21564269065857 and a rent of 
32.0. 
Fund:  we'll finance the invention. Let's see if it works. 
Fund: We have just financed a new invention which costs 
60.21564269065857 from the capital stock which has now left 
4092.8552647214747. So, in total, we have now invested 
3263.314062841586. 
Fund: Unfortunately, the invention failed. 
Fund: I just want to make sure, we'll get the right ones. This 
invention's finance status is false and its rent/cost ratio is 
0.506095544728359 with a cost of 33.59049526730087 and a rent of 
17.0. 
Fund:  we'll finance the invention. Let's see if it works. 
Fund: We have just financed a new invention which costs 
33.59049526730087 from the capital stock which has now left 
4059.264769454174. So, in total, we have now invested 
3296.9045581088867. 
Fund: Great, the invention turned out to be an innovation. 
Fund: We had 0 no interest years. 
Fund: We had 0 negative years. 
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3) Human agent 
This is an exemplary message which a Human agent may return during the course of a 
year. 
We'll start a new year, I'm updating my variables 
My friends do have an effect on me. But to start with, I have a 
risk aversion of 4, a time preference of 3 and my happiness is 
61.0. 
This friend has a risk aversion of 5, a time preference of 7 and 
interests of 0.0 and 0.0. 
This friend has a risk aversion of 5, a time preference of 4 and 
interests of 0.0 and 0.0. 
This friend has a risk aversion of 1, a time preference of 3 and 
interests of 0.0 and 0.0. 
This friend has a risk aversion of 6, a time preference of 3 and 
interests of 0.0 and 0.0. 
This friend has a risk aversion of 6, a time preference of 7 and 
interests of 0.0 and 0.0. 
My friends did have an effect on me. Now I have a risk aversion of 
4, a time preference of 3 and my happiness is 58.0. 
I'll see what revenue I can generate 
I'm employed! 
I'm working! 
I'm working, I'll get an income of 29.37 
And I get the rent from my innovations 
Ok, so in total I get 0 EUR from my innovations. 
I received 0.23412115199144307 EUR interest from my fund. 
Furthermore, I get interest: From my bank, it's 0.0 and from my 
fund it's 0.23412115199144307 
I received or paid 0.41249547965838435 EUR interest from or to my 
bank corresponding to an invested amount of 8.88073216532618. 
Furthermore, I get interest: From my bank, it's 0.41249547965838435 
and from my fund it's 0.0 
I had no credit and just keep my savings account. 
Ok, and I just repaid my credit 
I have to look for my risk 
Let's go for individual risk provision 
Ok, I just emptied my bank account 
Ok, I just deleted my savings or risk provision account 
I just deleted my bank account 
Here's a fund with 3.0071183065883815% interest...count for 
average. 
Here's a bank with 5.8401467038784185% interest...count for average 
Here's a bank with 4.644836393883453% interest...count for average 
Here's a bank with 4.110504244221374% interest...count for average 
The interest gap between funds and banks I can see is -
1.8580441407393666%. 
I will invest my risk provision at a bank because the interest gap 
(-1.8580441407393666) is smaller than my risk aversion coefficient: 
8. 
Ok, so I found a new bank and will save my money here 
I just saved 4.8436556589629625 in my bank account. 
I had enough money for the subsistence minimum and I put 0.22 % as 
savings into my account, that's 4.8436556589629625 EUR. Now I have 
17.172960972686866 EUR left over for saving and consuming. 
Now, I'll save or consume! 
Here's a fund with 3.0071183065883815% interest...count for 
average. 
Here's a bank with 5.8401467038784185% interest...count for average 
Here's a bank with 4.644836393883453% interest...count for average 
Here's a bank with 4.110504244221374% interest...count for average 
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To calculate my consumption ratio, I take the interest offers from 
funds 0.030071183065883817 and from banks 0.058651624473277486 and 
the time preference 3 (as -0.04 into account. 
My savings are 7.78556505337686 and I still have 
17.172960972686866. Hey, I'd like to consume 81.41304981911345% of 
the amount of money I still have. 
I just consumed 13.981031272110469 and so left over money is 
3.191929700576397 
I'm saving the left over money 
Well, I'm out of all my investments 
I just deleted my savings or my provision account 
I just deleted my investment account 
Here's a fund with 3.0071183065883815% interest...count for 
average. 
Here's a bank with 5.8401467038784185% interest...count for average 
Here's a bank with 4.644836393883453% interest...count for average 
Here's a bank with 4.110504244221374% interest...count for average 
The interest gap between funds and banks I can see is -
1.8580441407393666%. 
I will invest my savings at a fund because the interest gap (-
1.8580441407393666) is greater than my risk aversion coefficient: -
4. 
Ok, so I found a new fund and will invest my money here 
I just invested 3.191929700576397 in my fund. 
I have been saving money which I didn't consume 
My risk aversion is 4 and accordingly, the risk Influence is 1.96. 
I invented something. My invention propensity was 68.404. 
I couldn't finance the invention. My finance propensity was -
33.37415202701445. 
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Appendix D: Analysis of the different runs 
1) Run 1: Default values 
 
 
Individual 
Model 
Governmental 
Model 
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of inventions 
   
  
invent-
individual 
invent-
governmental 
Mean 657.65 714.73 
Variance 7592.957071 7488.562727 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.513747675 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
6.665382365 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 7.55158E-10 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 1.51032E-09 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of innovations 
   
  
inno-
individual 
inno-
governmental 
Mean 272.48 325.17 
Variance 23935.90869 18856.38495 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.303317286 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
3.046916276 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.001482019 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.002964039 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
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t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Ratio of innovations from inventions 
     ratio ratio 
Mean 0.400151169 0.451448675 
Variance 0.047096872 0.032142234 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.252298599 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat -2.10111391 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.019085329 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.038170657 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean 
Mean 
income 
 
     mean inc mean inc (a) 
Mean 31.15618511 37.51908206 
Variance 130.307857 43.67698643 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.393355459 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
5.942896197 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 2.0991E-08 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 4.1982E-08 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
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t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean standard deviation 
     mean sd mean sd (a) 
Mean 48.22591291 31.96204167 
Variance 62.02009072 74.89395084 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.263020092 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 16.17815623 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 7.46973E-30 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 1.49395E-29 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean risk aversion 
     mean r_a mean r_a 
Mean 6.110927869 6.030619672 
Variance 0.556969204 0.52048781 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.541343491 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 1.142008178 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.128102604 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.256205209 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
 
 
  
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 2: Without merit goods   
A-123 
 
2) Run 2: Without merit goods 
 
 
Individual 
Model 
Governmental 
Model 
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Inventions 
     invent invent 
Mean 658.47 693.35 
Variance 7607.928384 6604.714646 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.508490003 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat -4.16786126 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 3.29476E-05 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 6.58953E-05 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Innovations 
     inno inno 
Mean 272.81 284.6 
Variance 23951.20596 22652.06061 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.112710028 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
0.579778518 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.281690558 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.563381116 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 2: Without merit goods 
A-124 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean 
Ratio of innovations from 
inventions 
     ratio ratio 
Mean 0.400053511 0.409576287 
Variance 0.047028054 0.043895455 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.054380356 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
0.324757981 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.373024747 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.746049495 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean income 
     mean inc mean inc (a) 
Mean 31.13013733 36.10223009 
Variance 130.3801956 47.58457219 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.214384198 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat -4.14064555 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 3.64588E-05 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 7.29175E-05 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 2: Without merit goods   
A-125 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean standard deviation 
     mean sd mean sd (a) 
Mean 48.14648419 30.41069296 
Variance 63.77418895 82.24164091 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.181881513 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 16.21269354 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 6.40462E-30 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 1.28092E-29 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean risk aversion 
     mean r_a mean r_a 
Mean 6.110904918 6.126085246 
Variance 0.543885991 0.41789418 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.404878782 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
0.200065025 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.420920058 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.841840117 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
 
 
  
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 3: Low subsistence minimum 
A-126 
 
3) Run 3: Low subsistence minimum 
 
 
Individual 
Model 
Governmental 
Model 
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Inventions 
     invent invent 
Mean 653.46 728.02 
Variance 6600.190303 6087.898586 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.644987975 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
11.10106891 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 2.20544E-19 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 4.41087E-19 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Innovations 
     inno inno 
Mean 277.98 325.76 
Variance 17215.79758 21841.96202 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.133548415 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
2.595881466 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.005434822 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.010869643 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 3: Low subsistence minimum   
A-127 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean 
Ratio of innovations from 
inventions 
     ratio ratio 
Mean 0.421830026 0.445181951 
Variance 0.034823272 0.037413784 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.072337534 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat -0.90206281 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.184606475 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.36921295 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean income 
     mean inc mean inc (a) 
Mean 33.96177355 34.85029574 
Variance 59.07253169 54.11252349 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.265231328 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
0.974143943 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.166179662 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.332359323 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 3: Low subsistence minimum 
A-128 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean standard deviation 
     mean sd mean sd (a) 
Mean 36.85520415 33.49294513 
Variance 81.30638178 71.28777952 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.107074442 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 2.880039251 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.002437069 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.004874138 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean risk aversion 
     mean r_a mean r_a 
Mean 6.120029508 6.0004 
Variance 0.537268815 0.526192897 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.443117212 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 1.55448351 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.061630122 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.123260245 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
 
  
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 4: High subsistence minimum   
A-129 
 
4) Run 4: High subsistence minimum 
 
 
Individual 
Model 
Governmental 
Model 
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Inventions 
     invent invent 
Mean 651.28 723.35 
Variance 7252.122828 6865.118687 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.547849437 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
9.018601613 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 7.54691E-15 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 1.50938E-14 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Innovations 
     inno inno 
Mean 281.86 316.9 
Variance 18875.67717 21230.13131 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.229688907 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
1.993038746 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.024504732 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.049009465 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 4: High subsistence minimum 
A-130 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean 
Ratio of innovations from 
inventions 
     ratio ratio 
Mean 0.421706671 0.434697227 
Variance 0.036705059 0.035477689 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.19549833 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
0.539063527 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.295526618 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.591053236 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean income 
     mean inc mean inc (a) 
Mean 24.62070296 38.90796819 
Variance 159.0017223 47.97436629 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.28956753 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
11.42450063 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 4.4133E-20 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 8.8266E-20 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 4: High subsistence minimum   
A-131 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean standard deviation 
     mean sd mean sd (a) 
Mean 65.13009529 31.8040236 
Variance 508.6517448 70.14700749 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.126711912 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 14.4632519 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 1.87004E-26 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 3.74008E-26 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean risk aversion 
     mean r_a mean r_a 
Mean 6.186537705 6.101845902 
Variance 0.540587306 0.427613304 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.447828275 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 1.155106213 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.125413666 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.250827332 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
 
  
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 1 vs. Run 3 in the Governmental Model 
A-132 
 
5) Run 1 vs. Run 3 in the Governmental Model 
 
 
Run 1 Run 3 
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Inventions 
     invent invent 
Mean 714.73 728.02 
Variance 7488.562727 6087.898586 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.655508025 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
1.933518827 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.028014305 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.05602861 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Innovations 
     inno inno 
Mean 325.17 325.76 
Variance 18856.38495 21841.96202 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.491584458 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
0.040962763 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.48370404 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.967408079 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 1 vs. Run 3 in the Governmental Model   
A-133 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean 
Ratio of innovations from 
inventions 
     ratio ratio 
Mean 0.451448675 0.445181951 
Variance 0.032142234 0.037413784 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.446001729 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 0.318872332 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.375247561 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.750495121 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean income 
     mean inc (a) mean inc (a) 
Mean 37.51908206 34.85029574 
Variance 43.67698643 54.11252349 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.578385688 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 4.140145341 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 3.65265E-05 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 7.30531E-05 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 1 vs. Run 3 in the Governmental Model 
A-134 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean standard deviation 
     mean sd (a) mean sd (a) 
Mean 31.96204167 33.49294513 
Variance 74.89395084 71.28777952 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.437492516 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
1.688051578 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.047274639 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.094549278 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean risk aversion 
     mean r_a mean r_a 
Mean 6.030619672 6.0004 
Variance 0.52048781 0.526192897 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.541398094 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 0.436175133 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.33182968 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.66365936 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 1 vs. Run 3 in the Governmental Model   
A-135 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean subsistence minimum 
     mean s_m mean s_m 
Mean 8.633723825 4.286393017 
Variance 0.49389612 0.048023597 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.282382032 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 64.45328753 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 5.8801E-83 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 1.17602E-82 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean contribution social services 
   
  
mean 
contrib mean contrib 
Mean 0.121967213 0.084481967 
Variance 0.001238086 0.000595522 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.530764304 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 12.34437766 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 4.73372E-22 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 9.46744E-22 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
 
  
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 1 vs. Run 4 in the Governmental Model 
A-136 
 
6) Run 1 vs. Run 4 in the Governmental Model 
 
 
Run 1 Run 4 
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Inventions 
     invent invent 
Mean 714.73 723.35 
Variance 7488.562727 6865.118687 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.752620205 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
1.444511268 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.07587639 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.151752781 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Innovations 
     inno inno 
Mean 325.17 316.9 
Variance 18856.38495 21230.13131 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.634699282 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 0.68237018 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.248299214 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.496598427 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 1 vs. Run 4 in the Governmental Model   
A-137 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean 
Ratio of innovations from 
inventions 
     ratio ratio 
Mean 0.451448675 0.434697227 
Variance 0.032142234 0.035477689 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.635767189 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 1.06626359 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.144448972 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.288897943 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean income 
     mean inc (a) mean inc (a) 
Mean 37.51908206 38.90796819 
Variance 43.67698643 47.97436629 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.694896166 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
2.623192084 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.005044246 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.010088492 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 1 vs. Run 4 in the Governmental Model 
A-138 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean standard deviation 
     mean sd (a) mean sd (a) 
Mean 31.96204167 31.8040236 
Variance 74.89395084 70.14700749 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.606498697 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 0.209078371 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.417408332 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.834816665 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean risk aversion 
     mean r_a mean r_a 
Mean 6.030619672 6.101845902 
Variance 0.52048781 0.427613304 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.663653608 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
1.255359999 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.10615157 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.212303141 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 1 vs. Run 4 in the Governmental Model   
A-139 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean subsistence minimum 
     mean s_m mean s_m 
Mean 8.633723825 9.249894799 
Variance 0.49389612 0.909216668 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.588946152 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
7.864894552 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 2.33405E-12 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 4.6681E-12 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean contribution social services 
   
  
mean 
contrib mean contrib 
Mean 0.121967213 0.142068852 
Variance 0.001238086 0.001507955 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.639091259 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
6.358077802 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 3.16175E-09 
 t Critical one-tail 1.660391157 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 6.32351E-09 
 t Critical two-tail 1.9842169   
 
 
  
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 5: Easier access to inventions 
A-140 
 
7) Run 5: Easier access to inventions 
 
 
Individual 
Model 
Governmental 
Model 
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Inventions 
     invent invent 
Mean 1351.21 1396.79 
Variance 6234.692828 7904.793838 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.54816922 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
5.678494331 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 6.81179E-08 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 1.36236E-07 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Innovations 
     inno inno 
Mean 655.31 691.76 
Variance 26986.17566 24767.09333 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.269306148 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
1.874076522 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.031934336 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.063868672 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 5: Easier access to inventions   
A-141 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean 
Ratio of innovations from 
inventions 
     ratio ratio 
Mean 0.482570084 0.494016283 
Variance 0.013372504 0.010603993 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.209920476 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
0.830897505 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.204015484 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.408030967 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean income 
     mean inc mean inc (a) 
Mean 58.05274053 56.66447212 
Variance 163.8999285 84.69281221 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.344910209 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 1.073248857 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.142884284 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.285768569 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 5: Easier access to inventions 
A-142 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean standard deviation 
     mean sd mean sd (a) 
Mean 59.3383171 48.34254543 
Variance 68.7312029 116.5257469 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.236630635 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 9.198230617 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 3.06699E-15 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 6.13399E-15 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean risk aversion 
     mean r_a mean r_a 
Mean 5.491557377 5.588245902 
Variance 0.614345824 0.644567883 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.429541157 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
1.140821447 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.128348226 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.256696452 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
 
 
  
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 6: more difficult access to inventions   
A-143 
 
8) Run 6: more difficult access to inventions 
 
 
Individual 
Model 
Governmental 
Model 
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Inventions 
     invent invent 
Mean 241.81 312.3 
Variance 3503.81202 3443.020202 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.653440205 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
14.36578424 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 2.94901E-26 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 5.89802E-26 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Amount of Innovations 
     inno inno 
Mean 46.78 87.36 
Variance 5311.304646 7978.778182 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.267193831 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
4.096834253 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 4.2877E-05 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 8.57539E-05 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 6: more difficult access to inventions 
A-144 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean 
Ratio of innovations from 
inventions 
     ratio ratio 
Mean 0.166554393 0.266651217 
Variance 0.062128375 0.069293703 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.234718683 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
3.155560683 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.001061165 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00212233 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean income 
     mean inc mean inc (a) 
Mean 15.6787844 27.45444365 
Variance 28.98094995 14.59929373 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.440888821 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
23.34557876 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 2.40446E-42 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 4.80892E-42 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 6: more difficult access to inventions   
A-145 
 
t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean standard deviation 
     mean sd mean sd (a) 
Mean 40.86485021 20.66804179 
Variance 27.96403037 37.44551644 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.353245412 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 30.9630234 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 5.02009E-53 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 1.00402E-52 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for Mean Mean risk aversion 
     mean r_a mean r_a 
Mean 6.525836066 6.414829508 
Variance 0.511485104 0.388354191 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.739245011 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 2.261700006 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.012951384 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.025902769 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
 
 
  
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 7: lower risk provision 
A-146 
 
9) Run 7: lower risk provision 
 
 
Individual 
Model 
Governmental 
Model 
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for 
Mean Amount of Inventions 
     invent invent 
Mean 662.93 720.76 
Variance 5916.510202 6261.275152 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.499395817 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
7.405169181 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 2.20312E-11 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 4.40625E-11 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for 
Mean Amount of Innovations 
     inno inno 
Mean 281.51 337.67 
Variance 18629.16152 14858.42535 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.325644442 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
3.731426102 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000158887 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000317773 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 7: lower risk provision   
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t-test: Paired Two Sample for 
Mean 
Ratio of innovations from 
inventions 
     ratio ratio 
Mean 0.416131893 0.467343436 
Variance 0.036033352 0.024833434 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.246000256 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 
t Stat 
-
2.383887331 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.009518641 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.019037282 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for 
Mean Mean income 
     mean inc mean inc (a) 
Mean 24.50103169 39.05222451 
Variance 1626.775274 37.26195427 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.033971289 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat -3.58518031 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.000262501 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000525002 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
     
 Analysis of the different runs - Run 7: lower risk provision 
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t-test: Paired Two Sample for 
Mean Mean standard deviation 
     mean sd mean sd (a) 
Mean 55.462924 33.49061991 
Variance 811.0425181 65.54172572 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.099854501 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 7.624219805 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 7.58883E-12 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 1.51777E-11 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
   
   
   t-test: Paired Two Sample for 
Mean Mean risk aversion 
     mean r_a mean r_a 
Mean 6.174560656 6.048540984 
Variance 0.444739623 0.543838057 
Observations 100 100 
Pearson Correlation 0.575437725 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 99 
 t Stat 1.938584799 
 P(T<=t) one-tail 0.027699888 
 t Critical one-tail 2.364605852 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.055399777 
 t Critical two-tail 2.62640545   
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